

1 **Effectiveness of the national pollutant release inventory as a policy**
2 **tool to curb atmospheric industrial emissions in Canada**

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11 **Highlights**

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13 • National Pollutant Release Inventory data accuracy is understudied

14 • Facilities across steel making, power generation, and oil extraction sectors report increasing
15 emissions

16 • Self-reported data from industry requires verification to ensure government programs are
17 successful in achieving their goals

18

19 **Abstract**

20 To curb greenhouse gas emissions and reduce concentrations of toxic substances in Canada's
21 atmosphere, many pieces of environment legislation are targeted at reducing industrial
22 emissions. Traditional regulation prescribes penalties through fines to discourage industries from
23 polluting, but in the past two decades, alternative forms of environmental regulation like the
24 National Pollutant Release Inventory (NPRI) have been introduced. NPRI is an information
25 management tool which requires industries to self-report emissions data based on a set of
26 guidelines determined by Environment and Climate Change Canada, a federal agency. The tool
27 works to inform the public regarding industry emissions and provides a large database that can
28 be analyzed by researchers and regulators to inform emissions trends in Canada. These tools
29 have seen some success in other jurisdictions (e.g., United States and Australia). However, some
30 research assessing the U.S Toxic Release Inventory suggests there are fundamental weaknesses
31 in the self-reported nature of the data, and incidences of under-reporting. This preliminary study
32 aimed to explore NPRI in Canada and test its effectiveness against the National Air Pollutant
33 Surveillance Network (NAPS), an air quality monitoring program administered by the federal
34 government. While instances of under-reporting were undetected, their study identified areas of
35 weakness in the NPRI tool and instances of increasing emissions across various industrial sectors
36 in Canada.

37

38 **Keywords:** Air pollution; National Pollution Release Inventory; National Air Pollutant
39 Surveillance Network; Industrial emissions; Self reporting; Environmental regulation.

40

41 1. Introduction

42

43 A regulatory tool that has recently gained traction as an alternative to traditional forms of
44 environmental regulation are information management tools that provide publicly available self-
45 reported data from industry (Bui and Meyer, 2003). These tools have been implemented
46 successfully internationally. The United States (U.S.) Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) is arguably
47 the most developed environmental pollutant reporting system and longest running tool,
48 beginning in 1986 (US EPA, 2016). Australia also recently developed such a tool, the National
49 Pollutant Inventory (NPI) in 1998, basing much of the guidelines on the TRI (Australian
50 Government, 2015). Enacted under federal legislation, the National Pollutant Release Inventory
51 (NPRI) is Canada's version of the information management tool (Tang & Mudd, 2014). The
52 NPRI provides publically-accessible data regarding pollutant emissions and transfers from a
53 variety of industries across the country. The NPRI was first established in 1993 and received
54 legislative authority under the *Canadian Environmental Protection Act* in 1999. The tool is
55 managed solely by the federal agency, Environment and Climate Change Canada (ECCC)
56 (ECCC, 2016a).

57

58 Commercial facilities and industries that surpass reporting thresholds outlined under CEPA are
59 required, by law, to report emissions data to the inventory. Failing to report emissions is
60 punishable under CEPA 1999 guidelines (ECCC, 2016a). It is the facility's responsibility to
61 gather their own data for reporting, which has been a point of discussion in the true accuracy of
62 the tool. Reporting is aimed at gathering data on significant point-sources and contaminants of
63 high quantities present in the environment. Currently, there are 343 listed substances tracked by
64 NPRI and in 2014, 7720 facilities reported to the database (ECCC, 2016a). Since its inception,

65 substances have been added or removed based on their current use or environmental effects.
66 ECCC may refer to other countries that have similar tools in place to guide the substance list.
67 Similarly, advancements in science and technology may prompt the addition of new substances
68 that had not been previously considered. Although reporting is required by law, reducing
69 emissions is voluntary, making the tool an alternative to conventional policy and regulation
70 (ECCC, 2016a).

