

11 **Abstract**

12 Developments on traditional Aboriginal territory in Canada often require environmental
13 assessments (EAs) to predict potential environmental and social impacts. Impacts considered
14 during the Canadian government's (Crown) consultation process (between the Crown,
15 Aboriginals and proponents), is known as the Duty to Consult (DtC). The DtC is a legal
16 requirement under the *Constitution Act*, 1982 and case law, which provides opportunities for
17 Aboriginal rights and interests to be protected by identifying and mitigating impacts. Scope of
18 consultation depends on the strength of Aboriginal claim and level of adverse impacts. However,
19 in Canada, there is a lack of DtC guidelines. Whilst a lack of guidelines offers flexibility, it also
20 presents many implementation challenges. Current DtC practices often result in proponent
21 withdrawal, delays, protests, conflict and creates risks to project development. This paper
22 assesses application of DtC criteria (established in EA literature), and compares them against
23 three recent case studies across Canada. Although results show some inadequate practices, there
24 are examples of effective DtC criteria which help reduce impacts to Aboriginal rights and land.
25 Recommendations to improve the DtC process that benefit all stakeholders includes: increased
26 Crown guidance to proponents; acknowledging benefits of Free, Prior, Informed Consent;
27 increased utilization of measures outlined in EA legislation including extensions and
28 suspensions; and stronger, earlier consultation legislation in federal and provincial EA
29 guidelines. The above recommendations seek to reveal that more effective consultations are
30 those which prioritize relationship building, consensus seeking and are responsive to each First
31 Nations circumstances. Although qualitative, this study provides evidence based criteria for
32 effective Aboriginal consultation approaches within the Canadian EA process.

33

34 **Keywords:** Duty to consult; Aboriginal consultation; First Nations; Environmental assessment.

35

36 **1. Introduction**

37 In Canada, federal and provincial environmental assessment (EA) processes are designed to
38 promote sustainable development through detailed planning to predict proposed project
39 environmental and social impacts (Ma et al., 2018; MacKinnon et al., 2018). The federal

40 *Canadian Environmental Assessment Act* (CEAA 2012) sets out explicit requirements to assess
41 environmental impacts affecting Aboriginal people, and requires the Crown (Canadian
42 government) to consult Aboriginals about potential impacts of decisions associated with federal
43 conduct on their rights (CEAA, 2012a). However, EAs increasingly affect Aboriginal (First
44 Nations [FNs], Metis and Inuit) territory in Canada (Kirchhoff et al., 2013). Impacts affecting
45 Aboriginals include health and environmental conditions, cultural and physical heritage, use of
46 lands for traditional purposes, and archaeological or paleontological artifacts (Walls, 2012).
47 Although projects in Canada seek a more sustainable development paradigm emphasizing
48 economic, environmental and social objectives, many often negate socio-economic and
49 environmental impacts on Aboriginal territory (Assembly of First Nations, 2011). Identifying
50 and mitigating impacts builds strong and meaningful relationships between the Crown and FNAs.
51 This opportunity is offered through the Duty to Consult (DtC) process.

52 The DtC is triggered when the Crown has knowledge of real or asserted Aboriginal rights
53 and is making a decision that may adversely impact these rights (The Duty to Consult, 2014).
54 Although EA consultation can provide opportunities for Aboriginals to influence project
55 developments, the lack of guidelines or effective criteria, often leads to unsatisfactory project
56 outcomes in Canada such as, court action, project blockades, strained relationships and conflict
57 (Baker and McLelland, 2003). Conversely, DtC following effective criteria can result in
58 reconciliation between the Crown and FNAs, project investments in Canada and avoidance of
59 impacts to Aboriginal rights and title. For proponents, there is a growing realization that
60 fulfilling the DtC is not a *nicety*, but a *necessity*. However Aboriginal consultation approaches
61 within the EA process is lacking in the peer-reviewed academic literature (e.g., Baker and
62 McLelland, 2003; Booth and Skelton, 2011). Therefore, this study aims to address this by: (i)
63 outlining how the DtC process emerged through relevant legislation and case law; (ii) describing
64 consultation best practices to identify effective criteria; and (iii) assessing effective criteria
65 against three recent case studies to provide recommendations for the DtC process.

66

67 **2. Background and Case Law**

68 The DtC applies to treaty rights, Aboriginal rights and title. Treaty rights were used for
69 resolving land ownership during colonization (The Duty to Consult, 2014). Aboriginal rights

70 include rights to the land itself (rights to fish, hunt and gather). The Crown's DtC is based on the
71 *Royal Proclamation of 1763*, signing of specific FN treaties, *the Constitution Act, 1982*, and
72 case law. The *Royal Proclamation of 1763* (defines the relationship between Aboriginals and the
73 Crown), and presents the Crown's first recognition of Aboriginal rights and title, serving as a
74 foundation for the DtC (The Duty to Consult, 2014). This established Aboriginal rights and title,
75 meaning the Canadian government could not grant lands not previously ceded. Consequently,
76 only the Canadian government can purchase surrendered land, which is the main cause for the
77 Crown's fiduciary duty towards Aboriginals. The *Constitution Act, 1982* guarantees the rights in
78 the *Charter of Rights and Freedoms* do not adversely impact existing Aboriginal rights.

79 Canadian courts have been reluctant to define the nature and scope of the DtC, as
80 consultation depends on the strength of Aboriginal claim and level of adverse impacts (Ross and
81 Smith, 2003). Aboriginal rights have evolved out of case law, including social, political, cultural
82 and economic rights including rights to land, fish, hunt and practice one's culture. Terms like
83 'consultation' and 'accommodation' have evolved out of common law through landmark court
84 cases, such as *Haida Nation v. British Columbia [Minister of Forests]* (2004), *Taku River Tlingit*
85 *FN v. British Columbia [Project Assessment Director]* (2004), and *Mikisew Cree FN v. Canada*
86 *[Minister of Canadian Heritage]* (2005). This ambiguity means that each EA requires a specific
87 approaches to consultation and accommodation, depending on potential infringement on
88 Aboriginal rights. Meaningful consultation has come to include the consideration of
89 accommodation, when the Crown or proponents identify potential adverse impacts, and engage
90 with the affected Aboriginal group to identify avoidance, mitigation or offset measures
91 (AANDC, 2015). Landmark case law decisions have helped define the rights of Aboriginals in
92 Canada, by allowing specifics of consultation to evolve incrementally (The Duty to Consult,
93 2014; Gill, 2015). Cases like the *Calder v. British Columbia* (1973) decision which set important
94 legal precedents regarding the existence of Aboriginal title, essentially initiated the field of
95 *Aboriginal Law* in Canada (and elsewhere). Additionally, cases like *R. v. Sparrow* (1990)
96 interpreted the *Constitution Act* and determined that the right to fish for food or ceremonial
97 purposes cannot be infringed. A landmark 1997 Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) case, known as
98 *Delgamuukw v. British Columbia* (1997), confirmed Aboriginal title exists in British Columbia.
99 *R. v. Marshall* (1999) and *R. v. Sparrow* (1990), further define Aboriginal rights and conditions

