An effective digital image watermarking scheme incorporating DCT, DFT and SVD transformations

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PeerJ Computer Science

Introduction

Extensive and rapid growth of internet based applications and communication technologies have increased vulnerabilities in authenticity, privacy and copyright issues of digital products and addressing these vulnerability issues are prime challenges in cyber space communication applications (Shih, 2017). Transmitted digital data face digital flaws and maltreatment when copied or forged illegally by violating copyrights (Nematollahi, Vorakulpipat & Rosales, 2017). Digital image watermarking deals with attaching visible/invisible watermark images as authentication identities in the owner’s documents (carrier image) for identifying the owner, verifying the authenticity and integrity of the carrier images (Nematollahi, Vorakulpipat & Rosales, 2017). These digital watermarks attached in the owner’s document as metadata are used as the prime forensic information source for tracing copyright violations (Nematollahi, Vorakulpipat & Rosales, 2017; Garg & Rama Kishore, 2020). Digital watermarking techniques are also used for enhancing security in the fields of broadcast monitoring, fingerprinting, indexing, medical imaging etc. Intruders/natural processing operations may damage watermarked images leading to removal, detection, overwriting or modification of watermark contents during transmission/unauthorized access. The watermarking methods that attach watermark contents directly to the bits of carrier image can have failures in protecting watermark contents during watermark inversion and other potential attacks necessitating frequency based watermarking approaches that are resistive to potential attacks.

The watermarking techniques are classified in to blind, semi-blind and non-blind approaches according to the additional information needed for reconstructing watermark images with the embedded contents. The full blind watermarking techniques do not need additional information to reconstruct the watermark. The semi-blind schemes require decoding watermark key to recover watermark image. The non-blind approaches require ample amount of original image contents to reconstruct the original watermark from extracted watermark components and it enforces possession of these additional information important in determining the proof of ownership. Hence these methods prevent intruders from recovering the watermark due to non-possession of owner’s private additional information. Additionally, the non-blind approaches as it holds much of the information contents of the watermark as owners proof to recover the watermark, these methods require very less embedding contents in the carrier image when compared to blind schemes that require complete information of the watermarks. This added advantages of non-blind algorithms over blind schemes makes the non-blind schemes produce more appealing watermarked images with better robustness than blind schemes.

The article presents a new non-blind watermarking algorithm by utilizing advantages of discrete Fourier (DFT), discrete cosine (DCT) and singular value decomposition (SVD) transforms while attaching secret contents in cover images. The article is presented in five sections. Section 2 makes the literature survey of the field. Section 3 discusses new watermarking scheme while section 4 makes experimental analysis of the algorithm. Conclusions with future scope are done in section 5.

Literature survey

Digital image watermarking schemes are widely categorized in to spatial and frequency approaches based on how watermarks are attached to the carrier images (Singh et al., 2017). Since spatial domain techniques attach digital watermark contents directly to the carrier image bits, these methods suffer severely when attacked in terms of watermark inversion and other potential attacks. Hence many frequency domains based algorithms (Wang et al., 2020; Hussain, Razak & Varghese, 2019) are developed using the frequency transformations such as DCT, Radon transform, DFT, Hadamard transform, discrete wavelet transform (DWT), Z-transform, Arnold transform and SVD for mixing carrier and watermark frequencies (Hussain, Razak & Varghese, 2019). Separating different frequencies by these frequency transformations help frequency domain methods to correctly identify and mix appropriate frequency spectrum for attaching watermark contents so that the resultant watermarked image shows better robustness against momentous potential attacks (Hussain, Razak & Varghese, 2019; Nematollahi, Vorakulpipat & Rosales, 2017).

Qin et al. (2017) proposed a least significant bit (LSB) based block-wise tampering localization and pixel-wise recovery for watermarking. But the algorithm is computationally complex and suffers severely with potential attacks since LSBs are the most sensitive bits to potential attacks. Makbol et al. (2017) addressed false positive problem (FPP) by incorporating integer wavelet transform (IWT) and secret keys. However, the algorithm uses computationally inefficient multi-objective ant colony optimization technique for optimizing its parameters. Lei et al. (2018) introduced a watermarking algorithm incorporating quantization index modulation (QIM) to address scaling based potential attacks. Roy & Pal (2018) incorporated redundant discrete wavelet transform (RDWT) with SVD to propose color image watermarking algorithm but the reconstructed watermarked image suffers blocky and patchy effects due to non-overlapping block based processing. Su & Chen (2018) attached watermark components in spatial domain. Liu, Pan & Song (2017) combined fractal coding and DCT methods for enforcing security in their DCT based watermark scheme but the algorithm suffers the limitations of DCT in protecting watermark contents from geometrical potential attacks.

In many frequency domain methods (Garg & Rama Kishore, 2020; Dixit & Dixit, 2017; Kang et al., 2018; Yadav, Kumar & Kumar, 2018; Li et al., 2018; Kaur, Gupta & Singh, 2019; Ali et al., 2015; Zheng et al., 2018; Nguyen, Chang & Yang, 2016), SVD is used in combination with other frequency transformations to provide better quality watermarked images with high robustness towards external potential attacks due to SVD’s simplicity, compactness and geometrical invariance properties (Shih, 2017; Nematollahi, Vorakulpipat & Rosales, 2017; Dixit & Dixit, 2017). Kang et al. (2018) introduced a watermarking algorithm in DCT, SVD and DWT domains by attaching watermark components in specific middle frequencies. However, the algorithm failed in reproducing valuable watermarks when potential attacks affect middle frequency components. Yadav, Kumar & Kumar (2018) attached watermark components in the third level frequency components of DWT. Since this scheme attaches watermark components only in low pass frequencies of first and second levels of DWT, the algorithm could not provide better robustness against attacks that corrupt low frequencies. Li et al. (2018) incorporated Hadamard transform and Schur decomposition. Kaur, Gupta & Singh (2019) attached watermark singular values in the singular value contents of DWT coefficients of the HH components of carrier image. Ali et al. (2015) incorporated artificial bee colony algorithm for selecting suitable non-overlapping blocks for attaching watermark components in wavelet domain. Zheng et al. (2018) used convolution neural network (CNN) to attach watermarks in DWT and SVD domains. However, the algorithm is computationally inefficient due to CNN optimization process with many hidden layers. Nguyen, Chang & Yang (2016) attached the watermark in second level low frequency area of DWT coefficients. Mokashi et al. (2022) used DWT-DCT-SVD transforms to attach watermark images. But the algorithm fails to retrieve correct watermark when potential attacks affect low-frequency sub-bands. These limitations of embedding single copy watermark in specific frequencies, paved way for later algorithms (Emir & Eskicioglu, 2004; Alexander, Scott & Ahmet, 2006; Run et al., 2012; Justin et al., 2016) to attach more copies of watermarks in various carrier frequencies. Hence the algorithms that embed watermark replicas in various carrier frequencies show improved robustness against external potential attacks as these algorithms have more possibility for protecting some watermark replicas although the potential attacks may damage other replicas attached in other carrier image frequencies.

