

# 1 Randomised Badger Culling Trial: Impact, based on 2 more extensive data

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11  
12 In 2007 the Independent Scientific Group (ISG) reported to the UK government the impact on  
13 bovine tuberculosis (TB) in cattle of the Randomised Badger Culling Trial (RBCT). Badgers were  
14 culled between 1998 and 2005 across 100 km<sup>2</sup> (nominal) zones in the West of England. The  
15 results were based on a model of confirmed New Herd Incidence (NHI). It was concluded that  
16 reactive culling generated overall detrimental effects, while proactive culling achieved very  
17 modest overall benefits at the cost of elevated incidence in surrounding areas.

18  
19 This work looks at more extensive RBCT data to examine if these findings hold true. Instead of  
20 presenting the results of a model, this work directly illustrates the data. The Animal and Plant  
21 Health Agency supplied this data in March 2016. Such data covers a greater number of years  
22 (1986 to 2012) and includes the prevalence of herd restrictions as well as herd incidence.

23  
24 Whilst the proactive culls substantially reduced confirmed NHI in treated areas, such culls did  
25 not significantly increase NHI in the surrounding outer ring. In fact, between 1998 and 2012  
26 these NHI slightly reduced in the outer ring . Between 2006 and 2012 they dropped by 28%, 1%  
27 and 18% in the treated, outer 2km ring, and combined areas respectively. Based on the total  
28 number of confirmed NHIs prevented between 1998 and 2012, a break-even cost to complete a  
29 badger removal exercise was calculated to be £8,693 per km<sup>2</sup> with benefits continuing in 2012.

30  
31 Proactive culling only reduced confirmed NHIs with no significant impact on unconfirmed NHIs.  
32 The more limited reactive culls had no impact on both the treated area and the outer 2km ring.

33  
34 Conclusions in the RBCT Final Report, which were based on the results of a model of time-  
35 shifted early data, poorly reflect the overall greater benefits seen in this more extensive data.  
36 Badger culling is highly contentious in the UK and many press reports adversely report the  
37 effectiveness of badger culling in general and the culls which started in 2013 in particular. The  
38 RBCT conclusions are often cited to add credence to these press reports. After the first year of  
39 substantial culling in the RBCT, this work found that 9 years of data were needed to clearly see  
40 the full extent by which TB dropped when plotted against calendar year. This delay should be  
41 reflected on when accounting for the circumstances and assessing impact of the 2013 culls.

42  
43 This work was restricted to looking at data showing total TB breakdowns over all zones. Further  
44 work to examine breakdowns by zone or groups of zones may reveal more.

## 45 INTRODUCTION

46  
47 The Randomised Badger Culling Trial (RBCT) was a trial performed in the South West and West  
48 of England where badgers were culled between 1998 and 2005 to investigate the impact on  
49 bovine TB in cattle. Badgers were either culled proactively or reactively. Ten areas of 100 km<sup>2</sup>  
50 each (nominal) were designated to the proactive culls, ten such areas were designated to the  
51 reactive culls and ten such areas were designated as survey-only areas. In the proactive areas  
52 badgers were culled over the complete area whereas in the reactive areas badgers were only  
53 culled local to where infected cattle herds were detected. Reactive culling was undertaken by  
54 removing all social groups of badgers having access to the breakdown farm so were conducted  
55 on or near farmland where breakdown herds were detected. (Bourne, 2007)

56  
57 The Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) at the Department for Environment, Food & Rural  
58 Affairs (DEFRA) made available for the first time raw, monthly, data covering prevalence as  
59 well as new herd incidence data for the RBCT on 15th March 2016. This article presents and  
60 discusses this data and finally reflects on implications for new culls which started in 2013.

## 61 DATA

62  
63 In August 2015 the following request was submitted by [www.bovinetb.info](http://www.bovinetb.info) to APHA for raw  
64 data covering years leading up to, during and after the trial.

