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The European and Japanese outbreaks of H5N8 derive from a single source population that has most likely been dispersed along the long distance bird migratory flyways

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The origin of recent parallel outbreaks of the high pathogenicity H5N8 avian flu virus in Europe and in Japan can be traced to a single source population, which has most likely been spread by migratory birds. By using Bayesian coalescence methods to analyze the DNA sequences of the virus to find the times for divergence and combining bird migration data we can show the most likely locations and migratory pathways involved in the origin of the current outbreak. This population was most likely located in the Siberian summer breeding grounds of long-range migratory birds. These breeding grounds provide a connection between different migratory flyways and explain the current outbreaks in remote locations. By combining genetic methods and epidemiological data we can rapidly identify the sources and the dispersion pathways for novel avian influenza outbreaks.

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11 Introduction

12 The H5N8 subtype of influenza A is a comparatively rare influenza A subtype that was first isolated
13 from a turkey in Ireland in 1983 (Murphy 1986). After that initial outbreak there were no more cases of
14 H5N8 until 2001 when a case was identified during environmental monitoring in a wild bird in New
15 Jersey. Since then there have been a few sporadic detections in the United States but the biggest single
16 outbreak to date has been in Korea in January 2014 (Lee et al. 2014).

17
18 This outbreak was preceded by cases in Eastern China in 2010 that are distinct from the American
19 virus. Although the Korean outbreak strains had the same subtype the Asian outbreak seems to have
20 been the product of a re-assortment of viral segments from other H5 containing subtypes such as H5N1
21 or H5N5 and an N8 containing subtype, rather than from the evolution of the previous H5N8 lineages
22 (Lee et al. 2014; Zhao et al. 2013). The Korean outbreak has been subdivided into two lineages one of
23 which is closely related to the Chinese sequences and that has only been identified in two samples in
24 Gochang and a second that contains all the other cases and that was originally identified in Buan (Fan
25 et al. 2014; Jeong et al. 2014).

26
27 The H5N8 virus is an example of a highly pathogenic avian influenza A (HPAI). These HPAI viruses
28 pose a significant threat to domestic poultry as mortality rates amongst chickens are particularly high
29 and can reach 100%. Recent studies of the virus have shown that it has a pathogenicity index of 3 in
30 chickens (Kim et al. 2014). This is significantly higher than that of the original H5N8 from Ireland
31 although that is a distinct lineage (Alexander et al. 1986). The management of the outbreak in Korea in
32 early 2014 resulted in the culling of over 10 million birds or 6% of the total Korean poultry flock

33 (Kang). Ducks and particularly wild ducks such as mallards are often asymptomatic but can still be
34 carriers of the H5N8 virus (Bae et al. 2014; Kang ; Kim et al. 2014).

35

36 Currently unlike H5N1, H5N8 is not considered a threat to human health as there has not been a case
37 of transmission to humans. However this might be a result of the low incidence of the subtype as
38 studies have shown that it can be transmitted to ferrets and mice, and antibodies have been detected in
39 domestic dogs (Kim et al. 2014). The results of genetic analysis of the H5N8 virus in infected ferrets
40 have also shown that that mutations to a mammalian transmissible form occur rapidly.

41

42 In November 2014 H5N8 was detected in Europe with outbreaks in poultry farms in the Netherlands,
43 Germany and the United Kingdom. At the same time the virus was also detected in farmed birds and
44 wild birds in Japan. This study identifies the probable geographical source and pathway for dispersal of
45 the November/December outbreaks of H5N8.

47 Materials and Methods

48 The complete set of available H5N8 nucleotide sequences were downloaded from the NCBI influenza
49 virus resource and GISAID (Bao et al. 2008; Bogner et al. 2006). The search was restricted to complete
50 sequences of H5N8 within the NCBI influenza virus resource.

51

52 All of the sequences were aligned with Muscle v3.8.31 (Edgar 2004). Manual inspection and editing of
53 the sequences was carried out using Mega6.06 (Tamura et al. 2013). During manual editing the 5' end
54 of the sequence was edited to remove the un-translated region. All sequences begin at the start codon.
55 Sequences with missing nucleotides were removed. This included the German turkey sequence and 3
56 Chinese duck sequences. There was no editing at the 3' end of the nucleotide sequences as influenza
57 uses a variety of stop codons that are sometimes repeated. Tip dates were assigned according to the
58 year of collection.

59

60 A subset of the sequences was created for the detailed analysis of the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase
61 sequences containing only the sequences from 2014. This provides a more detailed analysis for
62 calculating the divergence dates from the Korean outbreak. For these calculations tip dates were given
63 in months before December 2014. This solves the problem of missing data from earlier sequences
64 where months might not be available.

65

66 Bayesian Coalescence trees were calculated for all the different segments and the subsets using
67 Beast2.1.3 (Bouckaert et al. 2014). The model used assumed an exponential population growth and tip

68 dates were set from the sequence collection dates. The Hasegawa-Kishino-Yano nucleotide substitution
69 model was used with an assumed rigid molecular clock (Hasegawa et al. 1985) as this was shown to
70 give the highest posterior probabilities when compared to other substitution models. All simulations
71 were performed as a single run with a minimum of 10 million iterations and 20 million for the NA,
72 PB1, PB2, PA and NS segments, and a burn-in of 10%.