Exploiting the combined merits of SVD and DWT transforms, Emir & Eskicioglu (2004) attached four copies of watermark singular values in the Haar DWT sub-bands. This algorithm produces flaws in watermarked images since it fails to spread the frequencies by applying frequency transformation to the watermark contents before attaching it to the carrier frequencies. Also the problems of DWT in handling JPEG and geometrical attacks produce distortions in its extracted watermarks. Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006) attempted to address these limitations by incorporating DCT with SVD, but the algorithm could not provide ample robustness due to the limitations of DCT in handling specific potential attacks. Run et al. (2012) attached principal components of watermarks with the carrier singular values but the algorithm has numerous flaws due to the sensitiveness of principal components towards potential attacks. As an improvement of Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006) and Emir & Eskicioglu (2004) algorithms, our previous work (Justin et al., 2016) incorporated DFT and SVD transforms in its watermarking scheme. The algorithm embedded four replicas of watermark singular value components respectively to the singular values corresponding to all the four frequency sub-images. Though this method performs better with majority of potential attacks, but could not provide stability in its performance to provide valid watermarks for all attacks including noise and cropping based attacks. Although these algorithms address some problems of image watermarking, could not simultaneously address all requirements of image watermarking such as capacity, imperceptibility, computational efficiency and robustness against all potential attacks (Shih, 2017; Nematollahi, Vorakulpipat & Rosales, 2017).

In the domain of watermarking, the watermarking techniques incorporating DWT shows better multi-resolution analysis but fails in protecting watermark contents when the carrier image is attacked with JPEG and noise (Poljicak, Mandic & Agic, 2011; Justin et al., 2015). Since DCT is highly used in JPEG image compression standards, it shows good robustness when the watermarked image is subject to lossy compression or in the case of other practical applications on the internet. The watermark contents attached in high frequency bands are damaged as good amount of high frequency coefficients are quantized to zero during JPEG compression. Though DCT show resistance against most of the geometrical attacks, it is highly sensitive to noise and filtering. Since there is a sudden compaction of energy in low frequency area in the top-left pixel of the block of DCT, it is hard to select the suitable middle frequency components of the carrier image for attaching the watermark components. DFT has strong energy compaction with rotation, scaling and translation invariance properties but could not offer comparative resistance in case of noise and cropping based attacks (Poljicak, Mandic & Agic, 2011). It is observed that these transforms though could individually offer better resistance towards some types of potential attacks, fails severely to resist other types of potential attacks (Justin et al., 2016). SVD is a matrix factorization method that factorizes given matrix to two orthonormal matrices and a diagonal singular value matrix with positive real numbers. Even if there are larger changes in the singular value matrix it will not produce much deviation in the reconstructed image. Since singular values possess inherent algebraic advantages and have very good stability, SVD shows good resistance towards noise and cropping based watermark attacks. Considering these advantages and demerits of different transformations, the article presents a new non-blind watermarking algorithm by utilizing the merits of DFT, DCT and SVD to provide stable robustness and imperceptibility qualities.

Materials and Methods

New non-blind DFT-DCT-SVD watermarking algorithm

The new watermarking algorithm exploits advantages of DFT, DCT and SVD transforms while attaching watermark in the carrier image. To achieve improved robustness against external potential attacks, the new method embeds watermark replicas in various carrier frequencies. By embedding watermark replicas to all frequencies of the cover image, the new method provides more chances for protecting some watermark replicas although the potential attacks may damage other replicas. The sequential flow diagram of new scheme is shown in Fig. 1.

Sequential flow diagram of new scheme.

Figure 1: Sequential flow diagram of new scheme.

Embedding the watermark

The algorithm begins by transforming carrier image to frequency domain by applying Fourier transform and shifting its origin to the center. The resultant image is then divided in to four frequency blocks depending on its circular distance from the direct current (DC) coefficient using OPD algorithm (Justin et al., 2016). DCT is applied to these four frequency bands and the resultant image is ordered in zigzag fashion to form four individual frequency arrays. These individual arrays are again equally divided into four frequency spectrums, the extremely high (B4), high (B3), medium (B2) and very low frequency (B1) arrays. Similar frequency components of these arrays are combined for forming final four frequency blocks and SVD transform is individually applied to these four carrier image frequency blocks. In parallel to these operations, the watermark image is also applied with Fourier transform followed by SVD and the copies of watermark singular values are attached with the singular values of cover image frequency blocks.

If C and X denote cover and watermark images with dimensions m×n and m2×n2 respectively, then new watermarking scheme is explained in the subsequent steps.

Step 1: Fourier transform provides energy compaction with strong tolerance towards translation and rotation (Setiadi, 2021) and hence the algorithm applies Fourier transform on C and X to form frequency domain images, F and W respectively.

Fu,v=1mni=0m1j=0n1Cije2πj(uim+vjn)

Wx,y=4mni=0m/21j=0n/21Xije4πj(xim+vjn)

Step 2: For utilizing the advantages of attaching watermark replicas to different frequency levels, the algorithm converts F to one dimensional frequency array using OPD. OPD algorithm performs a circular sweep of Fourier spectrum starting from the upper left corner (high frequency components) to the DC coefficient (lowest frequency components) located at the center of F. The OPD track all the frequencies of DFT spectrum in the high to low frequency order. Since the frequencies in DFT image, F vary from low to high frequencies in proportion to its positional distance from the DC component at the center position, the output of OPD is a 1D frequency array whose values starts at the highest frequency and ends at the DC coefficient. If this array is divided in to four equal parts, it is easy to separate the frequency components. These sub-bands are reshaped to 2D shape to form ultra high, very high, high and low frequency sub-band images. The singular value components of these sub-band images are then used for attaching multiple copies of watermark components. The OPD algorithm with its demonstrating example is given in Fig. 2. Let B4, B3, B2 and B1 denote extremely high, high, medium and very low frequency arrays of equal size 1×mn4. The OPD operation is defined as

Illustration of OPD traversal with example.

Figure 2: Illustration of OPD traversal with example.

[HHHLLHLL]=OPD(F).

Pictorial illustration of OPD and inverse OPD are given in Fig. 2 and the details of the algorithm with pseudo codes are found in our older work (Justin et al., 2016). These B4, B3, B2 and B1 arrays are reshaped into m2×n2 blocks for further processing and the corresponding frequency blocks formed are denoted as B1, B2, B3 and B4 blocks.

Step 3: To provide better robustness towards JPEG compression based external attacks, DCT is applied on B1, B2, B3 and B4 frequency blocks as a second level frequency decomposition to obtain the frequency block FDk for all the four blocks k=1,2,..4.

Since the frequencies in the DCT image, FDk vary from low to high in proportion to its diagonal distance from the DC component at position (0,0), each FDk is ordered in zigzag manner to convert FD to one dimensional frequency array where values of FDk starts at low frequency and ends at high frequency coefficient. When these individual arrays are divided into four equal parts (totally 16 for all four blocks), it is easy to separate the frequency components into the second level of B4, B3, B2 and B1 components. From all these individual arrays, the B4, B3, B2 and B1 counterparts are individually collected and four frequency arrays with equal sizes of 1×MN4. Further, if the frequency components which belong to FD1 are denoted as B1B1, B1B2, B1B3 and B1B4, those which belong to FD2 are denoted as B2B1, B2B2, B2B3, B2B4, those which belong to FD3 are denoted as B3B1, B3B2, B3B3, B3B4 and those which belong to FD4 are denoted as B4B1, B4B2, B4B3, B4B4, then these combined frequency arrays are formed by combining and reshaping (B1B1 B3B1 B2B1 B4B1), (B1B2 B3B2 B2B2 B4B2), (B1B3 B3B3 B2B3 B4B3) and (B1B4 B3B4 B2B4 B4B4) arrays to individual blocks Dk k=1,2,..4 of size M2×N2.