65  
66 *Please email to me for each calendar month from 1986 to 2012 (i.e. 27 years, subject to*  
67 *availability) the following quantities*

- 68  
69 *(a) the number of cattle herds,*  
70 *(b) the number of confirmed new herd incidents,*  
71 *(c) the number of unconfirmed new herd incidents,*  
72 *(d) herds under restriction due to an OTF-W breakdown, and*  
73 *(e) herds under restriction due to an OTF-S breakdown*

74  
75 *in each of the following areas after the ten triplets are combined,*

- 76  
77 *(1) proactive area,*  
78 *(2) reactive area,*  
79 *(3) survey area,*  
80 *(4) 2km ring around the proactive area,*  
81 *(5) 2km ring around the reactive areas,*  
82 *(6) 2km ring around the survey area,*  
83 *(7) high risk area of England.*

84  
85 *Please note that I only need data for the total area (not for each triplet) for the area given in (1)*  
86 *to (6).*

87  
88  
89 With help from the Information Commissioner's Office, APHA supplied the data on 15th March

90 2016 under the Environmental Information Regulations 2004 and Access to Information  
 91 Reference Number ATIC0693. In that response APHA supplied data in the Excel spreadsheet  
 92 shown in Data S1.

93

## 94 METHODS

95

### 96 Data smoothing

97 Data was smoothed by summing the monthly data in each year to give annual quantities, dividing  
 98 by twelve if a monthly average was needed, and applying a Hann window to smooth the data  
 99 over 5 years.

100

### 101 Calculation of 95% confidence interval limits

102 For quantities plotted without smoothing, 95% confidence intervals can be calculated as follows.

103

$$104 \text{ Confidence intervals} = p \pm z \sqrt{\frac{p(1-p)}{n}}$$

105 where

106

107  $z = \text{desired level of confidence (1.96 for 95\% confidence intervals)}$ ,

108  $p = x/n = \text{proportion}$ ,

109  $x = \text{number of cases for which the condition applies, and}$

110  $n = \text{size of the sample in which those cases were found.}$

111

112 However results were averaged to reduce sample error and give a Hann-smoothed graph line.

113 This averaging would reduce the confidence interval at each smoothed point. These reduced


114 intervals were calculated by replacing the values of  $x$  and  $n$  by the sum of  $x$  and sum of  $n$

115 respectively after applying a Hann weight to each value. The weighting applied is shown in Fig.

116 1.

117

118



119

120 **Figure 1. Hann weight when smoothing over 5 points.**

121  
122 The confidence intervals are now calculated as follows.

$$123 \text{ Confidence intervals} = P \pm z \sqrt{\frac{P(1-P)}{N}}$$

124  
125 where

$$126 P = X/N,$$

$$127 X = \sum_w x = \text{weighted sum of } x, \text{ and}$$

$$128 N = \sum_w n = \text{weighted sum of } n.$$

### 130 131 **Calculation of badgers culled per square kilometre**

132 The number of badgers culled per square kilometre were calculated by dividing the number of  
133 badgers culled each year by the total treatment area summed across all triplets in which badgers  
134 were removed. These areas are given on Pages 205 to 209 of the RBCT Final Report (Bourne,  
135 2007). No badgers were removed in Triplet J in the reactive area so the area of this triplet was  
136 not included when calculating the total area. Total treatment and accessible areas, after excluding  
137 triplet J when calculating reactive areas, are shown in the table below.

138

Cull type	Area type	Total area (km <sup>2</sup> )
proactive	treatment	1132.4
proactive	accessible	796.6
reactive	treatment	1044.5
reactive	accessible	723.4

139  
140 **Table 1. Total cull areas in the RBCT.**

## 141 142 **RESULTS**

### 143 144 **Proactive badger culling substantially reduced confirmed herd breakdowns** 145 **without significantly increasing herd breakdowns in the 2km rings outside the** 146 **treatment areas**