100 under which it is reasonable to infringe on these rights. A leading explanation on the DtC comes
101 from *Haida Nation v. British Columbia* (Minister of Forests), where one major issue before the
102 SCC was whether the Crown was required to consult Aboriginals before their rights or title to the
103 land had been proven (The Duty to Consult, 2014). The Haida Nation had a strong, although
104 unproven, land claim and the Crown had knowledge of activities that would infringe on this
105 claim. Thus, the Crown had a DtC, but failed to do so (Thomson, 2015). The SCC ruled that the
106 scope of the duty is “proportionate to a preliminary assessment of the strength of the case
107 supporting the existence of the right or title” (*Haida Nation v. British Columbia* (Minister of
108 Forests) [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73), meaning that the amount of consultation required
109 depends on severity of potential adverse impacts of an Aboriginal right. This case, also
110 emphasized the need for good faith on both sides of the consultation table (The Duty to Consult,
111 2014).

112 During the *Taku River Tlingit FN v. British Columbia* case of 2004, the SCC highlighted
113 that the DtC was critical to maintain the Crown’s honour in situations and cases where
114 uncertainty and honour were at stake. The SCC emphasized that the “ultimate goal of
115 reconciliation favours consultation given past treatment of Aboriginals” (The Duty to Consult,
116 2014). The SCC also held that while meaningful consultation was required by the Crown’s DtC,
117 an agreement upon the accommodation terms between FNs and the Crown was unnecessary
118 (Thomson, 2015). Similar to consultation, accommodation is an additional term arising out of
119 case law, which can be similarly ambiguous. Accommodation measures throughout EA have
120 come to mean identifying avoidance, mitigation and offset measures when an adverse impact is
121 identified. Aboriginal groups are in advantageous situations to provide in-depth, local
122 information about how proposed activities can impact lands and resources, and the Crown is able
123 to use this information to inform decision making.

124 The diversity of cases serve as the foundation for the *Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British*
125 *Columbia* (2014) decision, where the SCC granted 1750 km² of land to the Tsilhqot’in,
126 representing the SCC’s first ever judicial declaration of Aboriginal title to a specific land area
127 (McLeod, 2015). In British Columbia (BC) where nearly all of the land is under claim of FNs,
128 existing economic development projects risk being terminated or suspended (Bain, 2014). When
129 title is recognized and a project exists on Aboriginal land without their support, the government
130 “may be required to cancel the project... if continuation of the project would be unjustifiably

131 infringing” (*Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia*, 2014 SCC 44). The Tsilhqot’in decision
132 served to raise the stakes in Aboriginal consultations (Stueck, 2014).

133 The most recent example of case law is *Gitxaala Nation et al v. Canada* (2016) where the
134 Federal Court of Appeal overturned the previous approval of the Enbridge Northern Gateway
135 project due to a lack of consultation taking place. The decision stated that Canada offered a
136 “brief, hurried and inadequate” opportunity for consultation that left “entire subjects of central
137 interest to the affected First Nations, sometime subjects affecting their subsistence and well-
138 being, entirely ignored” (SCC 325). In addition, the decision requires the federal government to
139 consult with potentially affected FNs again before it issues a new decision on Enbridge. This
140 case is expected to provide a lot of guidance for the Crown moving forward with the DtC.

141

142 **3. Methodology**

143 A systematic review of scholarly articles, federal and provincial government EA websites (e.g.,
144 <https://www.ceaa-acee.gc.ca/>; <https://www.novascotia.ca/nse/ea/>), and best practices guidelines
145 for consultation produced by government agencies and FN’s related Crown–First Nations
146 interactions during project developments in Canada were conducted. Search terms, such as
147 “Aboriginal consultation”, “duty to consult,” “environmental assessment”, “FNs participation in
148 environmental assessment” were used. Terms were grouped in various combinations and
149 examined for their contributions to the meaning and procedure of the DtC. EA policy and
150 legislation were analyzed to outline the regulatory framework of the DtC. Similarly, case law
151 decisions relating to Aboriginal consultation and project developments from the past decade
152 were reviewed for references to Aboriginal and treaty rights, and how the decisions advanced
153 and developed the DtC. Articles most useful to this study were related to the intersection of
154 project developments, EA and Aboriginal consultation, as the analysis focused on the DtC during
155 EA. Although Aboriginal consultation guidance within the EA process is lacking in the peer-
156 reviewed academic literature (e.g., Baker and McLelland, 2003; Booth and Skelton, 2011), this
157 review was designed to take a lessons learned approach to help develop a list of effective criteria
158 for the DtC. Three large projects (including one energy and two mining projects) were selected
159 as case studies based on the following criteria: (i) representative of Canada’s resource based
160 economy; (ii) project information was publicly available; and (iii) strong public interest. A five-

161 point Likert scale, with an assigned numerical value was used to evaluate projects against DtC
162 criteria (Very Poor = 1; Poor = 2; Average = 3; Good = 4; Very Good = 5). Significant statistical
163 differences between summed project scores were determined using one-way analysis of variance
164 (ANOVA) followed by Tukey's test using Minitab. Criteria for the DtC process were described
165 and compared against the case studies to develop more effective DtC criteria to help reduce
166 impacts to Aboriginal rights and land.