Step 4: Since external modification of the carrier image doesn’t affect the singular values much, SVD of individual frequency blocks Dk k=1,2,..4 are then determined for attaching the copy of watermark singular values with the carrier frequency block singular values. The SVD operation on carrier and watermark frequency blocks are defined respectively as

Dk=UkSkVkT1k4

W= UX SX VXTwhere T performs transpose, Uk, Vk, UX, VX are orthonormal matrices while Sk and SX are singular value matrices. The diagonal elements of Sk and SX are called singular values of cover and watermark blocks, respectively.

Step 5: Embedding watermark content replicas at different frequency bands of cover image help protect watermark contents from external attacks affecting specific frequencies and hence the watermark embedding process is done by adding the replicas of watermark singular value matrix SX to the singular value matrices of carrier frequency block as

Sk=Sk+ηkSX1k4.

Here ηk and Sk represent embedding strength parameter and singular values corresponding to carrier image respectively of the kth block. The embedding intensity ηk controls the watermark contents in cover image and it is set according to the trust on the communication media and the quality of watermarked image for specific applications.

Step 6: Once the watermark contents are attached with cover image frequencies, the algorithm starts the inverse process to reproduce the watermarked image. The watermarked frequency blocks Dk k=1,2,..4 are determined by performing inverse SVD as

Dk=UkSkVkT1k4.

Step 7: These watermarked frequency blocks Dk k=1,2,..4 are then reshaped back to size of 1×MN4 and are divided in to four equal parts (totally 16 inclusive of all four blocks). The reordered and combined frequency arrays are formed by rearranging (B1B1 B3B1 B2B1 B4B1), (B1B2 B3B2 B2B2 B4B2), (B1B3 B3B3 B2B3 B4B3) and (B1B4 B3B4 B2B4 B4B4) arrays of Dk k=1,2,..4 to FDk such that FD1 is (B1B1, B1B2, B1B3 B1B4), FD2 is (B2B1, B2B2, B2B3, B2B4), FD3 (B3B1, B3B2, B3B3, B3B4) and FD4 (B4B1, B4B2, B4B3, B4B4) arrays.

Step 8: Since these rearranged arrays are in DCT and zigzag ordered form, inverse zigzag operation followed by inverse DCT are applied to these individual arrays to find the next level of processing to reconstruct the watermarked image. Let Bk k=1,2,..4 denote the frequency block after applying inverse zigzag and the inverse DCT operations.

Step 9: The frequency blocks, Bk k=1,2,..4 are individually reshaped into four arrays to form B1, B2, B3 and B4 arrays to form the combined array (B4, B3, B2, B1). The inverse OPD algorithm is then applied to reconstruct back the Fourier transform of the watermarked image as

F=IOPD([B4,B3,B2,B1]).

Step 10: As the final stage, Inverse Fourier Transform is performed on F for regenerating the watermarked image, C as

Cij=u=0M1v=0N1Fuv e2πj(uiM+vjN).

The watermark components SX attached inside watermarked image C is utilized as a meta-data to identify the owner, authentication and uprightness of the host images. The scheme has better energy compaction, geometrical invariance and other resistance properties towards external attacks due to the collective advantages of different transforms. Also the algorithm is capable producing better quality watermarked outputs with high visual qualities due to better energy spreading capabilities of different transforms.

Extraction of watermark

This sub-section explains the operations to be performed for extracting the watermark from carrier image. The algorithm performs the same way as embedding process but extracts the watermark contents from watermarked singular values. If C~ denotes watermarked image received for authentication, the watermark extraction procedure is detailed through following steps:

Step 1: The watermark extraction algorithm starts by applying Fourier transformation on the watermarked image, C~ as in (1) to produce F~.

Step 2: As used in watermark embedding process, OPD is applied for converting F~ to one dimensional frequency array as

[B4,B3,B2,B1]=OPD(F~)

The B4, B3, B2 and B1 arrays are reshaped into m2×n2 blocks for further processing and these frequency blocks are denoted as B~1, B~2, B~3, and B~4.

Step 3: DCT is applied to B~1, B~2, B~3, and B~4 frequency blocks for obtaining second level frequency decomposition, FD~. Each FD~k is ordered in zigzag fashion for converting FD~ to one dimensional frequency array whose values starts from low frequency coefficients and ends at high frequency coefficients, i.e., B1B1, B1B2, B1B3 and B1B4 belong to FD~1, B2B1, B2B2, B2B3, B2B4 belong to FD~2, B3B1, B3B2, B3B3, B3B4 belong to FD~3 and B4B1, B4B2, B4B3, B4B4 belong to FD~4. Further, these arrays are reshaped to individual blocks D~k k=1,2,..4 with sizes m2×n2.

Step 4: Same as step 4 of watermark embedding process, SVD on individual frequency blocks, D~k k=1,2,..4 are performed for extracting the watermark singular value replicas from carrier block singular values as

Dk~=U~kS~kVkT~1k4.

Step 5: The watermark singular value copies SkX are then extracted from the watermarked frequency block singular value matrices as

Sk~X=(S~kSk)ηkwhere ηk and Sk are the embedding strength parameter and hast image singular values of kth block, respectively.

Step 6: The watermarked blocks are constructed by applying inverse SVD to respective watermark singular values

W k= UX SX~VTX.

Step 7: As the final step, the algorithm applies inverse Fourier transform on W~k and the watermark replicas Xk~ are extracted as

X~kij=u=0m21v=0n21W~u,v e4πj(uim+vjn).

Since the scheme exploit the merits of DFT, DCT and SVD transforms to protect watermark contents from wide levels of potential attacks through its watermark embedding and extraction schemes, it consistently produces better quality watermarked images with better robustness. Since it attaches singular value replicas to all frequency contents of cover image frequencies, the algorithm has better provision for protecting watermarks from various sets of attacks that affect specific frequency bands of cover images. Also, as the algorithm apply Fourier transform to the watermark before it is attached with cover image contents, it ensures better frequency spreading of watermark contents in cover image contents ensuring high quality watermarked images with better resistance towards external attacks. The sequential flow diagram of extracting watermark is given in Fig. 3.

Sequential flow diagram of watermark extraction process.

Figure 3: Sequential flow diagram of watermark extraction process.

Test images are from https://ccia.ugr.es/cvg/CG/base.htm and https://in.mathworks.com/help/images/ open databases.

