

Quantifying the association of natal household wealth with women's early marriage in Nepal

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Background. Women's early marriage (<18 years) is a critical global health issue affecting 650 million women worldwide. It is associated with a range of adverse maternal physical and mental health outcomes, including early childbearing, child undernutrition and morbidity. Poverty is widely asserted to be the key risk factor driving early marriage. However, most studies do not measure wealth in the natal household, but instead, use marital household wealth as a proxy for natal wealth. Further research is required to understand the key drivers of early marriage.

Methods. We investigated whether natal household poverty was associated with marrying early, independently of women's lower educational attainment and broader markers of household disadvantage. Data on natal household wealth (material asset score) for 2,432 women aged 18-39 years was used from a cluster-randomized Low Birth Weight South Asia Trial in lowland rural Nepal. Different early marriage definitions (<15, <16, <17 and <18 years) were used because most of our population marries below the conventional 18-year cut-off. Logistic mixed-effects models were fitted to estimate the probabilities, derived from Adjusted Odds Ratios, of (a) marrying at different early ages for the full sample and for the uneducated women, and (b) being uneducated in the first place.

Results. Women married at median age 15 years (interquartile range 3), and only 18% married ≥ 18 years. Two-thirds of the women were entirely uneducated. We found that, rather than poverty, women's lower education was the primary factor associated with early marriage, regardless of how 'early' is defined. Neither poverty nor other markers of household disadvantage were associated with early marriage at any age in the uneducated women. However, poverty was the key driver of women being uneducated.

Conclusion. When assets are measured in the natal household in this population, there is no support for the conventional hypothesis that household poverty drives families to marry off their daughters early, but it does determine whether they go to school. Improving access to free education would both reduce early marriage and have broader benefits for maternal and child health and gender equality.

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22 Abstract

23

24 **Background.** Women's early marriage (<18 years) is a critical global health issue affecting 650
25 million women worldwide. It is associated with a range of adverse maternal physical and mental
26 health outcomes, including early childbearing, child undernutrition and morbidity. Poverty is
27 widely asserted to be the key risk factor driving early marriage. However, most studies do not
28 measure wealth in the natal household, but instead, use marital household wealth as a proxy for
29 natal wealth. Further research is required to understand the key drivers of early marriage.

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31 **Methods.** We investigated whether natal household poverty was associated with marrying early,
32 independently of women's lower educational attainment and broader markers of household
33 disadvantage. Data on natal household wealth (material asset score) for 2,432 women aged 18-39
34 years was used from a cluster-randomized Low Birth Weight South Asia Trial in lowland rural
35 Nepal. Different early marriage definitions (<15, <16, <17 and <18 years) were used because
36 most of our population marries below the conventional 18-year cut-off. Logistic mixed-effects
37 models were fitted to estimate the probabilities, derived from Adjusted Odds Ratios, of (a)
38 marrying at different early ages for the full sample and for the uneducated women, and (b) being
39 uneducated in the first place.

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41 **Results.** Women married at median age 15 years (interquartile range 3), and only 18% married
42 ≥ 18 years. Two-thirds of the women were entirely uneducated. We found that, rather than
43 poverty, women's lower education was the primary factor associated with early marriage,
44 regardless of how 'early' is defined. Neither poverty nor other markers of household
45 disadvantage were associated with early marriage at any age in the uneducated women.
46 However, poverty was the key driver of women being uneducated.

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48 **Conclusion.** When assets are measured in the natal household in this population, there is no
49 support for the conventional hypothesis that household poverty drives families to marry off their
50 daughters early, but it does determine whether they go to school. Improving access to free
51 education would both reduce early marriage and have broader benefits for maternal and child
52 health and gender equality.

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63 Introduction

64 Women's early reproduction is detrimental to both maternal and child health (Finlay, Özaltın &
65 Canning, 2011; Fall et al., 2016). However, in many societies, strong cultural norms mean that
66 the vast majority of women marry *before* having children. In such societies, early marriage is
67 therefore the gateway to early childbearing, and as it also has broader implications for women's
68 health, early marriage is a crucial global health issue in its own right (Marphatia, Amable &
69 Reid, 2017).