73
74 Analysis of the Bayesian coalescence output was carried out using Tracer1.6.0 (Rambaut &
75 Drummond 2013a). All simulations were run until the effective sample sizes for all of the parameters
76 in the model were over 200. The maximum clade credibility trees were calculated using Treeannotater
77 2.1.2 along with the median node heights and the final tree diagrams were generated using
78 FigTree1.4.2 (Rambaut 2007; Rambaut & Drummond 2013b).

79
80 The locations of the H5N8 cases were taken from the EMPRES Global Animal Disease Information
81 System (EMPRES-i) and information about the original reports were sourced from the Avian Flu Diary
82 Blog (<http://afludiary.blogspot.co.uk/>). The map was created using Google maps and is available from:
83 <https://www.google.com/maps/d/edit?mid=zcvUWKLLjKsE.kvYJ1NxAer8k>

85 Results and Discussion

86 The Bayesian coalescence analysis of the complete set of H5N8 sequences produces a consistent gene
87 tree, where the same clade structure is produced for all eight segments (supplementary figures 1 to 8).
88 These show that the European and Japanese sequences all form a single cluster closely related to, but
89 distinct from those found in the Korean outbreak. This clustering suggests that the viruses are likely to
90 come from a single source population.

91
92 Bayesian coalescent analysis of the 2014 sequences also permits the sequence divergence time to be
93 calculated with greater accuracy (Lemey et al. 2009). The Bayesian coalescent trees for the 2014
94 hemagglutinin gene segments and the neuraminidase gene segments are shown in figures 1 and 2. The
95 bars above the branch points represent the 95% highest posterior density for the distance between
96 branches. The x-axis represents the date in months starting from January 2014. For the viral
97 hemagglutinin gene segment the cluster of sequences responsible for the current European and
98 Japanese outbreaks diverged between a median value of 1.58 and 5.53 months before December 2014
99 (95% highest posterior density), if the hemagglutinin sequence from the German sample was omitted.
100 This sequence was excluded because of a nine base truncation at the 5' end. In a reconstructed tree
101 where this sequence was included and the missing nucleotides were inferred to be the same as those
102 from all of the other sequences the median time for divergence from the Korean sequences increases to
103 between 3.22 and 7.33 months before December 2014 (95% highest posterior density). Only the
104 hemagglutinin and neuraminidase segments are available from the infected German turkey and the
105 median divergence time calculated from the neuraminidase tree is from 1.39 to 6.21 months before
106 December 2014 (95% highest posterior density).

107

108 During the Korean outbreak a large number of wild birds were also affected, particularly in the region
109 around the Dong-Lim reservoir (Jeong et al. 2014). One of the bird species that was found to be
110 infected was the Baikal Teal (*Anas formosa*) which is a migratory species that over-winters in Korea
111 before returning to North Eastern Siberia to breed during the summer months (Allport et al. 1991). This
112 migration coincided with the last Korean H5N8 sequences identified in wild birds during the initial
113 outbreak. This migration also falls within the range of divergence dates from the Bayesian coalescence
114 analysis for the current cluster of H5N8 cases in Europe. This result strongly suggests that the virus
115 was carried to the Siberian breeding grounds as the Baikal teal migrated north and that the European
116 and Japanese sequences evolved there.

117

118 The wide geographic dispersal of the current outbreaks gives further support to the contention that
119 migratory birds are the source of the virus. Most of the recent cases occur close to the coastline and in
120 areas where there lakes and known sites for waterfowl and migratory birds. In Holland the virus has
121 been identified in widgeon and in Germany it was found in a common teal (*Anas crecca*) that had no
122 apparent clinical symptoms. The Japanese have recently identified the wild bird species infected with
123 the virus as tundra swans (*Cygnus columbianus*), white naped cranes (*Grus vipio*), pochards (*Aythya*
124 *ferina*) and wild ducks (*Anas platyrhynchos*).

125

126 The breeding grounds and migratory staging grounds for Baikal teal overlap with those for many other
127 migratory species including common species such as mallards, pochards, widgeon (*Anas penelope*),
128 common teal, whooper swans (*Cygnus cygnus*) and tundra swans, as well as endangered species such

129 as white-naped cranes (Miyabayashi & Mundkur 1999). Mallard and teal have previously been
130 identified as having a high prevalence (between 6 and 7%) for influenza A virus (Munster et al. 2007).
131 The bird migrations flow from Siberia along the five different flyways that overlap in Central Siberia.
132 They are the East Atlantic, East Asia Australian, East Africa West Asia, Central Asia and Black Sea
133 Mediterranean flyways. So far H5N8 infections in birds have only been detected in the East Atlantic
134 and East Asian Australian flyways (figure 9). The absence from other flyways can be explained either
135 through transmission by a limited number of bird migratory species, or because of the lack of
136 surveillance in these geographical regions. Although there have been a few cases recently reported in
137 North America these are from the different lineage not related to the Korean outbreak.

