

# Madagascar's rosewood (*Dalbergia* spp.) stocks as a political challenge

Authors: Patrick O. Waeber<sup>1</sup>, Derek Schuurman<sup>2</sup>, Lucienne Wilmé<sup>3,4</sup>\*

<sup>1</sup> ETH Zurich, Institute of Terrestrial Ecosystems, Forest Management and Development (ForDev) Group, Universitätstrasse 16, 8092 Zurich, Switzerland  
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-3229-0124>

<sup>2</sup> Rainbow Tours, 2 Waterhouse Square, 140 Holborn, EC1N 2ST, England  
<https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0523-5672>

<sup>3</sup> Missouri Botanical Garden, Madagascar Research & Conservation Program, BP 3391, Antananarivo 101, Madagascar  
<http://orcid.org/0000-0002-8344-1957>

<sup>4</sup> World Resources Institute, Madagascar Program, BP 3884, Antananarivo 101, Madagascar

\* Corresponding author: Lucienne Wilmé, [lucienne.wilme@mobot-mg.org](mailto:lucienne.wilme@mobot-mg.org)

## Abstract

**Background.** Malagasy rosewood (*Dalbergia* spp.) has attracted international attention for centuries due to the high quality and intense coloration of the wood. Rosewood was sourced from the time of the colonial era during the early 20<sup>th</sup> century. Extraction continued after the country's independence in 1960. The sourcing of rosewood—almost exclusively from protected areas—escalated to unprecedented levels during the 2000s, which coincided with the political crisis from 2009–2013. It continues unabated. Following pressure by the international community and spearheaded by the World Bank, the Malagasy government started to confiscate and stockpile the precious timber. In 2013, all 45 Malagasy rosewood species were uplifted to CITES Appendix II. In June 2018 the stockpiles were the subject of an internationally-attended workshop in Antananarivo, facilitated by the World Bank. **Survey methods.** The focus of this study is the period from 2009 to the present. Based on structured literature review and grey literature, we examine the forest governance context, analyse ongoing deforestation, and look at how traders continue to take advantage of ‘loopholes’ created by a combination of semantics and the lack of taxonomic knowledge about the target genera. **Results.** In this paper we provide an update surrounding the confiscated Malagasy rosewood stocks. With presidential elections scheduled for November and December 2018, we examine plans under way to sell off at least some of the stocks. Forest governance mechanisms are complicated and management is rendered all the more difficult by a lack of technical, human and financial resources. Deforestation remains unchecked, with 2017 levels having been the worst during the past decade. Since 1982, the trading of rosewood has spiked significantly prior to presidential elections. Additionally, corruption escalated during recent years. **Conclusions.** We argue that, in order to ensure increased transparency and reduce the risk of corruption, the best option to deal with the rosewood stocks, is to hold off on any plans to sell the


stocks until such time that uplifting the status of CITES- listed species to Appendix I, has been achieved so as to ensure that the proper mechanisms are put in place to handle the stocks.

## Introduction

In countries with abundant natural resources but where institutions have low levels of democracy, corruption is often-times encouraged, because leaders will tend to favour sources of guaranteed income (Bhattacharyya & Holder, 2009). Angeles & Neanidis (2009) evaluated the critical role of local elites in effectively eliciting foreign aid in developing countries. There is a greater likelihood of aid misuse if the ruling class has significant economic and social power along with scant regard—if not utter contempt—for the lower classes, and if the ratio of European settlers to the indigenous population was high during the colonial period (Angeles & Neanidis, 2009; Razafindrakoto et al., 2014).

In Madagascar, a similar situation prevails; the allocation of wealth has deep roots in its colonial history (Razafindrakoto et al., 2014; Razafindrakoto et al., 2015). The country suffers from its chronic political instability (cf. Randrianja, 2012a; Randrianja, 2012b). Since the 2009 coup d'état, increased political uncertainty has further undermined economic development, amid a global financial crisis that has accentuated impacts on the poor, leading to increased food insecurity and corruption (Randrianja, 2012a; Figure 1). Poor governance and a lack of clarity in forest regulations have aided timber trafficking during at least three periods (1992, 2006 and 2009–2010). Escalation of rosewood exportation has been facilitated by government decrees issued prior to elections, or,