70
71 Globally, 20% of women aged 20-24 years marry or enter into a formal union before 18 years of
72 age (UNICEF, 2021). Among the specific penalties for women associated with early marriage
73 are less education, under-nutrition, lower access to contraception and healthcare, early
74 childbearing, and higher morbidity and mortality during pregnancy and labor (Godha, Hotchkiss
75 & Gage, 2013; Raj & Boehmer, 2013; Ganchimeg et al., 2014; Raj et al., 2014; Delprato et al.,
76 2015; Goli, Rammohan & Singh, 2015; Marphatia et al., 2021). However, these disadvantages
77 are likely to propagate adverse effects to the next generation (Bates, Maselko & Schuler, 2007;
78 Marphatia, Amable & Reid, 2017).

79
80 Universally, child or early marriage is defined using a cut-off of <18 years (UN General
81 Assembly, 2014, 2018). However, among the Maithili-speaking Madhesi population in Nepal,
82 where our study is based, most women marry well before this threshold, around a median
83 age of 16.5 years (MOHP, New ERA & ICF International, 2017). In this population, it would
84 therefore be more informative to investigate the factors associated with marrying at different
85 early marriage ages.

86
87 In most studies using the <18 years cut-off to define early marriage, natal household poverty is
88 widely suggested to drive women's early marriage across the global South, including in Nepal
89 (ICRW, 2006; Chaudhuri, 2015; Hodgkinson, 2016). However, most studies measure material
90 assets (as an index of wealth) in the marital household only *after* women have already married,
91 and then use this information as a proxy for the natal household's wealth (Raj et al., 2014;
92 Delprato et al., 2015; Wodon et al., 2017; Scott et al., 2021). This practice therefore relies on an
93 assumption that women are likely to marry into households of similar wealth as their natal
94 homes. Wealth of natal and marital households might indeed be correlated, but a severe shortage
95 of data on natal wealth means that there is little evidence for this assumption.

96
97 The wealth of the natal and marital households might therefore also be uncorrelated. For
98 example, some studies find that younger marriages (<15 years) may in part be driven by girls
99 wanting to marry into economically better off marital households as a way of escaping the
100 poverty of their natal home (Human Rights Watch, 2016). However, as wealth was measured
101 neither in the natal or marital household in this qualitative study, it is unclear whether the aims of
102 these families were achieved. Moreover, some poorer families are able to educate their daughters
103 to the secondary level, and this is then leveraged to marry them into more educated and wealthier
104 households (Fafchamps & Shilpi, 2011; Jackson, 2012; Boyden, 2013). We argue, therefore, that
105 using wealth of the marital household, where women end up after marriage, to represent wealth
106 of the natal household, where women came from prior to marriage, is inappropriate when
107 investigating the potential role of poverty in driving early marriage.

108

109 Attributing wealth to the correct household is crucial in this context, because it reflects not only
110 the family's socio-economic status but also its spatial niche. Collectively, these characteristics
111 are likely to shape the natal household's intentions around the timing of their daughter's
112 marriage. Misinterpreting the source of the natal household's interests (by using marital
113 household assets) therefore means that we have an inadequate understanding of how both wealth
114 and other related factors may be associated with early marriage.

115

116 Using data on natal households from a cluster-randomized trial in lowland rural Nepal, we
117 investigate the independent associations of natal household poverty, as well as other socio-
118 economic factors, with different age groupings of early marriage. We also investigate the
119 contribution of education to early marriage, and whether broader socio-economic factors are
120 associated with women being uneducated in the first place.

121

122 **What do we know about poverty's association with early marriage?**

123 Most studies which investigate the link between wealth and age at marriage have used marital
124 household assets as a proxy for the natal household's assets (wealth) without appropriate
125 supporting evidence for this assumption. Such studies relating to Nepal vary in whether the
126 poorest (Guragain et al., 2017), or the wealthiest (Aryal, 2007) have the highest risk of marrying
127 early. Other studies find an inconsistent relationship between wealth and marriage age (Raj et al.,
128 2014) or no relationship at all (Pandey, 2017).