Results

The empirical analysis of the watermarking method based on imperceptibility and robustness capabilities is made with a large set of images from which rice, man, circles, Barbara, cameraman, boats, baboon, peppers, bridge and different logo images are presented in this article for demarcating the subjective and objective performances of different algorithms. To perform effective comparative study of various watermarking schemes with subjective and objective metrics, the payload of watermark content in cover image needs to be same for these algorithms. Aiming at these requirements, the algorithms that attach similar amount of data with similar multiple replicas are being considered in this study for analysis. Comparative algorithms used in the study to analyse the effectiveness of the new scheme are DCT based Run et al. (2012), DWT based Run et al. (2012), Mokashi et al. (2022), Emir & Eskicioglu (2004), Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006), and Justin et al. (2016) algorithms. Mokashi et al. (2022) algorithm attaches watermarked watermarks in DCT domain of LL sub-bands. However, for this experimental comparison, the watermarks used are not watermarked with signature of the owner.

Imperceptibility measures the similarity of watermarked images with its original counterpart while robustness makes the tolerance of watermarked images to external potential attacks in preserving watermark contents. The imperceptibility analysis of the new algorithm is made with peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR) (Setiadi, 2021), mean structural similarity index measure (MSSIM) (Setiadi, 2021; Wang et al., 2004) and feature similarity index measure (FSIM) (Zhang et al., 2011). PSNR is determined as

PSNR=10log10((255)2MSE)(dB).

Here, MSE is the mean square error of C with C. SSIM provides human perception-based structural similarity analysis between C and C (Wang et al., 2004). MSSIM is given by

MSSIM=1kb=1k(2μCbμCb+c1)(2σCbCb+c2)(μCb2+μCb2+c1)(σCb2+σCb2+c2).

Here, Cb and Cb*​​​ respectively represents image areas of bth window of C and C. Also μ and σ denote the mean and standard deviation while c1 and c2 are constants. FSIM provides human perception based low-level feature comparison measure by extracting phase congruency (PC) and gradient magnitude (GM) of comparative images. If Ω is the set of entire row and column positions of C and C, FSIM is determined by

FSIM(C,C)=bΩSL(b)×PCm(b)bΩPCm(b).

Here, SL(b) is the local similarity map by phase congruency (PC) and gradient magnitude (GM) while PCm(b) represents maximum of phase congruency of C and C. Detailed explanation on FSIM calculations can be found in Zhang et al. (2011).

For maintaining consistency in comparative analysis of various schemes, the embedding strength parameter ηk k=1,2,..4 is set to 0.1 for all algorithms.

Robustness of the new scheme is analyzed with other algorithms using bit error rate (BER) in percentage and normalized cross correlation (NCC) values of attached and extracted watermark images and the Pearson’s correlation coefficient (PCC) values of attached and extracted singular values against a variety of external attacks, from which Gaussian and impulse noises, geometrical transformations, filtering, histogram equalization, JPEG compression, resizing, unsharp masking, contrast stretching, flipping and pixelate attacks are used in this article to illustrate the analysis. Bit error rate (BER) (Mokhnache, Bekkouche & Chikouche, 2018) represents the ratio of corrupted bits to total available bits. The BER of extracted watermark, X~ from attached watermark, X in percentage is determined as

BER=i=0M1j=0N1X(i,j)X~(i,j)M×N×100(%).

Here represents the XOR operation. An effective watermarking algorithm should produce low BER in case of potential attacks affected watermarked images. The normalized cross correlation (NCC) (Xie & Qin, 2010) measures the resemblance of attached and extracted watermarks and is defined by

NCC=i=0M1j=0N1X(i,j)×X~(i,j)i=0M1j=0N1(X(i,j))2×i=0M1j=0N1(X~(i,j))2.

High values of NCC near one indicates that the output watermark of algorithm has high s resemblance with the original watermark. PCC is used for measuring the linear relationship of original singular values SX with the extracted singular values Sk~X from watermarked image impinged with different attacks. PCC calculation can be expressed by

PCC= (SXμSX)(Sk~XXμS~kX) ( SXμSX) (Sk~XμS~kX)2.

Here, μSk and μSkX respectively denote the mean of SX and Sk~X. The result of PCC varies from +1 to −1, where +1 indicates positive linear correlation, 0 indicates non-correlation, and −1 indicates negative correlation. From all extracted watermark replicas X~k k=1,2,..4, the best replica in terms of PCC values of its singular values are used for analyzing the performance of all algorithms used in the study.

In order to identify the best combination of transformations from DWT, DCT and DFT that shows better perceptibility qualities, experiments are conducted on DWT-DCT-SVD, DWT-DFT-SVD and DCT- DFT-SVD combinations with 15 carrier and watermark images and the perceptibility quality results of watermarked images from these methods are compared based on PSNR, MSSIM and FSIM values as presented in Table 1. Table 1 show that DFT-DCT-SVD scheme produces better PSNR, MSSIM and FSIM values than DWT-DCT-SVD and DWT-DFT-SVD based algorithms except for the MSSIM values of Barbara-Cameraman and FSIM values of Bridge- Logo-4 carrier-watermark image combinations. The robustness comparison of DWT-DCT-SVD, DWT-DFT-SVD and DFT- DCT-SVD based methods are performed with BER and NCC values of attached and extracted watermark images and the PCC values of attached and extracted singular values against different image processing attacks. Average BER, NCC and PCC values produced by DWT-DCT-SVD, DWT-DFT-SVD and DFT- DCT-SVD from 15 watermark images are presented in Table 2. From Table 2, it is vivid that the DFT-DCT-SVD algorithm produces better BER, NCC and PCC values than DWT-DCT-SVD and DWT-DFT-SVD based algorithms except for rescaling/multi-resolution based potential attacks. By analyzing the quantitative results of DWT-DCT-SVD, DWT-DFT-SVD and DFT-DCT-SVD algorithms from Tables 1 and 2, it can be identified that DFT- DCT-SVD algorithm shows better imperceptibility and robustness qualities than DWT-DCT-SVD and DWT-DFT-SVD algorithms and hence, we use DFT- DCT-SVD algorithm as the proposed method to compare other prominent algorithms used in this comparative study.