during challenging political periods, in each instance accompanied by ‘exceptional’ government orders, which allowed a select few, powerful operators to export massive quantities of wood. The near-silence of the international donors and NGOs is linked to their loss of influence following suspension of all but humanitarian aid since 17 March 2009 (Schuurman & Lowry, 2009; Randriamalala & Liu, 2010)—international aid resumed its financial support right after the official presidential elections early 2013 under Hery Rajaonarimampianina. A new Madagascar government (N. 4 under the same mandate) was formed on 11 June 2018, after Prime minister Christian Ntsay assumed his post on 6th June 2018. Only eight ministers out of 30 were retained in this interim government; Guillaume Venance Randiatefiarison is the new Minister of Environment, Ecology and Forest (MEEF). The current situation in Madagascar is politically unstable with presidential elections scheduled to happen on 7<sup>th</sup> November 2018 and 19<sup>th</sup> December 2018.



78

79 Logging and trade of rosewood

80 Despite an international ban on export and trading, the timber has been exported unceasingly to the  
 81 present day. As is the case with most tropical precious timber, the bulk of the rosewood has been  
 82 shipped to China, where demand for it is enormous (Innes, 2010). On the Chinese market, 2014  
 83 prices often exceeded US\$17,000 per ton—ten times more than that of other tropical hardwoods  
 84 (Cerutti & Gumbo, 2018). In 2011, Malagasy rosewood stocks were estimated to be in excess of  
 85 500,000 tons. In 2013, the international community, spearheaded by the South African  
 86 Development Community (SADC) prepared new presidential elections, expected to put an end to  
 87 the political and economic crisis of an increasingly beleaguered nation (Waeber et al., 2016). In  
 88 the same period, the World Bank implemented a project (#PO93271) aimed at finding a solution

of how to deal with the controversial rosewood stocks. Additionally, in 2013 all species of *Dalbergia* and *Diospyros* were placed in CITES Appendix II and embargoed from international trade until Madagascar made sufficient progress on the Precious Wood Action Plan presented at CITES 16<sup>th</sup> Conference of Parties.” [Mason et al., 2016, p15]. This measure meant that stocks could not leave Madagascar and were split into three categories: (a) seized; (b) declared and unseized and (c) hidden. It may be worth mentioning ‘stockpile elasticity’—an example of which is illustrated in the stockpiles, which were declared in 2011 but were never verified. As the stockpiles were not verified, there was ‘room’ within them to serve as ‘buffers’: movement could occur by means of newly-sourced timber being shifted into and out of an undeclared stockpile, to facilitate opportunistic sales. The afore-mentioned World Bank project ended in December 2015. In the same year the government undertook an audit of seized stocks (in-country only, not stocks seized abroad, nor stocks declared in-country but not seized), as questions surrounded their integrity. The database with the details of marked logs, is under the ownership of the Ministry of the Environment.

International collaboration resulted in seizures by authorities in several countries, of containers filled with Malagasy rosewood. These occurred in Kenya, Mauritius and in Singapore (Butler, 2014; Mason et al., 2016). Mason and collaborators (2016, p.12) note, “Yet, despite these bans and enforcement activities outside Madagascar’s borders, illegal harvesting and trade persists, and the accelerated extraction of rosewood has degraded the landscape and depleted the resource even further.” The report alludes to instances of loggers returning to exploited forests in order to retrieve stumps of previously felled rosewood trees. Note a parallel here, which serves to illustrate the unstoppable determination with which the suppliers will go to, in order to obtain the commodity:

in the crisis facing rhinos in Africa, poachers have killed many dehorned animals for the sake of harvesting just the stumps of their horns (Lindsey & Taylor, 2011).

## Survey Methodology

The results and analyses of this study are founded on a structured literature search of both published peer-reviewed publications and unpublished grey literature. We targeted both, English and French publications for the years 1990 to 2018; this work was undertaken in June and July 2018 using the online catalogue google scholar. Key search terms were “forest governance/ management/ policy/ rosewood/ tropical timber” and a Boolean combination of these with the term “Madagascar”. We further searched international repositories of CITES, the World Bank, UNEP, Transparency International, and the WRI for reports and indices on poverty, human development, deforestation, governance, and corruption.