147 Proactive culling led to substantially reduced confirmed incidence of cattle herd breakdowns in  
148 the treatment areas (see Figs. 2A and 2D) with no overall increase in the 2km rings surrounding  
149 these areas (see Figs. 2B and 2E). In the 2km rings a ripple effect may have occurred where an  
150 initial increase in TB occurs which is then cancelled out by a reduction after the reduction in the  
151 treated areas appeared. This is at odds with the conclusions reached in the RBCT Final Report  
152 (Bourne, 2007) which stated in Section 5.94 on Page 119 that proactive culling yielded only very  
153 moderate benefits at the expense of elevated TB incidence on neighbouring lands. However  
154 instead of showing the data (as are shown in the graphs below), the data were modelled by  
155 Poisson regression. In addition to this, that model incorporated large adjustments in the 2km  
156 rings throughout time based on differences seen between the subject and survey areas during a 3-

157 year pre-cull period. Concerns regarding the size of these adjustments, and what they were based  
 158 on, have been raised (Hendy D, 2016).

159

160 The graphs below show the data.

161



162


163 **Figure 2. Impact of proactive culling on confirmed TB herds in terms of annual average**  
 164 **percentage of restricted herds (A,B,C) and annual percentage of New Herd Incidents**  
 165 **(D,E,F).**

166

167 **Badger culling did not significantly reduce unconfirmed cattle breakdowns**

168 Although proactive badger culling may have slightly reduced the **incidence** of unconfirmed  
 169 cattle breakdowns (Fig. 3F), such culling does not appear to have had any significant impact on  
 170 the **prevalence** of unconfirmed restricted herds (Fig. 3C). Culling clearly reduced the prevalence  
 171 of confirmed restricted herds (Fig. 2C) so why did the culling not reduce the prevalence of  
 172 unconfirmed restricted herds? The ISG reported an absence of clear impact on unconfirmed new  
 173 herd incidence in Section 5.22 on Page 95 of Bourne FJ, 2007. The lack of impact on  
 174 unconfirmed TB is intriguing and perhaps worth investigating but is not pursued further in this  
 175 study. (Unconfirmed is a term which is no longer used. It means that infection was confirmed by  
 176 neither lesions nor culture. This term is applicable to the data considered in this report.)

177



178

179

**Figure 3. Impact of proactive culling on unconfirmed TB herds in terms of annual average percentage of restricted herds (A,B,C) and annual percentage of New Herd Incidents (D,E,F).**

180

181

182

### **The limited reactive culs had no impact on cattle TB**

184

Reactive culling was limited for the following reasons.

185

186

187

188

189

190

- It was only concentrated over 2 years.
- It only involved culling 2,067 badgers as opposed to the 8,892 badgers culled in the proactive culs.
- No reactive culling was performed in triplet J.

191

192

Figs. 4 and 5 show that reactive culling had no obvious impact on either confirmed or unconfirmed herd breakdowns respectively. This is at odds with conclusions in the RBCT Final Report (Bourne, 2007) which state in Item 10.45 on Page 172 that reactive culling generated overall detrimental effects.


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196

The graph below shows the impact on confirmed breakdowns.

197



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
199

200 **Figure 4. Impact of reactive culling on confirmed TB herds in terms of annual average**  
 201 **percentage of restricted herds (A,B,C) and annual percentage of New Herd Incidents**  
 202 **(D,E,F).**

202

203

204 The graph below shows the impact on unconfirmed breakdowns.  
 205



206  
 207 **Figure 5. Impact of reactive culling on unconfirmed TB herds in terms of annual average**  
 208 **percentage of restricted herds (A,B,C) and annual percentage of New Herd Incidents**  
 209 **(D,E,F).**

210  
 211 **Incident herd breakdowns in proactive areas did not clearly reduce until 5 years**  
 212 **after the first substantive cull**

213 Although there was no culling of badgers in 2001 due to Foot and Mouth, the first year incident  
 214 herd breakdowns due to proactive culling reduced in the treated and outer rings combined was  
 215 2005. See Fig. 2F above. The year 2000 was the first year in which a large number of badgers  
 216 were removed. If the year 2001 is excluded, years 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005 elapsed  
 217 before incident breakdowns clearly reduced; in other words, 5 years. However it should be noted  
 218 that time was shifted in the analysis reported in the final RBCT report (Bourne, 2007). Indeed  
 219 some areas were further advanced and others less advanced depending on when culling in those  
 220 areas started. However 1998 will always remain the earliest year culling could have possibly  
 221 started in any area and 2006 will be the last complete year data could have been included in that  
 222 report's analysis.