129

130 Some studies have used household wealth data appropriately, but in two different ways. One
131 group of studies has described the proportion of women married <18 years stratified by marital
132 wealth quintiles without making an assumption that this also represents wealth in the natal
133 household. These studies consistently find that in both impoverished regions of the world,
134 including Nepal and more generally, the poorest marital household quintile have the largest
135 proportion of women married <18 years (ICRW, 2006; UNFPA, 2012; UNICEF & UNFPA,
136 2017; MacQuarrie & Juan, 2019). Fewer studies have first measured wealth in the natal
137 household itself, and then investigated if this is associated with the likelihood of women
138 marrying early (Muchomba, 2021). For Nepal, we could only find one such study, which
139 produced a less consistent pattern, where it was not the poorest, but the second poorest
140 households whose daughters were married earliest (Bajracharya and Amin 2012). Collectively,
141 these studies suggest that the relationship between poverty and early marriage is not as strong
142 when wealth is measured in natal households, and that using wealth in the marital household as a
143 proxy for wealth in the natal household may be inappropriate.

144

145 Many of the insights on how poverty may push girls into early marriage come from qualitative
146 literature, where household wealth is not measured or quantified. Nevertheless, such work does
147 offer valuable insights on subjective perspectives and decision-making around marriage. Several
148 studies from Nepal have identified a strong economic rationale for the natal household to marry
149 daughters at a young age, related to material poverty: specifically in relation to the costs of
150 caring (food, clothes) for daughters and paying for their education (Verma, Sinha & Khanna,
151 2013; Chaudhuri, 2015; Human Rights Watch, 2016; Samuels et al., 2017). Dowry (illegal, but
152 typically still paid from the natal to marital household) also tends to increase with age and
153 education level, and may provide an incentive for early marriage (Sah, 2012; Hodgkinson, 2016;
154 Human Rights Watch, 2016; Karim, Greene & Picard, 2016). Hence, in the poorest families,

155 girls may be perceived as economic burdens and thus the earlier they are married, the better the
156 natal household's economic welfare (Hodgkinson, 2016; Guragain et al., 2017). However, one
157 study from Nepal reporting both attitudinal and quantitative data found the primary drivers of
158 early marriage were family pressure, socio-cultural norms, less education and food insecurity;
159 income poverty was cited as a less important factor (Maharjan et al., 2012).

160 **Other markers of disadvantage and early marriage**

161 Beyond low material assets, other markers of disadvantage may also be associated with early
162 marriage. For example, education is a key factor associated with marriage age, and studies
163 generally find that girls' lower educational attainment (years of schooling completed) increases
164 their risk of marrying early (Raj et al., 2014; Delprato et al., 2015; Sekine & Hodgkin, 2017;
165 Marphatia et al., 2020; Scott et al., 2021). The association between poverty and early marriage
166 may therefore vary by girls' education level, and poverty may also contribute to whether girls are
167 educated in the first place because of the costs associated with schooling (e.g. fees, books,
168 uniforms, etc) (Verma, Sinha & Khanna, 2013; Chaudhuri, 2015; Samuels et al., 2017).

169
170 To understand the association between poverty and the timing of women's marriage, we also
171 need to consider other relevant socio-economic factors. In rural contexts, agrarian land-holding is
172 another relevant marker of household wealth (Fisher & Naidoo, 2016). Landlessness may
173 increase the risk of food insecurity, which in turn has been associated with both lower schooling
174 and earlier marriage (Moock & Leslie, 1986; UNICEF, 2014). Caste affiliation is also linked to
175 socio-economic status, with studies generally finding that girls from disadvantaged castes tend
176 to complete less education and also marry <18 years (Stash & Hannum, 2001; Sah, 2018;
177 Devkota, Eklund & Wagle, 2020). There is much less literature on the role of the natal
178 household's geographic location in relation to early marriage, but greater distance to school has
179 been found to be a key constraint to accessing education (Jamison & Lockheed, 1987; Ayril,
180 2014; Devkota & Upadhyay, 2015). Thus, if schooling is not a viable option, marrying daughters
181 early may alleviate household financial and food pressures (Maharjan et al., 2012; Human Rights
182 Watch, 2016; Samuels et al., 2017).

183
184 Socio-cultural norms are also likely to shape both the timing of marriage and the amount of
185 education girls are likely to complete. Bicchieri et al. (2014) define these normative social
186 preferences as 'moral rules' governing decision-making relating to women's life options,
187 whether they refer to marriage, chastity, education, employment, etc. Failing to conform to these
188 norms may adversely affect a girl's marital options and also her natal household's social standing
189 in the community (Caldwell, Reddy & Caldwell, 1983; Maertens, 2011, 2013). However, norms
190 can change over time. Several studies have suggested that secular changes in attitudes and
191 norms, coupled with widespread advocacy on minimum marriage age legislation, improvements
192 in household wealth, and increased girls' educational attainment are collectively likely to explain
193 the overall decrease in early marriage over the past ~15 years across South Asia (Raj, McDougal
194 & Rusch, 2012; Allendorf & Thornton, 2015; MacQuarrie & Juan, 2019; Prakash et al., 2020;
195 Scott et al., 2021).