167

168 **4. Criteria for effective consultation**

169 *4.1 Theoretical components of the DtC*

170 Newman (2009) outlines several fundamental criteria of the DtC, evolved out of the
171 relevant case law. DtC can arise before proof of an Aboriginal title claim, or with uncertainty
172 regarding infringement on a treaty right. DtC can be triggered with the slightest hint of an
173 adverse impact on Aboriginal rights, with the scope determined by scale of potential impacts on
174 Aboriginal or treaty rights and strength of Aboriginal claim (Aboriginal Consultation in Federal
175 EA, 2014). DtC may lead to accommodation of Aboriginal interest if negative impacts cannot be
176 mitigated. If the Crown fails to meet the DtC, project delays can arise (e.g., litigation or further
177 consultation) (Newman, 2009). The *Haida* case established the "sliding scale" test, where
178 stronger claims and higher potential for adverse impacts receive deeper consultation and
179 accommodation, with weaker claims requiring less extensive consultation (Thomson, 2015). If
180 impacts are unavoidable, consultation shifts to whether accommodation can address impacts.
181 Accommodation can include: modifying plans to avoid impacts, halting of plans, mitigation of
182 impacts, compensating for impacts, profit-sharing or economic participation (Griffith, 2006).

183 Consultation continues to evolve via policy frameworks (McLeod et al., 2015). Federal
184 procedures outlined by AANDC (2011), aim to assist federal officials in matters affecting
185 Aboriginal rights and title. Provincial guidelines cite that provincial staff should consult with
186 their own legal staff for further guidance (McLeod et al., 2015). Provincial agencies often
187 develop their own DtC guidelines within provincial legislation (Newman, 2009). To further
188 complicate, Aboriginal organizations and proponents may develop their own DtC policies and
189 guidelines (McLeod et al., 2015). For example, DtC guidelines developed by the Gitxaala FN are
190 targeted to federal and provincial government to describe what meaningful consultation is *not*
191 (e.g., consultations will not be conducted via telephone, access to council and Elders will be

192 guaranteed only one day per month and there will be no consultation with parties other than the
193 Crown) (Hipwell et al., 2002). The New Relationship Trust of BC created guidelines outlining
194 best practice for consultation and accommodation based on input of FNs in BC (Thomson,
195 2015). These guidelines recommend being clear about FNs needs, appointing appropriate FN
196 representation and to participate throughout to allow FNs to have more control over the entire
197 consultation processes (Plate et al., 2009).

198

199 *4.2 Practical components of the DtC*

200 Three factors are required to trigger the DtC: a proposed Crown conduct; potential
201 Aboriginal or treaty rights in the area of said Crown conduct; and the proposed Crown conduct
202 potentially adversely impacting established Aboriginal or treaty rights (Fig. 1). In addition, three
203 major roles and responsibilities exist in the DtC: Crown-Aboriginal group; Crown-proponent;
204 and proponent-Aboriginal group (Fig. 2). For federal EAs, CEAA is the responsible authority,
205 and acts as Crown Consultation Coordinator for the federal government to integrate consultation
206 to the greatest extent (Aboriginal Consultation in Federal EA, 2014). The CEAA allows
207 opportunities for potentially affected Aboriginal groups to comment at four stages: potential
208 environmental effects of the project, potential impacts on Aboriginal or treaty rights, mitigation
209 measures and follow up programs. Provincial EA agencies regularly coordinate with other
210 federal and provincial agencies via consultation coordinators, to ensure that consultation is
211 consistent, efficient and respectful of FNs' and proponents time and capacity to foster seamless
212 consultation throughout the whole process (BCEAO, 2013).

213 The Crown has many roles throughout the DtC. A crucial initial step is to review ethno-
214 historical data and assess potential project impacts to Aboriginal interests, using this information
215 to determine the appropriate level of consultation (BCEAO, 2013). In some jurisdictions, the
216 next step is to inform the potentially affected Aboriginal group of the strength of claim analysis,
217 including reasoning on the level of consultation expected. Informing the FN of this strength of
218 claim information helps the nation to understand the basis for the level of consultation. Next, the
219 Crown provides specific direction to proponents regarding consultation, including relevant
220 agreements between the Crown and affected Aboriginal groups that may impact the DtC. This
221 direction informs which Aboriginal groups must be engaged (including appropriate depth of

222 engagement). The Crown provides advice regarding appropriateness of studies requested by FNs
223 (e.g. Traditional Use Studies). Where appropriate, the Crown meets with potentially affected
224 Aboriginal groups to address issues that cannot be resolved by proponents. The Crown also
225 assesses adequacy of consultation and any proposed accommodation measures based on the
226 strength of any asserted rights and title (BCEAO, 2013).

227 Although the DtC is the Crown's responsibility, procedural aspects are often delegated to
228 proponents, which may not reflect Crown standards (Lambrecht, 2013). This was highlighted in
229 the *Haida Nation v. British Columbia* (2004) case, where the SCC stated that although project
230 proponents were responsible for procedural aspects of consultation; legal duty and responsibility
231 rests solely with the Crown (The Duty to Consult, 2014). Procedural delegation to proponents
232 during consultation involve: discussions about Aboriginal interests that may be impacted;
233 considering modifications to plans to avoid or mitigate impacts to Aboriginal interests;
234 documenting engagement (including specific Aboriginal interests that may be impacted); and
235 providing records to the Crown (BCEAO, 2013). Procedural delegation does not include
236 authority to make decisions to the Crown's DtC, strength of FNs claimed rights and title, or
237 whether Crown decisions represents potential infringements of treaty rights (BCEAO, 2013).
238 Additionally, proponents should incorporate traditional knowledge into baseline studies, and
239 involve Aboriginals in relevant studies (e.g., archaeological work or ecological land
240 classification) (Walker, 2012). This involvement is also important to ensure the proponent is
241 aware of any potential impacts early on in the process.

242 Delegation of the DtC can result in more effective and efficient consultation because
243 proponents are generally better suited to discuss project specifics, especially when it comes to
244 accommodating First Nations interests, for example, altering a pipeline route to avoid a site of
245 cultural significance. However, effectiveness of delegation is not always guaranteed, as it can
246 sometimes result in confusion related to roles and responsibilities, a reduction in the scope of
247 consultation and at times, a deterioration of the nation-to-nation relationship between the Crown
248 and Aboriginal peoples (Ritchie, 2013). Although delegating consultation to proponents can
249 offer some accommodation (e.g., wetland compensation), other forms of accommodation often
250 require government intervention (Bankes, 2015). Occasionally, Crown employees delegate the

251 entire consultation process to proponents, resulting in a lack of information, confusion and
252 unnecessary time constraints – all lessening the quality of the DtC (Griffith, 2006).