Table 1:
PSNR, SSIM and FSIM analysis of watermarked images of different algorithms with embedding strength parameter ηk = 0.1.
Carrier image Watermark image DWT-DCT-SVD DWT-DFT-SVD Proposed scheme (DCT- DFT-SVD)
PSNR MSSIM FSIM PSNR MSSIM FSIM PSNR MSSIM FSIM
Lena Rice 34.477 0.957 0.992 33.780 0.967 0.953 34.825 0.987 0.993
Man Circles 33.893 0.944 0.966 34.931 0.963 0.947 34.985 0.983 0.983
Barbara Cameraman 32.336 0.988 0.966 33.683 0.988 0.986 33.721 0.986 0.992
Boats Logo-1 28.539 0.946 0.925 28.539 0.936 0.916 29.728 0.975 0.954
Baboon Logo-2 31.668 0.972 0.958 31.040 0.962 0.949 31.754 0.992 0.978
Peppers Logo-3 30.034 0.962 0.919 29.133 0.972 0.900 30.752 0.974 0.938
Bridge Logo-4 28.963 0.947 0.962 28.086 0.956 0.974 29.256 0.986 0.971
Average of 15 sets of images 32.215 0.973 0.937 31.813 0.983 0.962 33.045 0.989 0.972
DOI: 10.7717/peerj-cs.1427/table-1
Table 2:
Average robustness analysis of extracted 15 watermark images from various cover images impinged with different external attacks by various schemes.
External attacks DWT-DCT-SVD DWT-DFT-SVD Proposed scheme (DCT- DFT-SVD)
BER NCC PCC BER NCC PCC BER NCC PCC
Gaussian noise with noise ratio 0.001 37.105 0.912 0.930 34.887 0.949 0.933 34.645 0.974 0.978
Gaussian filtering 3 × 3 36.875 0.902 0.948 36.934 0.956 0.967 36.746 0.994 0.994
Gaussian filtering 5 × 5 36.824 0.963 0.926 36.927 0.907 0.992 36.776 0.994 0.993
Gaussian filtering 7 × 7 36.871 0.931 0.922 36.989 0.897 0.952 36.776 0.994 0.997
Histogram equalization 37.307 0.920 0.941 37.478 0.942 0.934 37.292 0.969 0.968
JPEG Compression with 75% quality 26.369 0.946 0.916 26.448 0.890 0.944 26.259 0.983 0.984
JPEG compression with 50% quality 30.061 0.910 0.966 30.064 0.930 0.974 30.055 0.975 0.979
Rotation 10° 37.831 0.899 0.923 37.891 0.922 0.901 37.616 0.931 0.937
Rotation 20° 28.548 0.943 0.908 28.259 0.948 0.954 28.862 0.941 0.947
Image resizing 512–>256 36.496 0.944 0.910 36.130 0.956 0.964 36.565 0.954 0.959
Image resizing 512–>1,024 33.530 0.952 0.925 33.394 0.985 0.952 33.304 0.987 0.989
Unsharp masking 38.229 0.858 0.877 38.538 0.905 0.920 38.171 0.933 0.934
Gamma correction γ=0.8 36.349 0.937 0.908 36.349 0.910 0.905 36.028 0.966 0.977
Gamma correction γ=0.6 36.776 0.791 0.841 36.666 0.801 0.858 36.419 0.833 0.870
Impulse noise 1% 36.745 0.869 0.875 36.701 0.861 0.946 36.551 0.954 0.951
Impulse noise 5% 35.530 0.963 0.956 35.220 0.969 0.982 35.206 0.996 0.996
Row flipping 34.610 0.924 0.887 34.796 0.883 0.895 34.496 0.938 0.937
Column flipping 33.819 0.900 0.974 33.971 0.958 0.981 33.674 0.984 0.984
Pixelate with 2 × 2 tiles 35.583 0.931 0.949 35.544 0.937 0.895 35.434 0.991 0.991
Pixelate with 4 × 4 tiles 37.853 0.984 0.912 38.061 0.903 0.941 37.785 0.998 0.991
DOI: 10.7717/peerj-cs.1427/table-2

Tables 35 respectively shows the PSNR, SSIM and FSIM comparison of watermarked outputs by various algorithms and these results are used for analyzing the imperceptibility capabilities of proposed algorithm against Run et al. (2012), DWT based Run et al. (2012), Emir & Eskicioglu (2004), Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006) and Justin et al. (2016) methods. Table 3 show that the proposed scheme produces better PSNR values than other comparative methods except for combination between Bridge and Logo-4. From Table 4, it is clear that the new scheme produces better MSSIM values than other methods except for the man and circle combination. Table 5 demarcates that the proposed scheme produces better FSIM values than other methods except for Baboon-Logo-2 and peppers- Logo-3 combinations. Figure 4 shows the cropped versions of watermarked images by comparative algorithms for Barbara (cover) image with the cameraman image as watermark. By analyzing the quantitative values of Tables 35 and by the visual analysis on Fig. 4, one can reach that the proposed scheme shows stable performance and it outperforms other algorithms in most of the test cases of imperceptibility analysis.

Table 3:
PSNR determined from watermarked images of different algorithms with embedding strength parameter ηk = 0.1.
Carrier image Watermark image PSNR values (dB)
Run et al. (2012) Run et al. (2012) Emir & Eskicioglu (2004) Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006) Justin et al. (2016) Proposed scheme
Lena Rice 26.614 26.440 26.778 26.614 34.777 34.825
Man Circles 26.662 26.756 26.863 26.662 34.415 34.985
Barbara Cameraman 25.582 25.435 25.725 25.582 33.413 33.721
Boats Logo-1 21.555 21.460 21.648 21.555 29.539 29.728
Baboon Logo-2 23.138 23.019 23.252 23.138 31.293 31.754
Peppers Logo-3 21.942 21.845 22.125 21.981 29.913 30.752
Bridge Logo-4 21.446 21.357 21.532 21.446 29.354 29.256
DOI: 10.7717/peerj-cs.1427/table-3
Table 4:
MSSIM determined from watermarked images of different algorithms with embedding strength parameter ηk = 0.1.
Carrier image Watermark image MSSIM values
Run et al. (2012) Run et al. (2012) Emir & Eskicioglu (2004) Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006) Justin et al. (2016) Proposed scheme
Lena Rice 0.877 0.991 0.986 0.900 0.987 0.987
Man Circles 0.875 0.963 0.959 0.919 0.985 0.983
Barbara Cameraman 0.889 0.991 0.978 0.913 0.985 0.986
Boats Logo-1 0.820 0.987 0.966 0.850 0.975 0.975
Baboon Logo-2 0.893 0.992 0.987 0.913 0.992 0.992
Peppers Logo-3 0.740 0.970 0.969 0.793 0.962 0.974
Bridge Logo-4 0.858 0.980 0.983 0.899 0.986 0.986
DOI: 10.7717/peerj-cs.1427/table-4
Table 5:
FSIM determined from watermarked images of different algorithms with embedding strength parameter ηk = 0.1.
Carrier image Watermark image FSIM values
Run et al. (2012) Run et al. (2012) Emir & Eskicioglu (2004) Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006) Justin et al. (2016) Proposed scheme
Lena Rice 0.926 0.996 0.989 0.943 0.991 0.993
Man Circles 0.942 0.991 0.981 0.957 0.976 0.983
Barbara Cameraman 0.934 0.956 0.991 0.946 0.989 0.992
Boats Logo-1 0.889 0.993 0.948 0.905 0.951 0.954
Baboon Logo-2 0.939 0.995 0.969 0.949 0.997 0.978
Peppers Logo-3 0.869 0.985 0.998 0.889 0.990 0.938
Bridge Logo-4 0.912 0.925 0.965 0.927 0.964 0.971
DOI: 10.7717/peerj-cs.1427/table-5
Cropped versions of watermarked Barbara (cover) images produced by various algorithms with the cameraman image as watermark.

Figure 4: Cropped versions of watermarked Barbara (cover) images produced by various algorithms with the cameraman image as watermark.

(A) Original cover image, (B) Run et al. (2012), (C) Emir & Eskicioglu (2004), (D) Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006), (E) Justin et al. (2016), (F) proposed scheme. Test images are from https://ccia.ugr.es/cvg/CG/base.htm and https://in.mathworks.com/help/images/ open databases.