71
72 The data is organized and compiled into an online database, accessible to the public
73 (<https://www.ec.gc.ca/inrp-npri/>). The NPRI intends to serve many functions. The inventory has
74 five major goals to: (1) assist in identifying pollution prevention priorities; (2) support the
75 assessment and risk management of chemicals and air quality monitoring; (3) help develop
76 regulations to reduce releases of air pollutants; (4) promote actions to reduce emissions; and (5)
77 inform the public (ECCC, 2016a). In recent years, the NPRI has also worked to inform
78 multilateral environmental agreements, such as the Clean Air Strategy (Officer of the Auditor
79 General, 2009). The tool provides communities information that may inform their purchasing
80 habits, and attitudes towards particular industries. Interestingly, the government does not make
81 explicit reference to the NPRI's ability to give power to the public in a 'right to know'
82 framework. It is the intention, however, that the NPRI tool acts as an incentive for industries to
83 improve their environmental standards.

84
85 Overall, the NPRI programs had been viewed as successful in the early literature
86 assessing the first few years of the NPRI being in effect (Harrison and Antweiler, 2003a). It was
87 estimated that the first three years of the NPRI brought a reduction of 38% in reported emissions.

88 Similar results were seen in the U.S., prompting many observers to suggest self-reporting
89 policies may be equally as effective as traditional regulatory measures (Harrison and Antweiler,
90 2003a, Dingwerth and Eichinger, 2010).

91
92 However, there has been some evidence suggesting weaknesses in the programs. Issues
93 including lack of compliance, data inaccuracies, and the omission of substances from reporting
94 have been suggested for the US TRI (Gottlieb et al., 1995). One such study identified under-
95 reporting in the US TRI after comparing the self-reported data to air quality surveillance
96 monitoring stations around emitting facilities (DeMarchi and Hamilton, 2006). In a review of
97 current literature regarding Canada's NPRI, very few studies were identified (eg. Hoffman et al.,
98 2015). In particular, there were no identified empirical studies that examined NPRI data in
99 comparison to measured ambient emissions.

100
101 In efforts to understand the potential weaknesses that may exist in the NPRI, self-
102 reported data was compared to monitoring data from the National Air Pollutant Surveillance
103 Network (NAPS) (<https://www.ec.gc.ca/rnspa-naps>). NAPS data is collected, monitored, and
104 analyzed by ECCC and has air quality monitoring stations across Canada. By using the NAPS as
105 a reliable indication of pollutant concentrations in the atmosphere around Canadian facilities,
106 comparisons were drawn between trends in both datasets. This study aims to (1) outline the
107 current NPRI and NAPS programs; (2) understanding the current theoretical framework
108 governing pollution abatement incentives; (3) compare NPRI and NAPS data to inform the
109 accuracy of reporting; (4) analyze NPRI data and trends, and; (5) provide recommendations on
110 improving the NPRI program.

111

112 *1.1 National Pollutant Release Inventory*

113 The NPRI was initially received as a success from many scholars and policy-makers considering
114 the initial few years of the program (Harrison and Antweiler, 2003b). Their positive outlook
115 suggested the intention of the inventory, to publicize otherwise embarrassing data, had prompted
116 consumer or environmental group pressure to influence industries. However, other factors may
117 be driving decreasing emissions such as regulations or economic factors. Harrison and Antweiler
118 (2003) attempted to understand what was driving polluters to lower emissions by examining
119 NPRI data. They assessed the percent change of NPRI data over a seven-year period between
120 1993-1999. However, the authors pointed out that during the time that data was collected, many
121 reporting changes had been occurring due to the relative infancy of the NPRI.