## Results

### World Bank

As a global player, the World Bank is involved in many tropical countries. “The overarching mission of the World Bank Group is a world free of poverty. Ambitious but achievable goals are being established to align the World Bank Group's diverse activities to this mission. The first goal is to end extreme poverty.” (International Monetary Fund & World Bank, 2013). The World Bank’s

activities and impacts have however, been extremely widely publicised and its efficacy debated. Ana Eiras, in her ‘IMF and World Bank Intervention: A Problem, Not a Solution’, (2003) described how sending money to countries with misdirected policies and weak rule of law increases their debt and does not result in visible economic growth. “Debt is an efficient tool. It ensures access to other peoples’ raw materials and infrastructure on the cheapest possible terms”, wrote Susan George in ‘A Fate Worse Than Debt’ (1990, p. 143). Anup Shah (2013) wrote: “In effect, the IMF and World Bank have demanded that poor nations lower the standard of living of their people.” Ana Eiras (2003): “According to the Index of Economic Freedom, the Bank’s money has done nothing to improve economic freedom in recipient countries.” She continues: “Predictably, those countries are still just as poor as they were 40 years ago when they started receiving World Bank loans.” In the conclusion, Eiras states “One of the main causes of continued poverty in the world is the work of the World Bank and IMF.” Among the world’s most respected economists, Joseph Stiglitz is also former chief economist at the World Bank, which he left after having launched criticism about it and the IMF. According to Nobel prize winning Stiglitz, assistance strategies put into place by the World Bank after using country-specific investigations, amounted to little more than the World Bank representative/s inspecting 5-star hotels and meeting with a desperate finance minister who would ‘voluntarily’ sign a pre-drafted ‘restructuring agreement’ (Shah, 2013). During the period 2009–2018, Madagascar has been ranking amongst the world’s poorest countries (Figure 2).






Figure 2. Trends in the Human Development Index for Madagascar and Sub-Saharan Africa between the lines of Low and Medium human development. Starting in 2012, Madagascar's index falls below the mean value of Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 2016).

151

152 Just during a period of highest political uncertainty, i.e., the phase leading up to new presidential

153 elections, the World Bank organized a 3-day workshop in Antananarivo (from 19–21 June 2018)

154 “to discuss implementation of Madagascar’s use plan (“Business Plan”) for disposing of stockpiles

155 of rosewood and other precious woods.” Delegates present at the workshop included

156 representatives from USAID Madagascar; AFD, TRAFFIC Madagascar; EIA WWF Madagascar,

157 World Bank (naturally), ITTO and various parties keen on trading in rosewood and ebony including

158 companies such as Stardust Materials and Hearne Hardwoods. On the first day, after the


159 workshop’s opening ceremony presided over by the Minister of the Environment, ITTO and World

160 Bank, there was a review of the status of CITES’ deliberations on Malagasy *Dalbergia* and

161 *Diospyros* species. This is an interesting topic when taking into consideration parameters such as

lack of knowledge and the projected time to study them being 2–2.5 years: Mason and colleagues (2016, p16) begin with “Little if any reliable information is available on which species of *Diospyros* are exploited in Madagascar”. For a better understanding, we need to consult with botanists. According to Lowry & Schatz (2016), more than 60% of the ca. 215–230 species currently recognized by specialists working on the genus, remain to be named and described. On Page 22 of the above report, there is a clear photograph captioned “Figure 3: Twelve species of *Diospyros* fruiting simultaneously on [the small uninhabited] Nosy Mangabe in north-eastern Madagascar, seven of which are new to science.” Additionally, it is written, “The population status of *Diospyros* species in Madagascar remains almost totally unknown.” “When it comes to the Malagasy *Dalbergia*, “the current taxonomic information and the available identification tools are both *seriously inadequate*.” [emphasize added] (Lowry & Schatz, 2016, p24). Currently, “a protocol for collecting the necessary material and compiling the associated data in an integrated database platform has been established and is now being initiated, tested and refined in the field.” Thus, while our understanding of the target species and taxonomic diversity remains minimal, we are simultaneously running out of time to actually and effectively halt further logging; this has become more accentuated since the 2009 political events (Randriamalala & Liu, 2010). There is an interesting statement in Mason et al. (2016, p23), referring to the printed booklet to help guide identification of logs of ebony, palisander, or rosewood ‘TRAFFIC wood identifier’: “In its current implementation, the TRAFFIC wood identifier can only classify wood as ebony, palisander or rosewood in the field and cannot identify the corresponding *Dalbergia* or *Diospyros* species”, making the job of monitoring and control almost impossible. (How should a non-botanist be expected to identify a wooden log accurately?). We happened on an interesting ‘loophole’, which has been taken advantage of in order to traffic plenty of timber not only from Madagascar, but from

elsewhere in the world. The ‘loophole’ in question is that of ‘semantics’, which we shall revisit later.