223  
 224 According to the final RBCT report (Bourne, 2007), the ISG performed the concluding analyses  
 225 of proactive culling data on 1 May 2007. As such conclusions were drawn based on data only in  
 226 whole years 2005 and 2006 of significant TB incidence reduction in the combined areas (Fig.  
 227 2F). That is 2 years. In addition to this, those last 2 years would have been needed to give a 5-  
 228 year smoothed value for the last year so would not have been depicted in any 5-year, smoothed  
 229 graph line because that smoothed graph line would only have extended up to the year 2004.



230 **DISCUSSION**

231

232 **Quantitative and financial impact of proactively culling badgers**

233 The full extent of the drop in the number of confirmed New Herd Incidents (NHI) in and around  
 234 the proactively treated areas of the RBCT was reached in 2006 (Fig. 2). The total number of  
 235 these NHI between 2006 and 2012 given by summing the raw unsmoothed data supplied by  
 236 APHA in Data S1 are shown in the table below.

237

Area	NHI in survey area	NHI in subject area
treated	950	687
outer 2km ring	540	534
combined	1490	1221

238

239 **Table 2. The total number of New Herd Incidents between 2006 and 2012.**

240 This table shows the number of New Herd Incidents in and around the proactively treated areas.

241 These numbers were calculated by summing the raw unsmoothed data in Data S1.

242

243 Examination of the way in which the data behaves in Fig. 2 shows that NHI in the subject and  
 244 survey areas leading up to the start of culling in 1998 closely overlaid. If it is assumed that any  
 245 differences were largely due to sample error, which cannot be adjusted for, it is appropriate to  
 246 calculate the number of NHI prevented by simply subtracting the number of NHI in the survey  
 247 areas from the number of NHI in the subject areas. These subtractions give the following  
 248 percentage drops in confirmed NHI in the 7 years between 2006 and 2012.

249

250 Percentage by which NHI dropped in treated area =  $(950-687)/950 \times 100 = 28\%$

251 Percentage by which NHI dropped in 2km ring =  $(540-534)/540 \times 100 = 1.1\%$

252 Percentage by which NHI dropped in combined area =  $(1490-1221)/1490 \times 100 = 18\%$

253

254 The following drops occurred between 1998 and 2012.

255

256 Percentage by which NHI dropped in treated area =  $(1716-1397)/1716 \times 100 = 18\%$

257 Percentage by which NHI dropped in 2km ring =  $(990-981)/990 \times 100 = 0.9\%$

258 Percentage by which NHI dropped in combined area =  $(2706-2378)/2706 \times 100 = 12\%$

259


260 Each confirmed NHI costs approximately £30,000 (DEFRA, 2011a). Between 1998 and 2012, in  
 261 the combined treated area and outer 2km ring, the sum of incidents recorded in the raw  
 262 unsmoothed data in Data S1 supplied by APHA reveals that, relative to the sum in the combined  
 263 survey-only areas,  $2706-2378=328$  incidents were prevented. The total cost of the RBCT was  
 264 estimated to be about £49,030,000 (DEFRA, 2011b). However this is the cost of a trial and a  
 265 culling exercise would be expected to be cheaper because it would not carry with it the cost of a  
 266 trial's overheads.  $1,132 \text{ km}^2$  was the overall encompassed treatment area, of which  $797 \text{ km}^2$  were  
 267 accessible for treatment. These areas are shown in Table 1. This suggests that the total break-  
 268 even cost per  $\text{km}^2$  to complete any future proactive badger culling exercise with the same

269 effectiveness will be approximately  
 270  
 271  $(30,000 \times 328) / 1,132 = \text{£}8,693 \text{ per km}^2$ .