253 Some proponents recognize the benefits of working with Aboriginals beyond
254 consultation, through measures like impact benefit agreements (IBAs) (Fidler and Hitch, 2007).
255 IBAs are confidential bilateral agreements negotiated between Aboriginal groups and proponents
256 to address issues, such as training, employment, environmental protection, monitoring, social
257 housing programs and protection of archaeological resources. IBAs are typically negotiated
258 during proponent-First Nations consultation discussions, and act as a tool to increase Aboriginal
259 participation, reduce negative impacts on Aboriginal interests, achieve reconciliation of
260 Aboriginal concerns and project development and typically include consultation guidelines,
261 funding for education, training and employment (Matiation, 2002; Lambrecht, 2013). For
262 example, Cenovus, signed five long term IBAs with Aboriginal communities near oil sands
263 projects since 2009 (Stueck, 2014).

264

265 *4.3 Meaningful consultation*

266 Meaningful consultation must exhibit both procedural and substantial elements has been
267 difficult to define, because it has never been prescribed through case law (Hipwell et al., 2002;
268 Griffith, 2006; Booth and Skelton, 2011). Procedural elements are required to ensure the process
269 is reasonable. Substantive elements are required to engage in good-faith bargaining. The concept
270 of balance is also inherent in consultation guidelines. For example, the *Haida Nation v. British*
271 *Columbia* (2004) decision states the “Crown must balance Aboriginal concerns reasonably with
272 the potential impact of the decision on the asserted right or title and with other societal interests”;
273 and outlines how the Crown is not “under a duty to reach an agreement; rather, the commitment
274 is to a meaningful process of consultation in good faith”, and also states that the guiding DtC
275 activities are required to maintain the Crown’s honour, and to effect reconciliation between the
276 Crown and Aboriginal people.

277 Griffith (2006) outlines four critical components of meaningful consultation: timely
278 provision of information is crucial; provide reasonable opportunities for FNs to express their
279 concerns; concerns must be seriously considered by decision makers; and concerns must be
280 integrated into decisions in demonstrable ways. An inherent difficulty in assessing meaningful
281 consultation is that scope of consultation varies case by case. Therefore, what is meaningful in

282 one case will differ in another, and the process must be project and FN specific. The Crown must
283 provide adequate notice and full information of project and impacts on rights, provide feedback
284 (and rationale) during decisions, listen in good faith, and be willing to revise proposals before
285 final decisions are reached. Refusal of the Crown to alter position during the process may
286 provide evidence of an unreasonable approach.

287

288 *4.4 Consent and Conflict*

289 Fulfilling the DtC does not require consent from the Aboriginal group, as the Crown is
290 only required to consult in good faith (Newman, 2009). The DtC does not provide Aboriginals
291 with a veto power, but is meant to attain reconciliation of conflicting interests. If Aboriginal title
292 is involved, consent of the Aboriginal titleholder is necessary (*Tsilhqot'in Nation v. British*
293 *Columbia*, 2014). Although outlined in case law, consultation does not mean veto power, at the
294 very least, the process has the potential to stop a project in its tracks whilst legal proceedings are
295 taken. Sometimes stalling may postpone or stop developments completely (Joseph, 2012). It is
296 also important to note the role that conflict plays in the DtC, which may not necessarily be
297 negative. EA provides an avenue for FNs to voice project concerns and ensure these concerns are
298 accommodated into various mitigation measures. These consultation discussions are likely to be
299 fraught with disagreement, but the outcome is intended to reconcile various perspectives, as EA
300 is now the “front lines of conflict and reconciliation between aboriginal peoples, government and
301 resource developers” (Noble, 2016).

302

303 *4.5 Aboriginal Deterrents to Participation*

304 Newman (2014) suggests the DtC can be wielded by Aboriginal peoples opposed to
305 developments in order to consistently deter and stall progress, but not all FNs use the DtC to stop
306 project developments. Although Aboriginal groups are open to development, there are many
307 deterrents for participation in the DtC, including: lack of community resources, narrow project
308 scoping, and complex project terminology (Baker and McLelland, 2003). For example, in
309 Spectra Energy’s 2014 EA application for the Westcoast Connector Gas Transmission Project,
310 17 out of 24 FNs potentially affected by the project stated they lacked technical, organizational
311 or financial resources required to effectively participate (Noble, 2015a).

312 Lack of capacity for Aboriginal participation during EA may include scarcity of financial
313 and technical resources to review technical EA documentation, which is amplified in remote, fly-
314 in, Aboriginal communities (Booth and Skelton, 2011; Kirchhoff et al., 2013). To alleviate
315 financial burden to participate, several jurisdictions have begun to offer capacity funding (e.g.,
316 Canada, Alberta, BC and Nova Scotia). These policies are consistent with recent case law which
317 stressed the importance of adequate funding opportunities to provide a level playing field and to
318 assist meaningful consultation and accommodation (Morellato, 2009).

319 Time commitments are also a common deterrent to Aboriginal participation. Case law
320 developments have dramatically increased the number of referrals of pending Crown decisions
321 that FNs receive (Griffith, 2006). Referrals are often time-sensitive, further impeding the ability
322 to respond. A perception of consultation being a wasted effort sometimes pervades Aboriginal
323 communities (United Nations, 2011) as FNs increasingly feel they are participating in a shallow
324 process that fails to result in meaningful consultation (Booth and Skelton, 2011). However,
325 Aboriginals have a reciprocal duty to participate in consultation, outlined in the *Haida* decision,
326 where the SCC emphasized the need for good faith on both sides of the consultation table.
327 Aboriginals must engage actively in consultation, and should delineate their claim(s) and the
328 potential for project impacts that makes sense to the Crown to help contextualize claims to
329 ensure consideration (Griffith, 2006).