Much time at the June 2018 workshop in Antananarivo was allocated to the Government of Madagascar’s ‘Stockpile Verification Mechanism and Business Plan’, published by the Ministry of Environment, Ecology and Forests in the same month (Revision 2 of Phase 1 and Phase 2) in June 2018 (MEEF, 2018). The aim of this business plan is to ‘liquidate’ all stockpiles of Malagasy rosewood and ebony to ‘zero’. In the introductory section is written “Businesses cannot function without a roadmap for success and we are benchmarking this Business Plan roadmap on the mandates by the CITES Standing Committee from COP17 and CITES Action Plan requirements

for addressing the longstanding issues caused by the rosewood crisis” (MEEF, 2018, p4). The intention is clarified: “The mandate is to audit ‘stockpiles’ in all forms and establish a precedent for reporting on 1/3 of the total (not disclosed in the report) for review and consultation for approving a partial sale through a pragmatic, transparent and controlled programme.” It is claimed shortly thereafter that the “first step to developing a viable forest management regime for precious woods in Madagascar, is to solve the ‘stockpiles’ issues’.

CITES (Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) structured a multi-pronged Action Plan (2013a) to back the implementation of the inclusion of all *Dalbergia* and *Diospyros* species onto Appendix II. Its aims are centred around management of known stocks; control of future trade of the target species and to determine the most appropriate method for earning revenue for the existing stockpiles that are in the country. When taking into consideration the current rate of destruction of the country’s remaining forests coupled with the fact that *Dalbergia* and *Diospyros* classification remains a subject on which a considerable amount of work still remains to be carried out in order to provide us with a reasonable understanding of the Malagasy representatives of these two genera, there is a significant risk that certain species of these trees may disappear before, or just as we get to learn of, their existence.

The convenience of semantics

The term rosewood represents hardwood trees of the family of Fabaceae. For centuries, people have admired these precious woods. Malagasy rosewood (*Dalbergia* spp.)—currently thought to comprise of some 45 species—is especially appreciated for its fine qualities in woodwork and

furniture production. Malagasy rosewood has been sourced since the colonial period (early 20<sup>th</sup> century) and continued after the country's independence in 1960. The sourcing of rosewood escalated to unprecedented levels in the 2000s, coinciding notably with the political fallout from 2009–2013 (Randrianja, 2012b). It has since continued unabated. Most Malagasy forests are within protected areas from which sourcing of precious timbers is illegal. The wood (logs with a dbh—diameter at breast height bigger than 25 cm)—has been extracted for the most part from protected areas in humid eastern Madagascar. This is difficult—not to mention dangerous—work since rosewood with 1t per m<sup>3</sup> is one of the densest woods on earth (the log needs to be cut into 'manageable' pieces of 2–3 m, and then dragged by manpower out of the forest, often on steep terrain, to a river. Rosewood cannot float, so it needs the support of other, lighter logs. Once extracted out the forest, the logs are stockpiled, mostly in well-concealed localities.

Contemporary wooden crafts in any Malagasy urban centre are made exclusively using what craftspeople call 'palisander', something which has replaced rosewood everywhere in recent years. In the past, artisans would have tinted wood in a dark reddish tone and referred to it as 'rosewood'. However nowadays, they invest effort in darkening the wood, albeit keeping it browner, without any red tones. These carved pieces are sold under the label of palisander. This language detail has its origins in the 2009 'rosewood crisis' when the international community was appalled by the events taking place in Madagascar, while there was political turmoil. In English, the French word 'palissandre' translates to rosewood, as does the French 'bois de rose'. Hence, there is no proper distinction between palisander and rosewood, in any language: both belong to the same tree genus, *Dalbergia*. The confusion or lack in clarity—coupled with the afore-mentioned paucity of knowledge about the genera *Dalbergia* and *Diospyros*, has benefited the timber traffickers in

francophone countries for years. They have cunningly used it to their advantage. Timber traders interpret a ban on rosewood as a signal to export ‘palisander’ and they quickly apply the misnomer of palisander to any logs which they want to export. This vernacular French term never existed in English and there are no scientific nor practical, reasons to adopt it in English, other than to aid and abet timber trafficking, or be able to manipulate or circumvent regulations.