272  
 273 If the cost per  $\text{km}^2$  is less than this, the cost of badger removal will be recouped and there will be  
 274 a cost benefit. However this break-even point may be an under-estimate because this figure only  
 275 accounts for NHI prevented up to 2012. Between 2006 and 2012 the drop in NHI was sustained  
 276 and indeed was continuing in 2012 as shown in Figs. 2A and 2D. Hence the break-even point and  
 277 financial gain would be expected to be higher.


### 278 279 **Data available to the ISG whilst writing the RBCT Final Report**

280 Fig. 6 shows what proactive cull data was available to the ISG when they wrote the Final RBCT  
 281 Report (Bourne FJ, 2007). The ISG performed the concluding analyses of proactive culling data  
 282 on 1 May 2007 before presenting the Final Report to the Minister of State on 23 May 2007.  
 283 Hence 2006 is the last whole year of data which was included in the analysis.  
 284



285  
 286 **Figure 6. Data available to the ISG whilst writing the RBCT Final Report.**


287  
 288 The ISG time shifted the data to account for the different years in which culling started in the  
 289 different cull zones, known as triplets. This may have revealed an earlier onset of impact by  
 290 bringing the impacts of the phased culling into focus. However this would have been at the  
 291 expense of defining impact after onset, irregular time periods and an uneven number of months  
 292 each triplet contributed to breakdowns in each time period (Hendy D, 2016). Fig. 7 overlays  
 293 results reported by the ISG. Data in the last reporting period in Fig. 7 usually omitted about a  
 294 month of data (Donnelly CA, 2010). Fig. 2 shows that, when TB levels were not time shifted and  
 295 were smoothed with 5-year Hann window, TB dropped over a period of about  $3\frac{1}{2}$  years.  
 296



297  
 298 **Figure 7. Differences in proactive culling effects calculated by the ISG time-shifted analysis.**  
 299 In the results shown in this graph, the interval between points of post-cull time periods was  
 300 nominally 6 months. The interval between points of during-cull time periods varied.  
 301

### 302 Data needed to see the full extent by which TB dropped in the RBCT

303 Fig. 8 below which shows how many years of data is needed to reveal the full extent to which  
 304 TB dropped in smoothed RBCT data. Data will need to extend up to 2009 which, after excluding  
 305 the year 2001, is 9 years worth of data starting at the first year of substantial culling.  
 306



307  
 308 **Figure 8. Data required before the culling impact becomes clear.**  
 309

310  
 311

### 312 **Timescales associated with the 2013 culls**

313 Badger culls in the South West of England started in the counties of Gloucester and Somerset in  
314 2013. If results for these culls are published every year at the same time as last year (i.e. 5th  
315 September), this will incur a 20-month delay beyond the last year of data shown in the results. If  
316 trends in the current culls follow those of the RBCT and 9 years of data are needed to see the full  
317 extent to which TB drops, 9 years of data will extend from 2013 to 2021. If this 20-month delay  
318 in publishing data persists, this data will be published in September 2023. However whether or  
319 not this data will be sufficient depends on if the results in Gloucestershire and Somerset over 9  
320 years carry the same significance as the results over this same length of time in the RBCT. In fact  
321 the significance will be less because the zones in South West England cover less total area. Time  
322 will need to be extended to reduce sample error. The treatment area is 256 km<sup>2</sup> in Somerset and  
323 311 km<sup>2</sup> in Gloucestershire (DEFRA, 2015a). This is exactly half the total proactive treatment  
324 area in the RBCT shown in Table 1. In addition to this, for culls starting in 2013, there are only  
325 two zones as opposed to ten in the RBCT. This increases the risk that overall TB dropped in the  
326 zones for reasons other than culling. However, an extra zone (in Dorset) was added in 2015 and  
327 an extra seven zones were added in 2016 (Natural England, 2016). A discussion of the statistics  
328 and outcomes surrounding timescales and number of culling zones is given by Donnelly CA et  
329 al, 2015.