Figure 5 shows the cropped versions of watermarked Barbara image impinged with different attacks. Tables 68 makes the PCC analysis of watermark images of various schemes from watermarked images impinged with different external attacks. From Table 6, it is clear that Emir & Eskicioglu (2004), Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006), Justin et al. (2016) algorithms produce best results for seven, 10 and five potential attacks respectively while the proposed method produces best results for 15 image processing attacks. Table 7 demarcates that Emir & Eskicioglu (2004), Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006), Justin et al. (2016) algorithms produce best results for two, nine and five potential attacks respectively while the proposed method produces best results for 17 image processing attacks. Table 8 shows that Emir & Eskicioglu (2004), Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006), Justin et al. (2016) algorithms respectively produce best results for five, 12 and four potential attacks while the proposed method produces best results for 15 image processing attacks. Tables 911 makes the BER and NCC analysis of watermark images of various schemes from watermarked images impinged with different external attacks.

Cropped versions of watermarked Barbara image impinged with various attacks.

Figure 5: Cropped versions of watermarked Barbara image impinged with various attacks.

(A) Gaussian noise with noise ratio 0.001, (B) rotation 45° (C) Gaussian filter 7 × 7, (D) histogram Equalization, (E) jPEG with 50% quality, (F) image Resizing (512-256-512), (G) image Resizing (512-1024-512), (H) unsharp Masking, (I) contrast Stretching, (J) impulse noise with 5% noise, (K) column Flip, (L) pixelate 4 × 4 tiles. Test images are from the https://ccia.ugr.es/cvg/CG/base.htm open database.
Table 6:
PCC analysis of extracted Rice watermark image from Lena cover image impinged with different external attacks by various schemes.
External attacks Pearson’s correlation coefficient (PCC) values
Run et al. (2012) Run et al. (2012) Mokashi et al. (2022) Emir & Eskicioglu (2004) (DWT-SVD) Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006) (DCT-SVD) Justin et al. (2016) (DFT-SVD) Proposed scheme
Gaussian noise with noise ratio 0.001 0.83 0.83 0.84 0.97 0.99 0.89 0.93
Gaussian Filtering 3 × 3 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.87 0.99
Gaussian filtering 5 × 5 0.98 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.87 0.99
Gaussian filtering 7 × 7 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.99
Histogram equalization 0.93 0.90 0.57 0.92 0.97 0.98 0.98
JPEG compression with 75% quality 0.44 0.21 0.92 0.85 0.98 0.97 0.98
JPEG Compression with 50% quality 0.44 0.22 0.93 0.85 0.95 0.92 0.95
Rotation 10° 0.64 0.53 0.93 0.93 0.91 0.96 0.96
Rotation 20° 0.59 0.51 0.89 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.94
Image resizing 512–>256 0.96 0.91 0.64 0.98 0.95 0.46 0.95
Image resizing 512–>1,024 0.98 0.91 0.95 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97
Unsharp masking 0.96 0.88 0.91 0.91 0.98 0.74 0.98
Gamma correction γ=0.8 0.91 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.97 0.94 0.97
Gamma correction γ=0.6 0.91 0.97 0.61 0.95 0.96 0.98 0.98
Impulse noise 1% 0.67 0.65 0.91 0.88 0.95 0.63 0.94
Impulse noise 5% 0.36 0.35 0.82 0.58 0.64 0.36 0.84
Row flipping 0.62 0.82 0.83 0.95 0.94 0.80 0.95
Column flipping 0.64 0.85 0.74 0.96 0.95 0.81 0.95
Pixelate with 2 × 2 tiles 0.81 0.51 0.89 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99
Pixelate with 4 × 4 tiles 0.53 0.54 0.85 0.57 0.94 0.43 0.94
DOI: 10.7717/peerj-cs.1427/table-6
Table 7:
PCC analysis of extracted Circle watermark image from Man cover image impinged with different external attacks by various schemes.
Potential attacks Pearson’s correlation coefficient (PCC) values
Run et al. (2012) Run et al. (2012) Mokashi et al. (2022) Emir & Eskicioglu (2004) (DWT-SVD) Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006) (DCT-SVD) Justin et al. (2016) (DFT-SVD) Proposed scheme
Gaussian noise with noise ratio 0.001 0.83 0.82 0.91 0.97 0.99 0.89 0.99
Gaussian filtering 3 × 3 0.94 0.95 0.99 0.97 0.99 0.74 0.99
Gaussian filtering 5 × 5 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.73 0.98
Gaussian filtering 7 × 7 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.73 0.98
Histogram equalization 0.96 0.89 0.98 0.98 0.91 0.99 0.99
JPEG compression with 75% quality 0.06 0.61 0.79 0.67 0.84 0.83 0.84
JPEG compression with 50% quality 0.04 0.61 0.74 0.67 0.83 0.82 0.83
Rotation 10o 0.61 0.56 0.97 0.95 0.96 0.99 0.98
Rotation 20o 0.57 0.52 0.94 0.93 0.95 0.96 0.96
Image resizing 512->256 0.51 0.85 0.65 0.94 0.89 0.93 0.93
Image resizing 512->1,024 0.95 0.91 0.91 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98
Unsharp masking 0.91 0.81 0.94 0.91 0.96 0.96 0.96
Gamma correction γ=0.8 0.91 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.96 0.97 0.99
Gamma correction γ=0.6 0.95 0.89 0.85 0.98 0.99 0.91 0.99
Impulse noise 1% 0.64 0.65 0.92 0.87 0.95 0.59 0.95
Impulse noise 5% 0.33 0.41 0.86 0.58 0.67 0.33 0.72
Row flipping 0.67 0.93 0.85 0.96 0.96 0.97 0.97
Column flipping 0.65 0.95 0.95 0.97 0.91 0.98 0.98
Pixelate with 2 × 2 tiles 0.51 0.43 0.97 0.97 0.98 0.46 0.98
Pixelate with 4 × 4 tiles 0.2 0.42 0.91 0.38 0.89 0.40 0.95
DOI: 10.7717/peerj-cs.1427/table-7
Table 8:
PCC analysis of extracted Cameraman watermark image from Barbara cover image impinged with different external attacks by various schemes.
Potential attacks Pearson’s correlation coefficient (PCC) values
Run et al. (2012) Run et al. (2012) Mokashi et al. (2022) Emir & Eskicioglu (2004) (DWT-SVD) Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006) (DCT-SVD) Justin et al. (2016) (DFT-SVD) Proposed scheme
Gaussian noise with noise ratio 0.001 0.86 0.86 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.99
Gaussian filtering 3 × 3 0.97 0.94 0.96 0.97 0.98 0.71 0.99
Gaussian filtering 5 × 5 0.97 0.93 0.96 0.96 0.98 0.71 0.98
Gaussian filtering 7 × 7 0.91 0.93 0.96 0.95 0.96 0.71 0.96
Histogram equalization 0.97 0.82 0.84 0.96 0.99 0.97 0.99
JPEG compression with 75% quality 0.24 0.27 0.90 0.82 0.92 0.91 0.92
JPEG compression with 50% quality 0.23 0.27 0.87 0.82 0.90 0.89 0.90
Rotation 10° 0.63 0.59 0.89 0.98 0.95 0.98 0.98