138
139 This year the winter migration has been later than usual because of the warmer autumn weather. Ideally
140 satellite-tracking data would be available for all of the migrating species from their summer breeding
141 grounds. However tracking data is only available for species of interest that include Bewick swans
142 (*Cygnus bewickii*), a sub-species of Tundra swans. These tracking data show that their migration was
143 delayed until late October and early November, which coincided with the European outbreaks of the
144 H5N8 virus (Slimbridge Wildlife Trust).

145
146 Gaidet and co-workers considering the spread of another HPAI, H5N1 suggested that the risk of
147 transmission by migratory birds was only a low risk because of the need for asymptomatic infections
148 and also taking into account the distances travelled, the time taken and the number of staging points
149 along the journey (Gaidet et al. 2010). However low pathogenicity avian influenza have been shown to
150 spread via migrating birds because the large majority of cases remain asymptomatic (Dusek et al. 2014;

151 Lam et al. 2012). In the case of high pathogenicity H5N8, the virus has been shown to be
152 asymptomatic in mallards, and there would have been selection of virus variants that are asymptomatic
153 amongst the Baikal teal if the disease has been carried by a migrant bird (Bae et al. 2014; Kang ; Kim
154 et al. 2014). Dispersion of the virus through migratory flyways still requires that there is relay infection
155 for the virus to spread over very long migratory distances.

156
157 Previous studies had shown that there was a spatio-temporal relationship between bird migration and
158 the spread of the HPAI H5N1 subtype (Takekawa et al. 2010). However it was not possible to show
159 that transmission by the migratory birds was the cause of this correlation. In this case the genetic data
160 and the calculated divergence times show that the evolutionary events responsible for generating the
161 European and Japanese cases occurred in the summer months in a single location.

162
163 The initial outbreak affected a large number of birds during the period close to the main spring
164 migration this increased the likelihood of long-range transmission. The spread of the virus requires that
165 there is relay infection so that it spreads amongst susceptible birds at the migratory staging points, in
166 order to provide the next step in transmission. This is seen with the presence of an increased number of
167 cases at staging points such as the Netherlands. This is supported by the current limited amount of data,
168 although there are other staging points in Estonia and in Denmark where there have not been any
169 reported cases (Beekman et al. 2002; Green et al. 2002).

170

171 **Conclusions**

172 The results presented here give strong support to the view that the H5N8 outbreaks that occurred in
173 Europe and Japan in December 2014 originated from a single source population. Although there is no
174 direct evidence of what this source population was it is likely that the virus was spread along long-
175 range migratory routes as trade is a less likely source given the absence in disease infections during the
176 summer months. This suggests that the summer breeding grounds for migratory species such as Baikal
177 teal are the most likely geographical location for the source of the outbreaks.

178 Increased monitoring for HPAI is needed in areas where there is overlap between migrating species,
179 especially if this zone links very disparate geographical regions. This could be achieved through
180 environmental monitoring of faecal samples in areas where migratory birds congregate. In the case of
181 H5N8 the main costs are economic as it is not currently a human pathogenic subtype, but it has had
182 devastating consequences for the Korean poultry industry. However the longer the virus is in
183 circulation in wild birds and poultry the more likely it is that a human case will occur, especially
184 considering the close relationship to the H5N1 strains and existing evidence that shows the virus can
185 reproduce in mammalian hosts.

186

187 It is important to involve local communities and experts as well as farmers so that we can significantly
188 improve the monitoring network giving earlier warning of potential epidemics. This also means
189 improved communication between international organizations and making the biological sequence data
190 available in a timely manner.

191

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193

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195 of information for the current outbreak.

196

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
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268

1

Bayesian coalescence gene tree for hemagglutinin

Bayesian coalescence gene tree for the 2014 H5N8 hemagglutinin sequences. The blue bars on the nodes represent the 95% highest posterior densities of the branch heights (this is the time for divergence in months). The European and Japanese clade is highlighted in red. 0 on the x-axis represents January 2014.



2

Bayesian coalescence tree for neuraminidase

Bayesian coalescence gene tree for the 2014 H5N8 neuraminidase sequences. The blue bars on the nodes represent the 95% highest posterior densities of the branch heights (this is the time for divergence in months). The European and Japanese clade is highlighted in red. 0 on the x-axis represents January 2014.




Figure 3 (on next page)

Migratory flyways and cases of H5N8.

Bird migratory flyways and the December 2014 cases of H5N8. The Eastern Asian Australian flyway is in red. The East Atlantic flyway is in dark blue. An expandable version of this map is available from: <https://www.google.com/maps/d/viewer?mid=zcvUWKLLjKsE.kvYJ1NxAer8k> -

Map Data (C) 2015 Google, INEGI

H5N8

H5N8 cases

● All items

Flyways

◻ East Atlantic Flyway

◻ East Asian Australian Flyway

East Asian Australian Flyway

Map of H5N8 cases December 2014