196

197 **Study aim and hypotheses**

198 Our study aims to contribute new insights on the economic and social drivers of women's early
199 marriage and lack of education in low-income settings. Using objective data on wealth and
200 broader markers of disadvantage measured in the natal household on 2,432 women aged 18-39

201 years from lowland rural Nepal, we investigate whether natal household poverty is associated
202 with marrying early. We define ‘early marriage’ using several different age groupings, because
203 most women in our population marry well below the 18-year threshold (minimum legal age)
204 conventionally used to define early marriage. This is crucial because if we only use the 18-year
205 threshold, we might miss identifying what shapes variability in age at marriage as it is
206 experienced in this population.

207

208 Since two-thirds of our sample is entirely uneducated, we also investigate whether poverty is
209 associated with early marriage in uneducated women, and also whether poverty is associated
210 with women being uneducated in the first place. The uneducated women are interesting to
211 examine on their own because for them, education cannot confound the association between
212 wealth and marriage age. Our models adjust for age of women at marriage, to capture potential
213 cohort effects and examine secular changes in social norms over time. To ensure observed
214 associations between poverty and early marriage are not an artefact of related factors, we include
215 women’s education level as another key exposure, and also broader markers of socio-economic
216 disadvantage measured in women’s natal household: agrarian land-holding, geographic location
217 and caste affiliation.

218

219 We investigate four hypotheses:

- 220 (1) Natal household poverty is associated with marrying early, using different ages to define
221 this outcome: <15, <16, <17 and <18 years, in each case compared to marrying ≥ 18 years;
- 222 (2) Women’s lower educational attainment, independent of natal household poverty and
223 broader markers of socio-economic disadvantage, is associated with early marriage: <15,
224 <16, <17 and <18 years, in each case compared to marrying ≥ 18 years;
- 225 (3) Amongst uneducated women, poverty, independent of broader markers of socio-economic
226 disadvantage, is associated with early marriage at different ages; and
- 227 (4) Natal household poverty, independent of broader markers of socio-economic disadvantage,
228 is associated with women being uneducated.

229

230 **Materials & Methods**

231 Our study is based on data from the Low Birth Weight South Asia Trial (LBWSAT), which
232 assessed the impact of three pregnancy interventions on birth weight and infant growth (Saville
233 et al., 2018). The trial was conducted across 80 geographic clusters in Dhanusha and Mahottari
234 districts in Province 2 of the Terai region bordering Bihar state in India. Married pregnant
235 women were randomized to one of four intervention arms: Participatory Learning and Action
236 (PLA) behavior change intervention in Women’s Groups, PLA with unconditional cash transfers,
237 PLA with a fortified blended food supplement, or a control group accessing Government of
238 Nepal health services. Questionnaires were administered orally to 25,090 married pregnant
239 women aged 10-49 years in the home that they were residing in during pregnancy (Saville et al.,
240 2016).

241

242 Research ethics approval to conduct the trial was granted by the Nepal Health Research Council
243 (108/2012) and University College London (UCL) Research Ethics Committee (4198/001).
244 Village Development Committee secretaries consented for villages to participate in the trial.
245 Women gave written consent and guardians consented to the participation of married adolescents
246 <18 years of age. Further ethical approval for secondary analyses of LBWSAT data for this

247 analysis was granted from the Nepal Health Research Council (292/2018), the Research Ethics
248 Committees at UCL (0326/015) and the University of Cambridge (1016).