122

123 An interesting observation in the data is that a few particular facilities had exceptionally
124 large emission reductions which influenced the overall provincial and national reduction
125 percentages (Harrison & Antweiler, 2003). The drastic reduction in a paint pigment facility was
126 seen as an anomaly and prompted by federal and provincial regulatory enforcement actions
127 (Harrison & Antweiler, 2003). Similarly, pulp and paper mills, which also contributed greatly to
128 the overall emission reductions, were under the control of extensive provincial regulatory
129 reforms in the 1990s and stricter federal enforcement measures (Harrison, 1995, 1996).

130 Following an analysis on the introduction of guidelines for pollutant releases, it was found the
131 pulp and paper mills reduced emissions likely because of traditional forms of regulation, such as
132 provincial industrial approval regulations (Hoffman et al., 2015). While the studies were not able
133 to definitively conclude the sole reason for decreased emissions, presumably reductions may be

134 attributable to a combination of factors, including traditional regulatory instruments (Harrison,
135 1996).

136 Harrison and Antweiler (2003) did, however, identify some fundamental weaknesses in
137 the NPRI tool. Of most evident, is the self-reporting nature of the tool. The industries ability to
138 report and recover their own data presents a clear bias, and combined with minimal oversight
139 from regulating bodies, industries are often left to estimate. These estimations are under no
140 particular scrutiny for reliability, which can have the potential for hugely miscalculated values.
141 Further, estimation methods may be altered over time, which can skew the data. For example,
142 research on the U.S. TRI found that 50% of industries studied reported production-related waste
143 reductions, were actually re-categorizing waste streams, rather than actual reduction in pollution
144 levels (Natan and Miller, 1998). Last, the NPRI is focussed on high-quantity emissions from
145 toxic contaminants. Some toxic contaminants can pose human or ecological health problems at
146 very low concentrations, which may be over looked (Harrison and Antweiler, 2003). The NPRI
147 undergoes extensive changes each year. These changes may be the addition of substances,
148 alterations in reporting methods, or recommendations for estimation methods, which poses
149 problems when assessing the data over time (Fig. 1).

150 <FIGURE 1 HERE>

151 *1.2 National Air Pollutant Surveillance Network*

152 The NAPS network is another emissions monitoring tool managed by ECCC to gather long-term
153 ambient air quality data, for public release, from 286 stations across Canada. The program is a
154 collaboration between multiple provinces, territories, and municipalities (Fig. 2; ECCC, 2013;
155 Hoffman et al., submitted). Stations collect samples in air canisters are then analyzed by ECCC
156 for over 167 volatile organic compounds, including sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and

157 particulate matter. The program has been in effect since 1970, providing consistent data for >20
158 years (ECCC, 2013).

159 <Fig 2 here>

160 <Table 1 here>

161
162 The NAPS network is arguably a more accurate environmental monitoring tool than NPRI
163 (Table 1). For example, NAPS data is collected and analyzed by ECCC. Whereas, NPRI data is
164 voluntarily reported introducing potential inaccuracies or under-reporting (Hoffman et al., 2015).
165 Further, NAPS is a consistent monitoring tool, in which hourly, daily, and monthly data are
166 produced (ECCC, 2013). Data has been collected and analyzed using similar methods since
167 inception. By comparison, NPRI is self-reported, and self-estimated data. Substance releases
168 have been based on thresholds determined by ECCC (ECCC, 2016a), but thresholds have
169 frequently changed year-to-year, making inter-annual emissions comparisons difficult.
170 Moreover, NPRI self-reporting provides flexibility in the collection of emissions data. Emissions
171 to land, water, and air are reported on-site. Recently, facilities were also required to report
172 emissions off-site. ECCC (2016a) recommends best practices for estimating emissions data;
173 however, industries often alter methods used to calculate emissions. Facilities are also required
174 to maintain their own records using their own methods, which introduce opportunities for
175 inaccuracies in reported releases.

176 **2. Incentives for Pollution Abatement**

177
178 The NPRI works as a tool to inform the public, regulatory bodies, and industry about their
179 emissions data. Several incentives exist that drive pollution abatement by industries. A

180 combination of internal and external pressures work to effect change in a facilities pollution
181 control. Internal pressures include the number of employees working at a facility, which
182 influences the scale of production, management, and production volume. According to Harrison
183 and Antweiler (2003), external factors are categorized into five groups: consumers, workers,
184 shareholders, community groups, and regulators.