330

### 331 **Effectiveness of the 2013 culls**

332 DEFRA are stipulating that the culls are only carried out for 4 years minimum. (DEFRA, 2015b).  
333 If culling stops after 4 years, no culling will take place in 2017 in Gloucestershire and Somerset  
334 where culling started in 2013. Culling in the RBCT was carried out in seven out of the ten  
335 proactive areas for at least 5 years, i.e. for an extra year, as shown in Table 4.8 of Bourne, 2007.  
336 It was not until during that fifth year in the RBCT, in which culling was taking place in those  
337 seven areas, that a clear reduction was seen. In terms of the number of badgers removed per  
338 square kilometre, cull rate each year in the current culls when averaged across the first 3 years  
339 ([www.bovinetb.info](http://www.bovinetb.info)) has been comparable to that in the RBCT. If culls stop after Year 4 in each  
340 cull zone in the current culls, this is likely to reduce the extent to which TB drops and lasts in the  
341 current culls. This will increase the risk that results fall short of what was achieved in the RBCT.

342

### 343 **CONCLUSIONS**

344

345 Badger culling in the UK is a very emotive subject which hampers rational debate. As a result of  
346 incomplete data, arguments and conclusions surrounding badger culling have been poorly  
347 grounded. This and strong public opposition to the culls has resulted in the majority of reports in  
348 the mass media being biased against culling. As a result it has been very difficult for government  
349 ministers to garner support for badger culling and to date progress towards implementation has  
350 been very slow. In view of this, perhaps the most important findings in this study of more  
351 extensive RBCT data are as follows.

352

- 353 a. Proactive badger culling substantially and sustainably reduced TB in cattle from 2005 to  
354 2012.
- 355 b. Proactive badger culling in the treated areas did not significantly increase cattle TB in the  
356 surrounding areas.
- 357 c. Nine years of data were required after the first year of substantial culling to clearly

358 identify the full extent by which TB dropped when plotted against calendar year.

359

## 360 FUTURE WORK

361

362 This study looked at the impact of culling when results for all ten triplets were combined. The  
363 number of badgers removed per square kilometre over the complete cull period from 1998 to  
364 2005 ranged from 3.5 to 12.3 depending on triplet. These figures were calculated from data  
365 presented in the RBCT Final Report (Bourne, 2007). This is a large range. A current unknown in  
366 TB endemic areas, which makes it difficult to assess the effectiveness of badger culling in terms  
367 of TB control, is how sensitive TB control is to badger density. Specifically, what badger density  
368 needs to be reached before cattle measures in endemic areas start working as they currently do in  
369 cattle-dense regions of England, such as in Lancashire, where TB is not endemic? DEFRA has  
370 set itself an undertaking to reach TB free by 2035 (DEFRA, 2014a). Indeed TB is a zoonotic  
371 disease so DEFRA has a responsibility to control TB. Knowing the efficacy associated with  
372 reducing badger density in areas which are currently endemic will help to gauge what effort will  
373 be needed to achieve TB eradication.

374

375 Cull sample matching (CSM) performed in the 2013 culls raised hope that developments in  
376 technology subsequent to the RBCT have made it possible to make the results of a cause and  
377 effect study more meaningful. Indeed CSM is considered to be the most reliable way for  
378 determining the proportional reduction in a culled badger population (Independent Expert Panel,  
379 2014). Given that the number of culled animals is known, the size of that population can be  
380 easily calculated. However DEFRA saw reason to abandon CSM after 2013 (Page 7 of DEFRA,  
381 2014b). As of July 2016, CSM has not been used since.

382

383 Can some insight be still gained regarding efficacy? Perhaps, subject to certain assumptions,  
384 some evidence can be provided by studying data accrued in RBCT areas, broken down by cull  
385 triplet, or certain triplets combined.

386

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