Something similar has been identified in the rosewood trade between Zambia and China: according to Cerruti & Gumbo (2018), the most common name for rosewood in Zambia is ‘mukula’, “(...) but because several different species are categorised as mukula, and because comprehensive inventories are lacking, current rosewood stocks are not known.” They add that “this means Zambia doesn’t benefit much from the rosewood trade.” And that, as is the case in Madagascar, “its forests are being decimated, causing serious environmental degradation.”

## Understanding the forest governance context

The use of natural resources like forests is bound to become increasingly complex while values and the nature of stakeholders undergo change. This poses growing challenges to the forest governance regime, whose efficiency or ‘success’ can be assessed through environmental and social criteria and indicators (e.g., Duffy, 2006; Phelps et al., 2010; Horning, 2012). In Madagascar, prior to the National Environmental Action Plan NEAP, forest governance was characterized by the existence of two types of stakeholders: the first, the managers, was comprised of the Malagasy State and the financial backers (i.e. International ENGOs). An interesting note here: at the time,

there was only WWF international with less than 10 employees in Madagascar; the other big NGOs joined later during the NEAP phases). A second category of stakeholders, the forest resource users, consisted of operators and base communities (Rabesahala Horning, 2008).

During the period of the NEAP spearheaded by the World Bank—including three phases, 1990–2008 (Mercier, 2006)—there was a strong push to accomplish forest conservation in Madagascar, as elsewhere in Africa, through the process of formal decentralization of forest resource governance (Waeber et al., 2016). This led to an increase in structural complexity and stakeholders: The Malagasy State consisted of the public authorities and ministries: Ministry of Environment and Forests MEF, with minister, cabinet and secretary general for the political aspects who regulated the general management of forest finances and set out the rules of forest access and forest use. The General Director of the MEF and its decentralized (regionally organized) structure presided over technical management of the forest resources. Another stakeholder comprised of the financiers who attempted to influence the allocation of the forest resources. National NGOs and related executive structures were responsible for the implementation of actions on the ground. A separate group, the Operators, were interested in the timber products from forests. They competed with local communities, who are the stakeholders with the least political power, making a living from the use of timber and non-timber products.

New policies like the GELOSE (10 September 1996, law No. 96 - 025, and in 1997, the law was incorporated into the new national forestry policy (Law 97 - 107 and Decree 97 – 1200) have not yet proved to be sustainable (Antoine et al., 2004; Raik & Decker, 2007; Rasolofoson et al., 2016).

As forest governance in Madagascar encounters growing challenges, we are seeing what could be described as a game of ‘pinball’ in the higher echelons of the political arena: the chair of the Ministry of Environment, for one, seems to be most volatile of all, undergoing frequent changes and replacements. These changes have implications further down the ladder as each new Minister is bringing his/her own staff, which translates in slowing down forest regulation policies at the cost of efficient forest management and monitoring. Forest governance has proven to be less effective than hoped and mapped out in the NEAP roadmap. Deforestation has proven to be unstoppable, with 2017 being a disastrous year for the remaining forests and its unique biodiversity (Figure 3). The years 2009 and 2010 have been the worst from a rosewood trafficking perspective (Randriamalala, 2010; Mason et al., 2016), while escalation of forest cover loss at national level has increased markedly from 2013, with a peak in 2017 (Figure 3).