185

186 In another study, Antweiler and Harrison (2003) assessed how industries respond to pressures
187 from verified or anticipated green consumerism. They used economic modelling to predict the
188 effect of green consumerism on companies. Results indicated potential impact of green
189 consumerism on companies with greater exposure to consumer markets. For example, companies
190 that were more likely to be influenced by green consumerism, made great progress in decreasing
191 emissions. However, the impact of green consumerism identified in the model was still very
192 small.

193

194 Another incentive to reduce emissions in response to programs like NPRI is benefits from public
195 recognition. A company that adheres to these programs, reduces emissions, and publicizes their
196 success in participating in voluntary programs may not only improve public perception of the
197 company, but other benefits. These benefits allow firms to increase market shares, or increase
198 prices for their products because of participation in NPRI-like programs (Khanna, 2001).

199 Community groups and environmental watchdog organizations can pressure companies to
200 participate in pollution abatement activities. Harrison and Antweiler (2003), suggest at the
201 national and local levels interest groups typically focus on facilities with the highest emissions.
202 Larger facilities that receive more interest from interest groups are more likely to curb emissions.

203
204 Incentives to reduce emissions are not solely from community pressures, but also investor and
205 market-based pressures. These pressures may be for a variety of reasons whether investors have
206 true concerns about the environment, receive community pressure, self-interest in negative
207 effects from a community, or government pressures (Harrison and Antweiler, 2003). Similarly,
208 facilities that do exhibit poor environmental performance, investors may view this as a risk to
209 exposing the company to liability, penalties, and the costs of compliance in the future. These
210 influences may have the potential to alter the company's stock prices (Khanna et al., 1998).
211 Traditional regulation and coercive pieces of legislation are arguably one of the greatest
212 incentives for pollution abatement. Understandably, facilities will reduce emissions if required to
213 do so by law. Therefore, traditional regulation that may be the cause for decreases in emissions
214 observed in NPRI and TRI programs. Several studies suggested that increasingly strict
215 regulations were the most important determining factor for facilities to reduce emissions
216 (Khanna, 1999). In particular, Harrison and Antweiler (2003) found that traditional regulations
217 like the *Fisheries Act* and *Canadian Environmental Protection Act* were the greatest causes for
218 emission reductions reported in NPRI during the 1990s.

219 **3. Methods**

220
221 To understand accuracy of NPRI reporting, a comparison of emission trends between NPRI and
222 NAPS data was conducted. Emission trends were compared at three facilities across Canada
223 including paper and pulp, energy generation, and steel making. Multiple industry types were
224 selected to compare trends across different sectors. When choosing facilities, the amount of
225 available data was considered. Initial review of NPRI data yielded many gaps in reported

226 emissions that would not provide sufficient data for analysis. Facilities with multiple data gaps
227 were omitted. Further, consideration was given to the types of reported substances. To compare
228 NPRI and NAPS data, substances that were reported consistently between 2002 and 2015 were
229 required. Three reported substances overlapped between NAPS and NPRI, and were used for this
230 study (sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide, and nitrogen dioxide). Locations of facilities and
231 location of NAPS stations were also considered. According to DeMarchi and Hamilton (2006),
232 when comparing the TRI inventory to an air surveillance monitoring, a radius of 50 km was used
233 between facilities and monitoring stations. For this study, facilities and monitoring stations were
234 between 3.5 and 10km away. Wind direction was not considered in this study.