Rotation 20° 0.59 0.55 0.95 0.95 0.91 0.96 0.96
Image resizing 512–>256 0.51 0.79 0.92 0.98 0.91 0.95 0.95
Image resizing 5,127>1,024 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.94
Unsharp masking 0.95 0.74 0.90 0.97 0.98 0.75 0.86
Gamma correction γ=0.8 0.99 0.99 0.96 1.00 1.00 0.99 0.99
Gamma correction γ=0.6 0.97 0.96 0.70 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.99
Impulse noise 1% 0.69 0.69 0.94 0.93 0.96 0.74 0.95
Impulse noise 5% 0.39 0.37 0.63 0.64 0.73 0.40 0.89
Row flipping 0.69 0.74 0.73 0.92 0.94 0.96 0.96
Column flipping 0.63 0.68 0.92 0.94 0.95 0.95 0.95
Pixelate with 2 × 2 tiles 0.55 0.91 0.96 0.97 0.94 0.76 0.97
Pixelate with 4 × 4 tiles 0.32 0.52 0.84 0.44 0.87 0.15 0.87
DOI: 10.7717/peerj-cs.1427/table-8
Table 9:
BER and NCC analysis of extracted Rice watermark image from Lena cover image impinged with different external attacks by various schemes.
External attacks Emir & Eskicioglu (2004) (DWT-SVD) Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006) (DCT-SVD) Justin et al. (2016) (DFT-SVD) Proposed scheme
BER NCC BER NCC BER NCC BER NCC
Gaussian noise with noise ratio 0.001 36.684 0.964 35.766 0.982 40.158 0.883 35.766 0.981
Gaussian filtering 3 × 3 39.597 0.992 38.897 0.992 44.014 0.867 38.797 0.994
Gaussian filtering 5 × 5 39.091 0.991 39.291 0.992 43.693 0.869 38.791 0.994
Gaussian filtering 7 × 7 39.591 0.99 39.591 0.984 43.793 0.873 38.791 0.994
Histogram equalization 42.075 0.976 39.675 0.970 40.784 0.969 39.464 0.958
JPEG compression with 75% quality 29.618 0.852 25.383 0.988 26.534 0.980 25.273 0.980
JPEG compression with 50% quality 35.501 0.861 31.067 0.989 31.637 0.974 30.063 0.989
Rotation 10° 41.634 0.905 39.802 0.878 41.434 0.932 39.232 0.926
Rotation 20° 34.099 0.958 33.819 0.958 32.599 0.961 32.479 0.961
Image resizing 512–>256 36.287 0.983 39.685 0.970 39.671 0.860 36.775 0.981
Image resizing 512–>1,024 32.102 0.989 33.095 0.972 32.702 0.985 32.375 0.969
Unsharp masking 38.485 0.923 38.485 0.989 47.314 0.749 38.454 0.976
Gamma correction γ=0.8 38.275 0.913 38.585 0.945 39.817 0.907 38.161 0.945
Gamma correction γ=0.6 39.524 0.819 38.485 0.825 38.165 0.844 39.410 0.813
Impulse noise 1% 36.429 0.919 33.877 0.991 44.586 0.659 35.378 0.937
Impulse noise 5% 50.268 0.682 38.275 0.790 59.361 0.425 37.775 0.989
Row flipping 30.837 0.977 30.947 0.969 29.974 0.982 30.637 0.980
Column flipping 33.979 0.995 33.989 0.976 32.032 0.983 33.323 0.976
Pixelate with 2 × 2 tiles 35.163 0.991 35.973 0.978 51.292 0.535 35.413 0.985
Pixelate with 4 × 4 tiles 54.542 0.597 39.394 0.993 60.950 0.456 38.994 0.984
DOI: 10.7717/peerj-cs.1427/table-9
Table 10:
BER and NCC analysis of extracted Circle watermark image from Man cover image impinged with different external attacks by various schemes.
External attacks Emir & Eskicioglu (2004) (DWT-SVD) Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006) (DCT-SVD) Justin et al. (2016) (DFT-SVD) Proposed Scheme
BER NCC BER NCC BER NCC BER NCC
Gaussian noise with noise ratio 0.001 36.684 0.964 35.766 0.982 40.158 0.883 37.721 0.931
Gaussian filtering 3 × 3 39.597 0.992 38.897 0.992 44.014 0.867 38.797 0.994
Gaussian filtering 5 × 5 39.091 0.991 39.291 0.992 43.693 0.869 38.791 0.994
Gaussian filtering 7 × 7 39.591 0.990 39.591 0.984 43.793 0.873 38.791 0.994
Histogram equalization 40.075 0.926 39.675 0.970 45.784 0.799 39.464 0.958
JPEG compression with 75% quality 29.618 0.852 25.383 0.988 26.534 0.980 25.773 0.980
JPEG compression with 50% quality 35.501 0.861 30.067 0.996 31.637 0.974 30.637 0.996
Rotation 10° 41.634 0.905 39.802 0.878 41.434 0.932 39.232 0.936
Rotation 20° 34.099 0.958 33.819 0.958 32.599 0.961 32.514 0.961
Image resizing 512->256 33.287 0.983 39.685 0.970 39.671 0.860 38.775 0.981
Image resizing 512–>1,024 32.202 0.999 33.095 0.972 32.702 0.985 32.375 0.999
Unsharp masking 38.485 0.963 38.485 0.989 47.314 0.749 38.454 0.976
Gamma correction γ=0.8 38.275 0.953 38.585 0.936 39.817 0.907 38.161 0.945
Gamma correction γ=0.6 39.524 0.819 38.485 0.825 38.165 0.844 39.410 0.813
Impulse noise 1% 36.429 0.919 33.877 0.991 44.586 0.659 35.378 0.937
Impulse noise 5% 50.268 0.682 38.275 0.790 59.361 0.425 37.775 0.989
Row flipping 30.837 0.977 30.947 0.969 29.974 0.982 30.637 0.980
Column flipping 33.979 0.995 33.989 0.976 32.032 0.983 33.323 0.976
Pixelate with 2 × 2 tiles 35.163 0.971 35.973 0.978 51.292 0.535 35.013 0.985
Pixelate with 4 × 4 tiles 54.542 0.597 39.394 0.993 60.950 0.456 38.994 0.995
DOI: 10.7717/peerj-cs.1427/table-10
Table 11:
BER and NCC analysis of extracted Cameraman watermark image from Barbara cover image impinged with different external attacks by various schemes.
External attacks Emir & Eskicioglu (2004) (DWT-SVD) Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006) (DCT-SVD) Justin et al. (2016) (DFT-SVD) Proposed scheme
BER NCC BER NCC BER NCC BER NCC
Gaussian Noise with noise ratio 0.001 36.684 0.964 35.766 0.982 40.158 0.883 37.721 0.931
Gaussian filtering 3 × 3 39.597 0.992 38.897 0.992 44.014 0.867 38.797 0.994
Gaussian filtering 5 × 5 39.091 0.991 39.291 0.992 43.693 0.869 38.791 0.994
Gaussian filtering 7 × 7 39.591 0.990 39.591 0.984 43.793 0.873 38.791 0.994
Histogram equalization 39.075 0.976 39.675 0.970 38.784 0.979 38.764 0.978
JPEG compression with 75% quality 29.618 0.852 25.383 0.988 26.534 0.980 25.773 0.983
JPEG compression with 50% quality 35.501 0.861 30.067 0.996 31.637 0.974 30.637 0.989
Rotation 10° 41.634 0.905 42.802 0.878 41.434 0.932 39.232 0.926
Rotation 20° 34.099 0.958 43.819 0.958 32.599 0.961 32.979 0.958
Image resizing 512–>256 32.287 0.983 39.685 0.970 39.671 0.860 38.775 0.981
Image resizing 512–>1,024 32.302 0.984 33.095 0.972 32.702 0.985 32.375 0.969
Unsharp masking 38.485 0.993 38.485 0.999 47.314 0.749 38.454 0.999
Gamma correction γ=0.8 38.275 0.953 38.585 0.936 39.817 0.907 38.161 0.945
Gamma correction γ=0.6 39.524 0.819 38.485 0.825 38.765 0.844 38.41 0.853
Impulse noise 1% 36.429 0.919 33.877 0.991 44.586 0.659 33.878 0.991
Impulse noise 5% 50.268 0.682 38.275 0.790 59.361 0.425 37.775 0.989
Row flipping 30.837 0.977 30.947 0.969 29.974 0.982 30.637 0.980
Column flipping 33.979 0.995 33.989 0.976 32.032 0.995 33.323 0.976
Pixelate with 2 × 2 tiles 35.163 0.991 35.973 0.978 51.292 0.535 35.413 0.985
Pixelate with 4 × 4 tiles 54.542 0.597 39.394 0.993 60.950 0.456 38.994 0.993
DOI: 10.7717/peerj-cs.1427/table-11

