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Large-scale human groups cannot rely on shared genetic interests or dyadic reciprocity to ensure social cohesion as genetic similarity is low and indirect reciprocity is rife; nevertheless, such societies continue to cohere, due to the evolution of novel regulatory mechanisms that inhibit defaulting on social obligations: moral sentiments and actions. The present paper argues that the extent of moral concern can be most usefully identified by defining the set of functions required to sustain a human ‘superorganism’. These functions are determined to be boundary, production, distribution, storage, control, structure, enforcement, signaling, memory, excretion, perception and reproductive functions. Moral obligations to act arise when individuals default on contributing to these functions. To test this approach, roughly 80,000 respondents from over 200 countries completed a web-based experiment hosted by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). This experiment elicited a suite of responses to a set of 33 short scenarios derived from the 13 domains of superorganism function. Results indicate that all functions are moralized, while violations falling outside this domain (social conventions and individual decisions) are not. People living in larger communities exhibited stronger moral sentiments and action propensities, consistent with the greater interdependence of living in groups with more social roles. Such people were also more likely to see the function of the justice system as supporting group-level protection rather than personal recrimination or restitution, were more willing to engage in punishment of those who failed to punish cheaters, and more offended by those who choose not to contribute to social welfare. These results support the contention of Human Superorganism Theory that large-scale human groups strongly rely on moral propensities to regulate those who fail to perform superorganismal functions. Given this supporting evidence, we believe this new approach to defining the moral domain has implications for fields ranging from psychology to legal theory.