235
236 Facilities included a steel plant in Hamilton, Ontario (ArcelorMittal Dofasco, 43°15'34.9"N
237 79°48'40.0"W), energy generation plant in Sault Ste. Marie in northern Ontario (Essar Power,
238 46°31'18.1"N 84°21'49.3"W), and an oil and gas facility in Fort McKay, Alberta (Suncor Power,
239 57°02'33.0"N 111°54'18.0"W). The NAPS and NPRI websites were used to collect all data.
240 Yearly mean (ppb) emissions for each substance were recorded from 2002 to 2015. Data was
241 imported into Microsoft Excel to create scatter plots and calculate correlations.

242

243 **4. Results**

244

245 *4.1 NPRI Data*

246 In the steel making facility, slight upward trends were observed for all substance releases, but all
247 were weakly correlated (Fig. 3). Nitrogen dioxide emissions were highly variable, particularly,
248 between 2014 and 2015 where a sharp decline was observed.

249

250 Consistent decreases in emissions were observed across all substances at the energy generation
251 plant ($R^2 = 0.353-0.763$) (Fig. 4). Sulphur dioxide showed only a weak decreasing correlation
252 where emissions were lower in 2009 but increased by 2012. Carbon monoxide and nitrogen
253 dioxide decreased sharply releases decreased sharply. The lowest recorded emissions were
254 observed between 2009 and 2010 for all 3 substances. Peak nitrogen and carbon monoxide
255 emissions were observed in 2008.

256
257 Oil and gas operations in Fort McKay at the Suncor plant showed consistent increases in
258 emissions between 2002-2015 (Fig. 5). Sulphur dioxide emissions increased seven-fold from
259 2002 to 2015 ($R^2 = 0.65$). In 2012, releases reached 180 kg/year. Nitrogen dioxide releases have
260 seen two considerable peaks in emissions during 2009 and 2012. Only weak upward correlations
261 were observed in nitrogen dioxide and carbon monoxide releases.

262

263 *4.2 NAPS Data*

264 NAPS data is collected and analyzed continuously. Mean annual measurements of substances at
265 stations showed wide variation. NAPS data was measured and reported in parts per billion (ppb).

266

267 Mean sulphur dioxide concentrations near the Elgin and Kelly monitoring station (steel industry)
268 showed little temporal variation. Initial measurements in 2002 showed an average sulfur dioxide
269 concentration of 5 ppb. After 13 years, average concentrations in 2015 were 5.1 ppb. Mean
270 nitrogen dioxide concentrations decreased slightly after 13 years (21 to 12 ppb). Carbon
271 monoxide concentrations were stable with the inter-annual variation.

272

273 Mean nitrogen dioxide concentrations measured near the power generating monitoring station
274 remained constant at 5 ppb from 2006-2015. Prior to 2006, data were unavailable and were not
275 included in this study. Mean sulphur dioxide concentrations varied between 0.6 - 2 ppb
276 throughout the study. Mean carbon monoxide concentrations were unavailable. Missing data and
277 monitoring stations lacking analyses for particular substances were common making data
278 interpretation challenging.

279

280 Mean sulphur dioxide concentrations remained stable near the oil and gas NAPS monitoring
281 station (~1 ppb). Data were missing for 2007. Mean nitrogen dioxide concentrations increased
282 slightly from 4 to 7 ppb at the Fort McKay monitoring station. Mean carbon monoxide data were
283 unavailable. Although, the next nearest monitoring station (30 km east of the original monitoring
284 station) reported data.

285

286 *4.3 NPRI vs. NAPS*

287 Mean NPRI and NAPS concentration data were compared to assess for correlations and
288 determine accuracy of NPRI data. Carbon monoxide concentrations in NAPS data from the
289 power generation and oil and gas sectors were unavailable and were excluded from analyses. In
290 all three substances assessed at the steel making facility, no strong correlations were identified
291 between the NAPS and NPRI data (Fig. 6). At the oil and gas facility, sulphur dioxide emissions
292 had a prominent negative correlation between NAPS and NPRI data (Fig. 7). While NAPS
293 indicated decreasing substance concentrations, NPRI releases showed increasing sulfur dioxide
294 releases from 2002-2015. However, because of stable substance concentrations between NAPS
295 data, it is difficult to observe trends between NAPS and NPRI data. Results from the oil and gas
296 facility indicated very weak correlations between NPRI and NAPS releases. In most cases,

297 NAPS data only had variations between 1-3 ppb changes in substance concentrations. The power
298 generation plant also did not have any strong correlations between NPRI and NAPS data (Fig. 8).
299 Sulphur dioxide showed weak positive correlation because both NPRI and NAPS decreased
300 slightly. Nitrogen dioxide had a fairly weak positive correlation between the NPRI and NAPS
301 data (Fig. 8).