330 Although many challenges exist in the DtC process, a sense of empowerment among
331 Aboriginals is growing, highlighted through examples of Aboriginal opposition to recent
332 Canadian projects, including anti-fracking protests in New Brunswick, legal confrontations
333 related to the Ring of Fire in Ontario and protests against Northern Gateway pipeline in BC
334 (Newman, 2014). Canadian courts have articulated a series of enforceable legal principles aimed
335 to protect and actualize Aboriginal rights (Morellato, 2008). Since the *Tsilhqot'in* decision, many
336 high powered Aboriginal leaders have spoken about reinvigoration and power when it comes to
337 resource development (Smyth, 2015). In addition, some FNs are taking EA into their own hands,
338 for example, Woodfibre LNG in Squamish, where Squamish FN operated their own EA process
339 that ran parallel to BC's and CEAs. The end result was a set of 25 conditions designed by
340 Squamish FN, 13 applied to the proponent and the rest to the Crown. To ensure these conditions
341 were legally binding, the FN required the proponent to sign a legally binding Squamish Nation

342 EA certificate (Squamish Nation, 2015). Woodfibre LNG serves as an example of an empowered
343 FN taking the consultation and EA process and ensuring it works for them.

344

345 **5. Case study criteria evaluation**

346 *5.1 Energy East pipeline*

347 Energy East pipeline proposed by TransCanada Corporation is a 4,600 km pipeline
348 project (\$12 billion) designed to carry ~1.1 million barrels of crude, from Alberta and
349 Saskatchewan to Saint John, NB, crossing 155 FN communities (Barrera, 2015). Pending review
350 and approval by the National Energy Board (NEB), who were delegated to perform the DtC by
351 the Crown, construction would begin in 2020 (Curtis, 2015; McCarthy, 2015). TransCanada and
352 the Crown consulted with 155 affected FNs groups (comprising 1700 meetings with 260
353 Aboriginal communities) to inform them of the project and seek support. TransCanada hired the
354 former Chief of the Assembly of FNs to represent it in meetings (McCarthy, 2014). According to
355 TransCanada, it spent over \$66.5 million on Aboriginal goods, services and businesses for its
356 construction projects in 2013. Since 2013, TransCanada signed 32 capacity funding agreements
357 with FNs, to assist in their participation in the EA process. Despite certain confidentiality
358 clauses, capacity funding agreements do not prevent FNs from opposing projects, although they
359 are rare for many potentially affected Aboriginal groups (Curtis, 2015).

360 The Ontario Regional Chief claimed these consultation efforts were insufficient, because
361 the pipeline had the potential to threaten their waterways or land and called for delays in NEB
362 approvals to allow for more appropriate consultation and accommodation, including in person
363 sessions by NEB and TransCanada for communities along the route (McCarthy, 2015). Treaty 3
364 Grand Chief stated similar concerns about the lack of consultation, speaking for over 25
365 Anishinaabe FNs in northwestern Ontario. This was also corroborated by the Ontario Energy
366 Minister who stated that affected FNs were not adequately consulted. The Woodstock,
367 Madawaska and Tobique FNs in NB called for a halt in review hearings, because participant
368 funding was cut (Patterson, 2015). The Federation of Saskatchewan Indian Nations also stated
369 their support for the project was contingent on a more robust consultation process with affected
370 FNs (Barrera, 2015). Despite the controversy surrounding the consultation process, TransCanada
371 maintained they conducted adequate consultation (McCarthy, 2015). Evidence suggests that
372 consultation was lacking, resulting in poor criteria scores for this project, this was also

373 compounded by the lack of funding allowing FNs communities to participate in consultations
374 (Table 1).

375

376 *5.2 Donkin coal mine*

377 Donkin coal mine is a proposed underground coking and thermal coal development
378 project by Xstrata Coal Donkin Management Limited in Donkin Peninsula in Cape Breton, NS.
379 The project underwent a joint CEAA and NSE coordinated comprehensive study, which was
380 reviewed extensively by multiple federal departments and received approval in 2013 (CEAA,
381 2013). The CEA Agency was the responsible authority, and acted as Crown Consultation
382 Coordinator for the federal government in order to integrate consultation activities (Aboriginal
383 Consultation in Federal EA, 2014). Mi'kmaq FN of NS asserts land claims to the whole
384 province, and consultation was organized through the Kwilmu'kw Maw-klusuaqn Negotiation
385 Office (KMKNO). From the onset, KMKNO viewed the Mi'kmaq as co-owners, rather than
386 stakeholders.

387 EIS guidelines outlined Xstrata's consultation with the Mi'kmaq, including consideration
388 of any rights (asserted or established), potential adverse impacts to the Mi'kmaq, and any
389 concerns raised by KMKNO through the consultation process. EIS guidelines also considered
390 traditional land uses as well as valued ecosystem components (VECs) (e.g., archaeological or
391 heritage resources). In addition, Xstrata followed NS's provincial EA guidelines for consulting
392 the Mi'kmaq (CEAA, 2013). KMKNO was consulted during the three stages: project onset, the
393 final EIS and during the comprehensive study. The CEA Agency also engaged the KMKNO
394 through letters, meetings, emails and calls (CEAA, 2013). During consultation, major issues
395 raised included developing training, employment procurement opportunities for the Mi'kmaq, as
396 well as requirements for a Mi'kmaq Ecological Knowledge Study (MEKS). The MEKS was
397 conducted, and it outlined all traditional uses of the project site, including lobster fishing and
398 potential for nearby archaeological sites. The KMKNO also received participant funding from
399 the CEA Agency. Xstrata also conducted engagement activities with the KMKNO and this
400 information was used to inform the CEA Agency of potential impacts of the project on the
401 Mi'kmaq.

402 The CEA Agency, NSE and Xstrata conducted consultation and engagement activities
403 with the KMKNO. Xstrata's consultation activities were used to inform the CEA Agency of

404 potential impacts of the project on the Mi'kmaq, and how these impacts would be mitigated
405 (CEAA, 2013). The CEA Agency comprehensive study concluded that Mi'kmaq interests and
406 concerns would be accommodated throughout the project's implementation. This
407 accommodation included the avoidance of certain wetlands, wetland compensation, fish habitat
408 compensation and the protection of archaeological resources (Thomson, 2015). In addition, a
409 memorandum of understanding was signed ensuring economic opportunities and benefits for
410 Mi'kmaq when the mine is operational (CEAA, 2013). The Donkin mine was recently purchased
411 by the Cline Group (Thomson, 2015). High criteria scores were assigned for this project based
412 on overall level of engagement, ability for Mi'kmaq communities to participate in consultations
413 and the level to which the proponent was involved in positive benefits for the Mi'kmaq (Table
414 1).