## Discussion

It is somewhat disconcerting to observe how forcefully the World Bank has been acting when it comes to dealing with this complex issue (see Waeber & Wilmé, 2013) that has all characteristics of a typical wicked problem (sensu Rittel & Webber 1973). Is facilitating the sale of the stocks—as per the Government of Madagascar’s recently published Business Plan (see Anonymous 2018)—really the best solution for the Malagasy nation as a whole? The World Bank remains silent about the fact that Malagasy rosewood stocks are illegally sourced (Schuurman, 2009; Schuurman & Lowry, 2009; Randriamalala & Liu, 2010; Wilmé et al. 2009) while all *Dalbergia* spp. are CITES II listed. Selling the stocks can only be made possible if the government, with the support



of national and international institutions, legalizes the illegal. This process of legalizing is mostly achieved in the form of a meeting not dissimilar than that described by the economist Stiglitz, i.e. where a few representatives are invited to sign an attendance list—and in most cases, the representatives lack any power to counteract the ‘solution’ already put in place and presented by the institution organizing the meeting (as was the case of the June 2018 workshop). There is a high risk that it will swiftly prompt loggers to re-enter the forests to fell and sell more precious wood. A vulnerable, volatile political setting is the perfect time, from a trafficker’s perspective, to sell timber. If this happens now, following the World Bank workshop that has preceded the upcoming election, it will be a case of history repeating itself: the same process has been occurring for decades (Randriamalala& Liu, 2011; Figure 2, p. 16).

Burning or destroying the stocks by any means are seemingly the best alternative to selling them off in order to avoid further corruption at the expense of people and biodiversity. However, there are various reasons for speaking against this alternative: (i) most Malagasy citizens do not want to destroy their natural resources, as a matter of principle; (ii) burning the stocks is ecologically inappropriate; there will be a cost linked to any kind of destruction of the stocks ensuring proper management and transparency; and (iv) probably the most important one, it may trigger demand for more timber (similar as to selling the stocks).

## Conclusion

The intense pressure on fast diminishing natural resources such as rosewood and other precious timber in Madagascar and elsewhere will increase the value of such stocks within the coming

decades. We need to learn from the story of ivory stocks, of which the burning did not help wild populations of African elephants (e.g., Biggs et al., 2016), and where selling of the stocks, despite CITES Appendix I listing, did not slow down further slaughtering of wild elephants. Traders generally sit on their stocks, waiting for better market conditions. We believe there is a case for the controversial stocks to be secured somewhere in Madagascar—for example, deep in an artificial lake. Therefore, this option may be a way for the rosewood stocks to truly benefit future generations of Malagasy people. If such an alternative is not adopted, China for the most part, will take the lion's share, just as has happened in the past—but see parallels to the case of ivory. We have to question if postponing the same issues for some decades, can be a viable future solution. If the timber is sold in 30 years from now, would it be a by means of a transparent process that benefits the Malagasy people and the island's biodiversity? Would the same institutions again, sit together only to have the same discourse as just happened in June? Given our paucity of knowledge on the delineation of the various Malagasy rosewood and ebony species, their ecology, distributions and conservation status, is it not completely premature to take risks, which would further put additional pressure on the remaining wild populations of these tree species? In the situation we have outlined, there is concern that Malagasy rosewoods may even be removed off the CITES Appendix II, when actually, up-listing them to Appendix I, seems to be the best way forward in this typical case of wicked problems. It would facilitate a more transparent handling of the stocks and render the current rosewood situation less politically motivated.

# References

- Anonymous. 21018. Workshop on Securing and Disposing of Stockpiles of Precious Woods in Madagascar. 19–21 June 2018, Antananarivo, Madagascar. Available at [http://www.itto.int/workshop\\_detail/id=5600](http://www.itto.int/workshop_detail/id=5600) (accessed 10 July 2018)
- Biggs D, Holden MH, Brackowski AR, Possingham HP. 2016. Track the impact of Kenya’s ivory burn. *Nature* 534:179. DOI: 10.1038/534179a
- Butler RA. 2014. Singapore intercepts massive illegal shipment of Madagascar rosewood. Available at <https://news.mongabay.com/2014/06/singapore-intercepts-massive-illegal-shipment-of-madagascar-rosewood/> (accessed 1 July 2018)
- Cerutti PO, Gumbo D. 2018. Why Zambia has not benefitted from its rosewood trade with China. *The Conversation* 25 June 2018. Available at <http://theconversation.com/why-zambia-has-not-benefitted-from-its-rosewood-trade-with-china-98092> (accessed 1 July 2018)
- Dhital N, Randrianjafy Rasoloarisoa V, Khasa DP. 2015. Issues and challenges of forest governance in Madagascar. *Canadian Journal of Development Studies / Revue canadienne d’études du développement* 36:38–56. DOI: 10.1080/02255189.2015.989197
- Eiras A. 2003. IMF and World Bank Intervention: A Problem, Not a Solution. Report to the Heritage Foundation. Available at <https://www.heritage.org/monetary-policy/report/imf-and-world-bank-intervention-problem-not-solution> (accessed 1 July 2018)
- Global Forest Watch. 2018. Tree Cover Loss and Gain Area. Available at <https://www.globalforestwatch.org/dashboards/country/MDG> (accessed 10 July 2018)