302 **5. Results and Discussion**

303
304 Decreasing emissions were not observed in the oil and gas, and steel industry cases. While only
305 weak increasing substance releases were reported, it raises concerns, despite positive national
306 outlooks from NPRI on emissions. Even slightly increasing emissions suggest that NPRI is
307 failing to inspire the change it aims to promote, nor are other environmental regulations that
308 closely monitor criteria classified air contaminants such as carbon monoxide and sulphur
309 monoxide. The power generation plant was the only example that yielded obvious decreases in
310 emissions over 13 years. Interestingly, in 2009, the Essar power plant opened a co-generation
311 facility to reduce dependence on the provincial power grid by 50% and to reduce nitrous oxide
312 emissions by 15% (400 tonnes/year) (Northern Ontario Business, 2009). However, NPRI results
313 did not indicate substantial decreases in any substances assessed. Many nitrogen dioxide
314 decreased the following year by approximately 220 kg, but emissions have steadily increased
315 since.

316 Between 2012 to 2014, the steel making facility faced 13 different environmental charges by the
317 provincial Ministry of Environment. Charges were related to their coke-making facility and
318 allowing air emissions that blocked light by more than 20% for six consecutive minutes.
319 Permitting light to be blocked by air emissions for this amount of time is a violation of the

320 *Environmental Protection Act*. The company pled guilty to six of the charges and was fined
321 \$350,000 CAD (CBC, 2014a). The lack of decreasing emissions was observed throughout this
322 study despite having traditional regulatory tools (e.g. *Environment Protection Act*). At the steel
323 making facility, only the strictest of regulations may be able to induce change. For example,
324 slight decreases in nitrogen dioxide and sulphur dioxide were observed following the
325 *Environmental Protection Act* violations.

326 It seems unlikely that NPRI has been responsible for positive changes in the steel making facility
327 emission practices as increased emissions were observed for most years. In 2014, Dofasco
328 announced it would be removing one of their coke ovens and upgrading two others (CBC,
329 2014b). Although attributing reductions in emissions due to these upgrades remains to be seen.
330 The oil and gas facility also had increases in emissions, but cyclical nature of the industry may
331 be responsible (Gulas et al., 2017). Suncor itself has also been charged with multiple
332 environmentally related infractions over the past decade (e.g., CBC, 2009). The majority of these
333 violations require payment of a fine and activity can proceed as usual. Seeing as there were
334 increases in emissions over the years it is highly unlikely that NPRI has been successful in
335 informing citizens and igniting industry to take action in reducing their emissions.

336
337 NAPS substance concentrations remained fairly stable over 13 years. Similarly, previous
338 literature found underreporting was occurring in other jurisdictions (e.g. U.S. TRI) (Koehler and
339 Spengler, 2007). It was assumed that NPRI emissions would be decreasing due to the NPRI
340 website indicating successes in decreasing emissions across all sectors (ECCC, 2016a).

341 However, NPRI and NAPS data were compared and there was no strong correlation found. Most
342 NAPS data across all sectors indicated minor decreases in substance concentrations. However,
343 NPRI data mostly indicated increasing in emissions. While underreporting may responsible, this

344 was not verified.. However, increasing emissions in the oil and gas, and steel industry suggest
345 there is no incentive to underreport or implement pollution abatement techniques.