415

416 *5.3 Detour Lake gold mine*

417 Detour Lake Gold Mine proposed by Detour Gold Corporation is an open pit mine 185
418 km northwest of Cochrane, Ontario (CEAA, 2011b). A comprehensive study (coordinated by the
419 CEA Agency) was approved in 2011 (CEAA, 2011b). The CEA Agency acted as consultation
420 coordinator. During consultation, six Aboriginal groups were consulted (Wahgoshig FN, Métis
421 Nation of Ontario, Timmins Métis, Northern Lights Métis Community Councils, Moose Cree FN
422 and Taykwa Tagamou Nation). All six FN's had land claims or treaty rights potentially impacted
423 by the project. The CEA Agency also provided funding through the Participant Funding Program
424 to four affected Aboriginal groups (CEAA, 2011b).

425 Consultation was held in three stages, and the CEA Agency sought comments from
426 Aboriginal groups at the start of the process, at the environmental effects stage during the
427 comprehensive study, and at the end on the findings and recommendations of the draft report.
428 The CEA Agency also addressed Aboriginal concerns by contacting participating communities
429 and organizations to clarify concerns through various means of communication. Furthermore, the
430 proponent conducted their own consultation and provided funding for traditional use and
431 knowledge studies (CEAA, 2011b). The comprehensive study listed the concerns raised by
432 Aboriginal groups throughout the consultation process. One of these was that the comprehensive
433 study report would be included without incorporating the interests of the Moose Cree FN.
434 However, the proponent made a presentation to the Moose Cree FN and these concerns were

435 incorporated into the EA (CEAA, 2011b). An additional concern stated that construction began
436 prior to EA completion, but according to CEAA this component of the project did not require
437 federal permits (CEAA, 2011b).

438 Detour Gold Corporation negotiated IBAs with three FN communities, as well with Métis
439 Nation of Ontario (CEAA, 2011b). The proponent also stated it would hire cultural monitors
440 from the Aboriginal groups to monitor and protect any archaeologically or culturally significant
441 sites encountered during the project. The IBA signed with the Métis Nation of Ontario is slated
442 to provide employment and training opportunities, including an educational and scholarship
443 program with Northern College and College Boreal (Métis National Council, 2012). This
444 agreement was finalized after the comprehensive study report was released in 2011,
445 demonstrating that the proponent continues to be involved with Aboriginal communities, post
446 approval. High criteria scores were also assigned for this project (Table 1).

447

448 **6. Results and recommendations**

449 Results illustrate positive outcomes when the DtC is undertaken in a meaningful manner
450 (Donkin and Detour Lake mines), in contrast to Energy East (Table 1; Fig. 3). One-way ANOVA
451 followed by Tukey's test revealed that both Donkin and Detour Lake mine DtC criteria scores
452 were significantly different at the $P < 0.01$ level when compared to Energy East, but were not
453 significantly different when Donkin and Detour Lake mines were compared against each other.
454 The magnitude and extent of proposed projects (i.e., those with very complex EAs with the
455 potential to impact more FNs) may influence the DtC, compared to smaller less complex
456 projects. Although Donkin and Detour Lake are mines, they highlight positive consultation
457 outcomes (e.g., by incorporating IBAs). These agreements help to ensure benefits for affected
458 Aboriginal groups (Janes and Walker, submitted.). In the Donkin mine, Mi'kmaq concerns were
459 accommodated through wetland compensation, protection of archaeological resources and fish
460 habitat compensation. Similarly, in the Detour Lake mine, Aboriginal groups were promised
461 employment and training opportunities. The potential for jobs and training also plays a major
462 role in the DtC process.

463 Although the Energy East pipeline had strong support from the Crown (the energy sector
464 was a priority under the previous government administration), the Crown should aim to remain

465 neutral throughout the consultation process, to minimize biases. For example, Lett (2015) argued
466 that the NEB favoured resource companies, approving all pipeline proposals in recent years
467 (Curtis, 2015).

468 Many issues can arise regarding timing of consultation. Generally, if FNs are consulted
469 early in the process, it can avoid unnecessary delays and conflict (Noble, 2015a) and ensure
470 Aboriginal concerns are acknowledged and incorporated into project design early. Projects like
471 the Mackenzie Valley Pipeline illustrate that delays may stretch beyond the economic
472 timeframes required for the project to remain viable (Newman, 2014). Positive examples also
473 serve to highlight attractive investment climates. When Aboriginal concerns are accommodated,
474 proponents have more certainty in terms of their investments in the province and operating
475 environment. Strong FNs support is generally required for projects to be successful (Guttsman,
476 2015). Although proponents may be able to rely on government to acquire necessary rights to
477 develop, the best starting point is consent rather than reliance on government's expropriation
478 powers (Bankes, 2015). In response to this need for consent, many proponents have looked
479 towards negotiating IBAs as a way to assist and alleviate Aboriginal concerns (Fidler, 2010).

480 It may be difficult for the DtC process to go smoothly if the tenets of the project do not
481 align with the interests and worldviews of affected Aboriginal groups. For example, with the
482 Energy East project, the former Chief of the Assembly of FNs (employed by TransCanada),
483 stated the right to say no, also includes the right to say yes and that these decisions must be based
484 on facts (McCarthy, 2014). It is sometimes challenging to align reasons behind opposition with
485 facts, when sometimes the reasons are so intrinsic for the FNs opposed. It remains unclear
486 whether consultation can ever be meaningful if the two parties' interests can never be reconciled.

487

488 *6.1 Crown guidance to proponents*

489 Since proponents conduct many procedural aspects of the DtC, it is crucial they have a
490 full understanding of Aboriginal rights and title before entering a community. At the onset of the
491 DtC, the Crown decides the scope of consultation required based on ethno-historical data and
492 various studies and informs the proponent of this information. However, it seems this is often
493 done inadequately and some proponents lack understanding when they go to the initial meeting
494 with the affected Aboriginal group.