249
250 Marriages in the Maithili-speaking Madhesi population of our study are generally arranged by
251 parents or close relatives, with girls having little say over the timing and choice of spouse
252 (Maharjan & Sah, 2012; Clarke, 2013). In 2016, the Maithili-speaking Madhesi women had the
253 lowest median age at marriage (16.5 years) nationwide (MOHP, New ERA & ICF International,
254 2017; Pandey, 2017), and were more likely to be uneducated (Marphatia et al., 2020). These
255 factors, and gendered socio-cultural norms restricting women's physical mobility outside of the
256 home, mean that women typically have low levels of agency and decision-making power (Gram
257 et al., 2017; Harris-Fry et al., 2018; Morrison et al., 2018). The main livelihood of this
258 population is subsistence farming (rice, wheat, pulses), with the majority of households
259 purchasing some food items from local markets, or 'bazaars' (Saville, Manandhar & Wells,
260 2020).

261

262 **Data**

263 ***Outcome variables***

264 For our first outcome variable, women's 'early marriage,' we use several different age groupings
265 since the majority of our sample (87%) married below the UN stipulated minimum age of 18
266 years. In Nepal, the legal minimum age at marriage is 20 years, but marriage at 18 years is
267 possible with parental permission (His Majesty's Government of Nepal, 1963). To ensure
268 comparability across these results, the same reference group, marrying at the minimum age cut-
269 off of ≥ 18 years, is used irrespective of the age used to define early marriage. We examine the
270 factors associated with marrying < 15 years (hence excluding women who married between 15-18
271 years), < 16 years (hence excluding women who married between 16-18 years), < 17 years (hence
272 excluding women who married between 17-18 years), and < 18 years of age (includes the full
273 sample). In other words, each of the models above the < 15 years has the lower group nested
274 within it, but excludes the higher group up to 18 years. **Figure 1** illustrates our approach.

275

276 **Figure 1 here**

277

278 Our second outcome variable, women 'being uneducated,' is coded as any formal education (≥ 1
279 year) vs no education (0 years). We use this cut-off because two-thirds of our sample have never
280 been to school.

281

282 ***Exposures***

283 Our primary exposure is the score of assets measured in the women's natal household. The natal
284 household asset score is categorized in quintiles, from 1 (poorest) to 5 (richest). This assessment
285 of assets is widely used by national representative surveys, including in our study context
286 (MOHP, New ERA & ICF International, 2017). These assets represent relatively stable markers
287 of wealth, relating to the structure of the home or ownership of consumer goods that require
288 significant financial outlay. They are assumed already to exist before a daughter marries.
289 However, in contrast to the 12-asset score that has been used in previous studies on this
290 population (Saville et al., 2016; MOHP, New ERA & ICF International, 2017; Sah, 2018), we
291 use an 8-asset score. We exclude goods such as color television, motorbike, and computer
292 because they could have been acquired after the daughter had married, especially if there was a

293 long time-gap between marriage and when the assets were measured. We also exclude agrarian
294 land-holding from the score, because we want to investigate whether the association of land-
295 holding with women's early marriage and lack of education is independent of that of assets.
296

297 The score of assets was therefore constructed from eight variables using principal component
298 analysis (Vyas and Kumaranayake 2006). The first principal component had positive factor
299 loadings for all eight variables and accounted for 36.7% of the variability, compared to 13.2%
300 for the second principal component. Thus we used the first score as the marker of natal
301 household wealth. The eight variables contributing the highest factor loadings to the first
302 principal component, listed in order of decreasing size (weight shown in parenthesis), were: wall
303 (0.457), roofing (0.442) and flooring (0.423) materials, toilet facilities (0.412), number of rooms
304 used for sleeping in the house (0.317), access to electricity (0.242), drinking water source (0.227)
305 and non-biomass cooking fuel use (0.188).
306

307 Our second key exposure is women's educational attainment. Education is coded according to
308 the Nepalese education system: none, primary (1-5 years), lower-secondary (6-8 years) and
309 secondary or higher (≥ 9 years) (Ministry of Education Nepal, 2016).
310

311 We also include broader markers of household socio-economic disadvantage. Agrarian land-
312 holding is coded as none, 0.01 to 0.5, 0.51 to 0.99 and ≥ 1 hectare. Geographic location is
313 categorized by accessibility to large markets, known as 'bazaars,' using the normal form of
314 transport, quantified in terms of time (<30 minutes, 30-59 minutes, 60-89 minutes and ≥ 90
315 minutes). Large bazaars may be a proxy for access to broader social connections, resources,
316 larger health facilities and schools. Four groups describe caste affiliation: disadvantaged castes
317 are coded into two separate groups: Dalit and Muslim, middle combines Janjati and various
318 Madhesi castes, and advantaged combines Yadav and Brahmin. We do not include religion as the
319 disadvantaged caste variable already examines the Muslim faith separately, and all other groups
320 refer to the Hindu faith.
321