346

347 Underreporting emissions may occur for several reasons. Reputation of the facility may be a
348 reason to underreport emission levels, using a tool such as NPRI which aims to inform the
349 public. Reporting lower emission levels to the NPRI database may also be advantageous for a
350 facility if regulatory officers review the data. For example, it would likely reduce the likelihood
351 of any ‘red flags’ in their emissions. While there may be incentives to underreport, facilities like
352 Dofasco do not seem to receive attention due to NPRI-derived data. Despite NPRI data
353 indicating increases in emissions, Dofasco received penalties because of traditional forms of
354 regulation (e.g. *Environmental Protection Act* violations). Presumably NPRI data informed
355 regulators, but changes in emissions may only result from hefty fines and penalties. Because the
356 NPRI tool receives little attention from the media, community, and NGOs, incentives for
357 companies to improve pollution abatement techniques to reduce emissions levels on the publicly
358 accessible NPRI site remains low.

359

360 **6. Recommendations**

361

362 Although this study provided limited evidence of inaccurate NPRI reporting or a lack of
363 correlation in NAPs and NPRI data, it helps highlight the lack of scholarly research conducted to
364 assess the effectiveness of NPRI. Several studies by Harrison and Antweiler (2003) were used to
365 inform this study, but those were the few studies identified which specially addressing the
366 Canadian environmental monitoring tool (Mudd, 2014). Earlier studies conducted on NPRI were
367 mostly published in the 1990s when the tool was first introduced, but there has been a lack of

368 studies using NPRI data since. Conversely, the U.S.' TRI has an extensive body of literature
369 using the tool to assess effectiveness of TRI data to inform other areas of research, such as health
370 (Currie et al., 2015). The TRI has been established five years longer than NPRI and is more
371 robust (e.g., website accessibility, substance list, and funding). More research related to the NPRI
372 tool is required, as it has the potential to provide information that can readily accessed by the
373 public, researchers, and regulators. For example, more research critically analyzes the tool may
374 assist in improving the NPRI's functions.

375

376 Allowing the public to understand and to subsequently promote change in industry practices and
377 their toxic releases is one of the main goals of information-based tools such as NPRI. However,
378 if data is difficult for the public to access, then the ability of the tool to inform communities may
379 not succeed. A particular issue that creates a level of unawareness is the relationship between
380 reported discharges and impacts to environmental or human health. Trends displayed in the data
381 only provide the weight (mass) of discharged substances; however, these amounts must be
382 compared to guidelines (i.e., CCME) to understand levels of toxicity. Reporting mass discharge
383 does not indicate levels of toxicity or risks imposed. If public understanding is to be increased,
384 then individuals using NPRI data need to understand how toxic emission levels are to their
385 community. Furthermore, improvements in website accessibility would assist public navigation
386 of the site to find information related to facilities in their area. Substance information should be
387 presented more clearly so that the public can understand what the substance is, where it is
388 derived, and what the potential environmental and health impacts are.

389

390 While the self-reporting nature of NPRI creates an inherent weakness in the accuracy of data,
391 particular issues arise when assessing temporal data over time. Facilities that report data may
392 change estimation methods over time. Data is reported to an online system organized by ECCC.
393 Guiding documents on how estimations should be made are provided to organizations, but
394 adopting these methods are not required by law. In previous studies (e.g., DeMarchi and
395 Hamilton, 2006), it was observed changes in emissions were most likely due to *paper reductions*,
396 where facilities altered the way they categorized emissions or substance releases. Considering
397 facilities that meet the standard, by law, must report to NPRI, more stringent estimation
398 measures would increase data accuracy. Over time, guidance documents prepared by ECCC may
399 also alter the recommended estimation protocols used to measure substances. When using NPRI
400 data, changes to reporting methodology should be taken into account when assessing temporal
401 trends.