495 Consultation involves intangibles; it can be very challenging to work in an environment
496 where there are no checklists to follow or permits to approve in order to satisfy the affected
497 Aboriginal group (Berkow, 2015). Even more challenging than sorting out the consultation
498 issues surrounding NR development is understanding the holistic, inter-dependent relationship
499 wherein most FNs are “‘of’ their environmental-ecological context and this context is every bit
500 as much ‘of’ them” (Prosper et al., 2011). It can be challenging for proponents to understand the
501 *pros* and *cons* of consultation, especially when many executives come from backgrounds in
502 science, engineering and accounting. Facing issues like social license can pose many challenges,
503 especially when most of the project approval process involves checklists and permits.

504 Further to additional guidance offered by the Crown, it would be beneficial for the Crown
505 to be directly involved in proponent’s early consultation activities. This involvement would
506 ensure that all involved understand roles and expectations of the DtC, and contribute to greater
507 awareness of the nature of projects and potential for infringement (Gardner et al., 2015). If the
508 Crown and proponents work together to begin initial discussions with potentially affected
509 Aboriginal groups, it could ensure that the DtC process begins in a meaningful manner (Fig. 4).

510

511 *6.2 Free, Prior, Informed, Consent (FPIC)*

512 A movement towards Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) may be in order to
513 facilitate partnerships during the DtC. FPIC is a standard contained in the *United Nations*
514 *Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* (UNDRIP) and acknowledges the right of
515 Aboriginals to provide informed consent prior to the approval of a project. FPIC could alleviate
516 FNs concerns of not being treated as full partners (McCarthy, 2015) and to challenge their
517 perceived role as ‘stakeholders’ to instead be viewed as planning partners (McLeod et al., 2015).
518 Although the UNDRIP was endorsed in 2010, it was endorsed with a caveat that the declaration
519 was “aspirational”. The Tsilhqot’in decision may work to spur greater change with regards to
520 FPIC as consent has now been elevated to the forefront of discourse since the Crown is now
521 required to seek consent from an affected FN when title is involved (McLeod, 2015). However, it
522 is important to note that FPIC is not intended to confer a FN veto power, but is instead meant to
523 encourage more than the DtC, but a movement towards collaboration.

524 FPIC involves a balancing of interests spurring from a genuine effort by both the Crown
525 and proponents to consult and seek consent. FPIC has been described as the power to say yes to

526 mutually beneficial initiatives that can promote healthy Aboriginal nations for the benefit of
527 current and future generations (Union of BC Indian Chiefs, 2015). Compared to the previous
528 federal government, the new administration has taken a different stance on the UNDRIP. The
529 new Prime Minister announced to new Ministers in their mandate letters that: “no relationship is
530 more important to [him] and to Canada than the one with Indigenous Peoples” (Smith, 2015),
531 furthering this by stating that “it is time for Canada to have a renewed, nation-to-nation
532 relationship with Indigenous Peoples, based on recognition, rights, respect, co-operation, and
533 partnership” (Patterson, 2015). The new Indigenous and Northern Affairs (INAC) Minister has
534 agreed to implement UNDRIP, however the specifics are unclear given the novelty of the
535 administration. Although the concept of FPIC is new, and may be challenging for projects, it has
536 strong potential in the EA process (Fig. 4).

537

538 *6.3 Utilization of Measures Offered in EA Legislation*

539 As previously discussed in section 3.5, one of the major limitations of FN participation in
540 the DtC process is lack of capacity, both in human and financial capital. Aboriginal groups often
541 struggle to respond to technical EA reports in a timely manner, especially in areas rich in natural
542 resources. Numerous referrals and requests for consultation, often sent from various provincial
543 and federal EA departments can create significant resourcing difficulties for FNs in Canada.
544 Increased understanding amongst FN deterrents to participation in consultation, especially those
545 rich in resources, may help avoid what Morellatto (2009) terms the “death of a thousand cuts”;
546 where lands and resources are repeatedly developed without meaningful Aboriginal consultation
547 taking place, simply due to lack of FN capacity to participate in the DtC.

548 EA acts exhibit a myriad of tools the Crown holds that would assist in cases where the
549 DtC is not adequate. For example, tools such as the suspension or extension of EA processes. A
550 common complaint amongst FNs is that EAs move too rapidly, lacking time for the potentially
551 affected FN to understand and explain project concerns. The suspension of EA processes is often
552 enabled in federal or provincial legislation, for instance, in BC, the Executive Director has the
553 power to suspend the time limit prescribed for subsection (1)(b) if more information is required
554 from the proponent (*Environmental Assessment Act*, 2002). Similarly, CEAA 2012 has similar
555 powers, in that the regulatory clock can be stopped until the proponent submits requested
556 information to the satisfaction of CEAA. It is usually the case that these suspensions are not

557 given a specific timeline, which may allow suspensions to be a suitable tool to ensure the DtC is
558 fulfilled. If it becomes evident throughout the EA process that the proponent has failed to
559 adequately consult with potentially affected FNs, then the Crown should be able to apply a
560 measure like suspension or an extension to ensure consultation is undertaken.

561 The opportunity for an EA extension is highlighted in the recent *Gitxaala Nation et al v.*
562 *Canada* decision in which the Governor in Council was subject to a decision under Section 54(3)
563 of the *National Energy Board Act*, this subsection allowed for a an extension of the deadline. The
564 decision found that the importance of the DtC provides “ample reason for the Governor in
565 Council, in appropriate circumstances, to extend the deadline” (251) and that there was no
566 evidence the Govenor in Council gave any thought to this extension. Perhaps the utilization of an
567 extension could have avoided costly litigation. As it is sometimes the case that proponents see
568 FN participation in the EA process as merely another obstacle to gain project approval (Plate et
569 al., 2009). Although the DtC poses an additional expense to the proponent, there is no avoiding
570 the process if a project is to be planned and scoped properly (Cundari and Langlois, 2012). What
571 this misconception misses is the increasing necessity of FN acceptance and understanding of
572 project proposals that may impact their land. In addition, it has been shown that a meaningful
573 consultation process will assist in avoiding costly and lengthy litigation. Delays in the EA
574 process do not necessarily indicate a bad process, but could in fact mean a more thorough DtC.