From Table 9, it is clear that Emir & Eskicioglu (2004), Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006), Justin et al. (2016) algorithms produce best results for three, two and two potential attacks respectively in terms of BER while the proposed method produces best results for 13 image processing attacks. Table 10 demarcates that Emir & Eskicioglu (2004), Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006), Justin et al. (2016) algorithms produce best results for two, four and three potential attacks respectively in terms of BER while the proposed method produces best results for 11 image processing attacks. Table 11 shows that Emir & Eskicioglu (2004), Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006), Justin et al. (2016) algorithms produce best BER results for three, four and three potential attacks respectively while the proposed method produces best results for 10 image processing attacks.

From Table 9, it is clear that Emir & Eskicioglu (2004), Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006), Justin et al. (2016) algorithms produce best results for five, six and four potential attacks respectively in terms of NCC while the proposed method produces best results for seven image processing attacks. Table 10 shows that Emir & Eskicioglu (2004), Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006), Justin et al. (2016) algorithms produce best results for three, five and four potential attacks respectively in terms of NCC while the proposed method produces best results for 12 image processing attacks. Table 11 shows that Emir & Eskicioglu (2004), Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006), Justin et al. (2016) algorithms produce best NCC results for five, six and four potential attacks respectively while the proposed method produces best results for nine image processing attacks. It is clear from Tables 611 that the results of proposed method is consistent in providing better robustness against all potential attacks although it fails in some cases to produce best results in terms of PCC, BER and NCC values.

Figures 68 makes visual analysis of watermark images reproduced by various algorithms from cover images interrupted with different external attacks. From Tables 611 and from Figs. 68, it can be clearly noted that unlike other algorithms, the new watermarking scheme makes consistent performance for majority of attacks and provides better quantitative values than other algorithms for majority of external attacks by utilizing advantages of DFT, DCT and SVD transforms while attaching secret contents in cover images.

Cropped versions of Cameraman watermark extracted by different algorithms from watermarked Barbara image impinged with different attacks.

Figure 6: Cropped versions of Cameraman watermark extracted by different algorithms from watermarked Barbara image impinged with different attacks.

Different algorithms: column 1 (A, F, K, P): Run et al. (2012), column 2 (B, G, L, Q): Emir & Eskicioglu (2004), column 3 (C, H, M, R): Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006), column 4 (D, I, N, S): Justin et al. (2016) and column 5 (E, J, O, T): proposed schemes. Different attacks: row 1 (A–E): Gaussian noise with noise ratio 0.001, row 2 (F–J): rotation 45O, row 3 (K–O): Gaussian filter 7 × 7, row 4 (P–T): histogram equalization. Test images are from https://ccia.ugr.es/cvg/CG/base.htm open database.
Cropped versions of Cameraman watermark extracted by different algorithms from watermarked Barbara image impinged with different attacks.

Figure 7: Cropped versions of Cameraman watermark extracted by different algorithms from watermarked Barbara image impinged with different attacks.

Different algorithms: column 1 (A, F, K, P): Run et al. (2012), column 2 (B, G, L, Q): Emir & Eskicioglu (2004), column 3 (C, H, M, R): Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006), column 4 (D, I, N, S): Justin et al. (2016) and column 5 (E, J, O, T): proposed schemes. Different attacks: row 1 (A–E): JPEG 50% quality, row 2 (F–J): image resizing (512-256-512), row 3 (K–O): image resizing (512-1024-512), row 4 (P–T): unsharp masking. Test images are from https://ccia.ugr.es/cvg/CG/base.htm open database.
Cropped versions of Cameraman watermark extracted by different algorithms from watermarked Barbara image impinged with different attacks.

Figure 8: Cropped versions of Cameraman watermark extracted by different algorithms from watermarked Barbara image impinged with different attacks.

Different algorithms: column 1 (A, F, K, P): Run et al. (2012), column 2 (B, G, L, Q): Emir & Eskicioglu (2004), column 3 (C, H, M, R): Alexander, Scott & Ahmet (2006), column 4 (D, I, N, S): Justin et al. (2016) and column 5: proposed schemes. Different attacks: row 1 (A-E): contrast stretching, row 2 (F-J): impulse noise with 5% noise, row 3 (K-O): column flip, row 4 (P-T): pixelate 4 × 4. Test images are from https://ccia.ugr.es/cvg/CG/base.htm open database.

Conclusions

The article presented a new non-blind watermarking algorithm that utilized the combined merits of DFT, DCT and SVD transforms. With the embedding of watermark replicas to all cover image frequencies, the new scheme provides improved resistance towards external potential attacks since the algorithm has more possibility for protecting some watermark replicas although the potential attacks may damage other replicas attached in other carrier image frequencies. As the algorithm utilizes the collective advantages of DFT, DCT and SVD transforms while attaching secret contents in cover images, it shows better robustness and imperceptibility capabilities than other algorithms used in the study. The experimental results based on subjective and objective metrics on various test images with different test conditions showed that the proposed non-blind algorithm exhibits better consistency by producing high visual quality images offering better resistance against external attacks.

Future scope

The new scheme is designed for performing consistently to provide acceptable watermark though the cover image is attacked with different external attacks. Future algorithms can look up on extending the new scheme to provide better quality watermarks for majority of external attacks. Intelligent hybrid solutions can be looked up on with better homogeneity analysis of the carrier and watermark images to achieve better quality watermarked image with comparatively less visual distortions.

Supplemental Information

Computer Code (Matlab) with Test Images.

The main program, and the subfunctions and programs (bloc.m, extract.m, farng.m, iarng.m, izigzag.m, rebloc1.m, watermkg.m, zigzag.m) required for calculations. The carrier and watermark image files are: barb.gif, cameraman.tif.

The images used in this study are non-copyrighted standard image processing test images widely available through many open image databases like http://sipi.usc.edu/database/ and http://www.imageprocessingplace.com/root_files_V3/image_databases.htm.

DOI: 10.7717/peerj-cs.1427/supp-1
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