402 Similarly, thresholds used to determine whether a substance should be reported. These thresholds
403 may also change over time, creating data gaps. Sectors required to report is also a changing
404 variable in NPRI reporting, which further reduces the accuracy of data. Despite NPRI reporting
405 being required under law, facilities are not required to conduct additional monitoring beyond
406 what information is available and what is already required under the provisions of other
407 legislation or bylaws. Because of this, there is not enough incentive for facilities to improve their
408 quality of data reporting. Another weakness in NPRI is facilities are not required to report to
409 NPRI if they have less than ten employees, despite producing NPRI-listed substances, small
410 facilities may still cause large impacts on the environment depending on released substances but
411 will not be reported on NPRI, reducing the number of reporting facilities. Improving the
412 accuracy of data is not limited to reporting measures, but also quality assurance. Most quality

413 checks to ensure data is properly reported is desk based through the reporting computer system.
414 Increasing on-site visits to ensure substance reporting is accurate may improve the overall
415 accuracy and place pressure on facilities to always maintain accuracy record keeping of their
416 emissions. Improving our accuracy of NPRI data may not only improve analyses but may entice
417 more attention from researchers and greater use by the public.

418

419 **7. Conclusion**

420 The NPRI tool was once met with praise as a new form of regulation aimed at decreasing
421 emissions in Canada. Initially decreases were seen across the country; however, studies from
422 other jurisdictions have indicated flaws in self-reported information tools citing underreporting
423 of emissions and inaccuracy in substance release estimation. This study sought to assess the
424 accuracy of NPRI data by comparing substance release data to NAPS measurements. Emissions
425 have increased over time in steel and oil and gas facilities assessed. Further, NAPS data
426 indicated only very slight decreases. No strong correlations were identified when NPRI and
427 NAPS data were compared. The lack of correlations makes it difficult to identify whether these
428 datasets are consistent or inconsistent with each other. No conclusive evidence was found of
429 underreporting. Despite the NPRI website reporting decreases in emissions across the county, the
430 facilities assessed in this study reported that emissions have increased. Improvements should be
431 made to the NPRI tool to strengthen its effectiveness in meeting its goals. Improving public
432 understanding of the tool is key to increasing the power NPRI may have in influencing facilities
433 to decrease their emissions. By making improvements to the NPRI tool, the public may have
434

435 increased awareness of emissions in their communities, inspiring them to promote change in
436 industrial pollution.

437

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531 **Table 1.:** Comparing NPRI and NAPS.

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	NPRI	NAPS
Reporting Method	Self-reported	Year round monitoring stations
Frequency of Reporting	Annually	Hourly
Analysis	Yearly ECCC report	Yearly ECCC report
Substances Listed Amount	343	167
Years of Reporting	24 (started in 1993)	36 (Started in 1970)

534

535 **Figure Legends**

536

537 **Fig. 1.** Changes made to the NPRI substance list over time (adapted from ECCC, 2016a).

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539 **Fig. 2.** Locations of NAPS monitoring stations across Canada (adapted from ECCC, 2013).

540 **Fig. 3.** Steel industry NPRI data (kg) from 2002-2015.

541 **Fig. 4.** Power generation NPRI data (kg) from 2002-2015.

542 **Fig. 5.** Oil and gas NPRI data (kg) from 2002-2015.

543 **Fig. 6.** Comparison of NPRI and NAPS data for each substance for a steel making facility from

544 2002-2015.

545 **Fig. 7.** Comparison of NPRI and NAPS data for sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide for an oil

546 and gas facility from 2002-2015.

547 **Fig. 8.** Comparison of NPRI and NAPS data for sulphur dioxide and nitrogen dioxide for a


548 power generation facility from 2002-2015.

549 **Fig. 1**

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556 **Fig. 2**

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


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
561 **Fig. 3**

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
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


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
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568 **Fig. 4.**


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


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


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
573 **Fig. 5.**
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
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
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
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578 **Fig. 6.**

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


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582 **Fig. 7.**


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584 (a)



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586 (b)



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
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599 **Fig. 8.**


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601 (a)



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603 (b)



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