575

576 *6.4 Stronger front-end consultation legislation*

577 Aboriginal communities are often consulted too late in the EA process, when project
578 design and planning are complete. This belatedness leaves the Aboriginal group to feel their
579 input will not be integrated into the project design plans, and that their participation is a waste of
580 time. Late consultation creates conflict and unnecessary delay (Noble, 2015a). The Crown and
581 industry stakeholders find that early engagement with affected Aboriginal groups creates trust
582 and builds strong relationships that help contribute to better outcomes for all (Newman, 2014).
583 Proponents engaging in development are wise to consider issues early and be proactive about
584 developing Aboriginal consultation strategies (Cundari and Langlois, 2012). Conflict at early
585 stages of an EA where FNs have the opportunity to let concerns be known while the proponent
586 still has time to alter project design will help to ensure the rest of the EA process is effective. EA

587 legislation should require better suited, culturally specific engagement, at a point where initial
588 decisions are made about rational and design of a project (Noble, 2015a).

589 Meaningful change to the DtC will likely not be sustained without amendments to higher
590 guiding policies (McLeod et al., 2015). It seems change is imminent, as the current Liberal
591 government began reviewing the EA process in June 2016 with a deadline of January 2017, with
592 one of the aims to create collaboration and partnership among FNs. One way the process can be
593 improved is through stronger front end legislation regarding the timing of Aboriginal
594 consultation. Front end consultation should include a stipulation in the *Canadian Environmental*
595 *Assessment Act*, 2012 for the Crown and proponent to consult at the project description stage
596 (Fig. 4). If it were to be enshrined to consult at the project description stage, it would allow for
597 FNs concerns to be integrated from the very onset. As the INAC Minister stated, “achieving
598 mutually beneficial results begins by having a conversation, and having it right away” (Smith,
599 2015) which aligned well with the resolution to adopt FPIC.

600

601 7. Conclusions

602 Natural resource development has significant consequences for Aboriginal groups in
603 Canada, particularly those choosing to maintain a traditional relationship with the land.
604 Aboriginal groups are required by law to have a clear and divisive voice in Crown decisions that
605 may impact their rights and interests. However, this voice is heard to varying degrees during the
606 DtC process. Meaningful consultation during EA is unlikely to add much additional strain or
607 expense to the EA process, however, it is becoming increasingly clear that the absence of it will
608 threaten the viability of projects. The DtC has emerged to provide an opportunity for key
609 Aboriginal interests to be protected and the process, ideally, allows for the Crown, proponents
610 and Aboriginals to come together in agreement over projects that benefit all parties. Still, the
611 current practice of the DtC can often bring results that do not work for any stakeholders
612 involved. These results include proponent withdrawal, project delays, protest, conflict and a
613 movement away from the real opportunity inherent in the DtC process: reconciliation.

614 With the surge in EAs on or near Aboriginal land, the increase in EA related First
615 Nations led case law, and the rise of proponent project delays has come an increased realization
616 of the capacity amongst Aboriginal groups to influence decision-making during development. It

617 is hoped that proponents realize the opportunity inherent in building meaningful partnerships
618 with Aboriginal groups their projects affect. With increased Crown guidance to proponents
619 during the onset of consultation, a movement towards FPIC, an increase in utilization of various
620 measures offered in EA legislation including extensions and suspensions and stronger front-end
621 consultation at the project description stage, it is hoped that this process can work to build
622 mutually beneficial relationships as well as prosperous developments in Canada. It has become
623 clear that consultation which seeks consensus, building partnerships, and are responsive and
624 sensitive to each specific FN's concerns and potential impacts will be most effective and
625 meaningful in Canada's evolving EA reality.

626

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629

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
808 **Figure legends**

809 **Fig. 1** Three factors required to trigger the DtC.

810 **Fig. 2** Three major relationships during the DtC, with the major roles/activities between each
811 outlined.

812 **Fig. 3** Common trends exhibited during positive and negative DtC examples.

813 **Fig. 4** Summary of recommendations.

814 **Fig. 1**


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
820 **Fig. 2**

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823 **Fig. 3**

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828 **Fig. 4**

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1) Crown Guidance to Proponents

- Education could enlighten proponents who see Aboriginal consultation as an obstacle to approval
- Crown to provide more clarity around consultation expectations for both FN and proponents

2) Movement towards acknowledging benefits of Free, Prior, Informed, Consent (FPIC)

- Outlined in UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
- Removes ambiguity, provides incentives to proponents to treat Aboriginals as partners, not stakeholders
- Genuine relationship building

3) Utilization of measures offered in EA legislation

- Measures included EA extension or suspension to ensure Crown receives all critical information from proponents
- Seeks to alleviate the lack of time Aboriginal groups often complain of

4) Stronger legislation surrounding front end consultation (CEAA 2012, provincial EA acts)

- Consult at project description to ensure concerns are integrated into plans from onset
- When possible, affected Aboriginal group should provide input into EA terms of reference

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832 **Table 1.** Comparison of the application of DtC criteria to recent EA case studies across Canada.

Criteria	Project		
	Energy East pipeline	Donkin coal mine	Detour Lake gold mine
Consistent approaches (federal and provincial)	3	5	4
Guidance for proponent delegation	3	5	4
Incorporation current case law into DtC	2	4	4
Incorporation of “sliding scale” into DtC	3	4	4
Incorporation of accommodation	2	5	4
Establishing strong DtC relationships	2	5	4
Engagement in meaningful consultation	3	5	5
Aboriginal engagement	2	4	4
Adequate opportunities for Aboriginal participation	2	5	5
Benefits to Aboriginal groups	2	5	5
Proponent participation beyond project approval	3	5	5
Mean score (+/- standard deviation)	2.5 (0.52)	4.7 (0.46)	4.4 (0.50)
Total score	27/55	52/55	48/55
Significant differences	A	B	B

833

834 Notes: A five-point Likert scale, with an assigned numerical value was used to evaluate projects
 835 against DtC criteria (Very Poor = 1; Poor = 2; Average = 3; Good = 4; Very Good = 5).

836 Significant differences were determined by one-way ANOVA followed by Tukey’s test. Projects
 837 assigned the same letters were not significantly different and projects with different letters were
 838 significantly different at the $P < 0.01$ level.

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