- 369 Innes JL. 2010. Madagascar rosewood, illegal logging and the tropical timber trade. *Madagascar*  
370 *Conservation & Development* 5:6–10. DOI: 10.4314/mcd.v5i1.57335
- 371 International Monetary Fund and World Bank 2013. A Common Vision for the World Bank  
372 Group. Development Committee (Joint Ministerial Committee of the Boards of Governors  
373 of the Bank and the Fund on the Transfer of Real Resources to Developing Countries).  
374 Available at  
375 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/23394965/DC2013->  
376 [0002\(E\)CommonVision.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/DEVCOMMINT/Documentation/23394965/DC2013-0002(E)CommonVision.pdf) (accessed 1 July 2018)
- 377 Lindsey PA, Taylor A. 2011. A study on the dehorning of African rhinoceroses as a tool to  
378 reduce the risk of poaching. Report prepared by the Endangered Wildlife Trust (EWT) for  
379 the South African Department of Environmental Affairs, Johannesburg. Available at  
380 [http://www.rhinosourcecenter.com/index.php?s=1&act=refs&CODE=ref\\_detail&id=134](http://www.rhinosourcecenter.com/index.php?s=1&act=refs&CODE=ref_detail&id=134)  
381 [2738800](http://www.rhinosourcecenter.com/index.php?s=1&act=refs&CODE=ref_detail&id=134) (accessed 1 July 2018)
- 382 Mason J, Parker M, Vary LB, Lowry II PP, Hassold S, Ruta G. 2016. Malagasy precious  
383 hardwoods: scientific and technical assessment to meet CITES objectives. The World  
384 Bank, Washinton DC. Available at [https://www.profor.info/content/malagasy-precious-](https://www.profor.info/content/malagasy-precious-hardwoods-scientific-and-technical-assessment-meet-cites-objectives)  
385 [hardwoods-scientific-and-technical-assessment-meet-cites-objectives](https://www.profor.info/content/malagasy-precious-hardwoods-scientific-and-technical-assessment-meet-cites-objectives) (accessed 1 July  
386 2018)
- 387 Mercier J-R. 2006. Madagascar moving towards sustainable development. The preparation of the  
388 National Environmental Action Plan (NEAP): Was it a false start? *Madagascar*  
389 *Conservation & Development* 1:50–54. DOI: 10.4314/mcd.v1i1.44122
- 390 Randrianja S. 2012a. *Madagascar, le coup d'État de mars 2009*. Paris: Éditions Karthala.

- 391 Randrianja S. 2012b. Love me tender – Transition vers où? *Madagascar Conservation &*  
392 *Development* 7:9–16. DOI: 10.4314/mcd.v7i1.3
- 393 Randriamalala H, Liu Z. 2010. Rosewood of Madagascar: Between democracy and conservation.  
394 *Madagascar Conservation & Development* 5:11–22. DOI: 10.4314/mcd.v5i1.57336
- 395 Randriamalala H, Rasarely E, Ballet J, Brizzi A, Razakamanarina N, Ratsifandrihamanana N,  
396 Schuurman D. 2011. Madagascar’s rosewood stocks – which way to go? *Madagascar*  
397 *Conservation & Development* 6:88–96. Available at  
398 <http://www.journalmcd.com/index.php/mcd/article/view/mcd.v1i1i2.8> (accessed 1 July  
399 2018)
- 400 Randriamalala H., Waeber P., Wilmé L. 2012. Les cyber-verts contre le trafic de bois de rose  
401 malgache. In Randrianja S, ed. *Madagascar, le coup d’État de mars 2009*. Paris: Éditions  
402 Karthala, 123–145.
- 403 Razafindrakoto M, Roubaud F, Wachsberger J-M. 2014. Élités, pouvoir et régulation à  
404 Madagascar. Une lecture de l’histoire à l’aune de l’économie politique. *Afrique*  
405 *Contemporaine* 251:25–50. DOI: 10.3917/afco.251.0025
- 406 Razafindrakoto M, Roubaud F, Wachsberger J-M. 2015. L’île mystérieuse : une approche  
407 d’économie politique de la trajectoire longue de Madagascar. *Canadian Journal of*  
408 *Development Studies / Revue Canadienne d’Études du Développement* 36:397–415. DOI:  
409 10.1080/02255189.2015.1075870
- 410 Rittel HWJ, Webber MM. 1973. Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. *Policy Sciences*  
411 4:155–169. DOI: 10.1007/BF01405730

- 412 Schuurman D. 2009. Illegal logging of rosewood in the rainforests of northeast Madagascar.  
413 *Traffic Bulletin* 22:49. Available at [http://www.traffic.org/traffic-](http://www.traffic.org/traffic-bulletin/traffic_pub_bulletin_22_2.pdf)  
414 [bulletin/traffic\\_pub\\_bulletin\\_22\\_2.pdf](http://www.traffic.org/traffic-bulletin/traffic_pub_bulletin_22_2.pdf) (accessed 1 July 2018)
- 415 Schuurman D, Lowry II PP. 2009. The Madagascar rosewood massacre. *Madagascar*  
416 *Conservation & Development* 4:98–102. DOI: 10.4314/mcd.v4i2.48649
- 417 Shah A. 2013. Structural Adjustment—a Major Cause of Poverty. Global Issues. Available at  
418 <http://www.globalissues.org/article/3/structural-adjustment-a-major-cause-of-poverty>  
419 (accessed 1 July 2018)
- 420 Transparency International 2018. Corruption Perceptions Index 2017. Available at  
421 <https://www.transparency.org/> (accessed 1 July 2018)
- 422 UNDP 2016. Human Development Report 2016. Human development for Everyone. Available at  
423 <http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/trends> (accessed 1 July 2018)
- 424 Waeber PO, Wilmé L. 2013. Madagascar rich and in-transparent. *Madagascar Conservation &*  
425 *Development* 8:52–54. DOI: 10.4314/mcd.v8i2.1
- 426 Waeber PO, Wilmé L, Mercier J-R, Camara C, Lowry II PP. 2016. How effective have thirty  
427 years of internationally driven conservation and development efforts been in Madagascar?  
428 *PLoS ONE* 118:e0161115. DOI: 10.1371/journal.pone.0161115
- 429 Wilmé L, Waeber PO. 2017. Tartuffe’s Madagascar: conservation hypocrisy. *Madagascar*  
430 *Conservation & Development* 12:3–6. DOI: 10.4314/mcd.v12i1.7
- 431 Wilmé L, Schuurman D, Lowry II PP. 2009. A forest counterpart fund: Madagascar’s wounded  
432 forests can erase the debt owed to them while securing their future, with support from the

433 citizens of Madagascar. *Lemur News* 14:8–9. Available at  
434 [https://www.dpz.eu/fileadmin/content/Bibliothek/Downloads/Lemur\\_News/Lemur%20Ne](https://www.dpz.eu/fileadmin/content/Bibliothek/Downloads/Lemur_News/Lemur%20News%2014%20%282009%29.pdf)  
435 [ws%2014%20%282009%29.pdf](https://www.dpz.eu/fileadmin/content/Bibliothek/Downloads/Lemur_News/Lemur%20News%2014%20%282009%29.pdf) (accessed 1 July 2018)

436

# Caption for figures

Figure 1. Corruption Perceptions Index and the rank of Madagascar in the Global World. The best rank has been achieved in 2008 when Madagascar was 85<sup>th</sup> out of 180 countries scored (Transparency International, 2018).

Figure 2. Trends in the Human Development Index for Madagascar and Sub-Saharan Africa between the lines of Low and Medium human development. Starting in 2012, Madagascar's index falls below the mean value of Sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 2016).

Figure 3. Cumulative tree cover loss with different canopy cover; the three-year moving average may represent a more accurate picture of the data trends to uncertainty in year-to-year comparisons. (Global Forest Watch, 2018)