322 The women in our sample range from age 18 to age 39 years, and access to education and social
323 norms might have changed in the 20 years between the oldest and youngest growing up. We
324 therefore control for women's age to capture the ways in which secular changes in societal
325 norms may impact marriage age and education patterns.
326

327 **Statistical methods**

328 We first test for bias in the characteristics of women with assets measured in their natal versus
329 marital households use chi-squared tests (categorical variables) and non-parametric k -sample
330 analysis of variance (Kruskal-Wallis test; continuous variables). We also test for differences in
331 individual assets by asset quintile level using chi-squared tests (categorical variables) and
332 ANOVA (reporting the mean and standard deviation, SD). Given the skewed distribution of
333 women's age, we report the median (and interquartile range, IQR) values in completed integer
334 years. A heat table examines the distribution of women by education group and natal household
335 wealth quintiles. We use SPSS 26 to conduct these analyses (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY). Using R
336 library tidyverse and ggplot2, we created boxplots to stratify the association of women's
337 marriage age with their education by natal household asset quintiles (Wickham, 2016; Wickham
338 et al., 2019).

339

340 We fit logistic mixed-effects models with a random effect on the intercept accounting for within-
341 cluster variability. Models estimate the probabilities, derived from adjusted Odds Ratios (aORs)
342 with 95% Confidence Interval (CI) of women (a) marrying <15, <16 <17 and <18 years, and (b)
343 being uneducated. Models of the factors associated with being uneducated do not include
344 marriage age because it is not appropriate to use a factor which occurred at time B (marriage
345 age) to predict something earlier, at time A (never starting school). All of the models control for
346 women's age (potential cohort effect), which, when included together with their age at marriage
347 effectively accounts for the time-gap between when they married and their current age (when
348 they were recruited into the trial). Since our interest is in understanding whether poverty (defined
349 relative to the richest quintile) is associated with early marriage, the reference group is set as the
350 highest category across variables, hence: richest asset quintile, secondary education, agrarian
351 land-holding of ≥ 1 hectare and advantaged caste. Living near to the biggest bazaar (<30 minutes)
352 is set as the reference group because we assume it is a proxy for access to school and other
353 resources.

354 Models control for random effects (80 geographic clusters of the trial). We evaluate goodness-of-
355 fit using the Nakagawa-Schielezth marginal R^2 which measures the percentage of variance
356 explained by the model's fixed effects (Nakagawa & Schielzeth, 2013). Models are fitted using
357 the R library lme4 (Bates et al., 2014).

358

359 We adjust for trial arms because women from natal households were more likely to enroll in the
360 cash and food interventions. However, since the trial recruited already married and currently
361 pregnant women, interventions could not have influenced marriage age or education (which
362 typically is ended before/once women marry). Moreover, assets were measured before the trial
363 was conducted, so the cash supplementation arm could not have changed their value. As the trial
364 arm was not associated with our outcomes, we do not report the findings, although it is still
365 controlled for in our analyses.

366

367 We conduct a sensitivity analysis to examine if the association between poverty and our
368 outcomes change if we apply looser selection criteria, by including all of the women measured in
369 their natal household ($n=3,379$) regardless of their age. While this introduces the possibility of
370 distortion due to selection bias (as discussed above), it nevertheless allows us to test our
371 hypotheses with a much bigger sample of women.

372

373 Results

374 Sample selection

375 Married pregnant women were interviewed in the home in which they were residing at the time
376 of recruitment into the trial. Of the 25,090 women recruited into our study, we first exclude 408
377 women with multiple pregnancies during the trial to ensure they are not double counted in our
378 analysis. Second, of the remaining 24,682 women (raw data in **Data S1** contains this sample), we
379 exclude 3,968 women who had no data on the household in which assets were measured and a
380 further 17,335 women who were interviewed in their marital home. This leaves 3,379 women
381 whose assets and other characteristics were measured in their natal household.

382

383 Third, we exclude 947 women aged <18 years because the relationship between wealth,
384 education and marriage age may be distorted due to the selection bias of recruiting only married

385 pregnant women into our study. Excluding these younger women is important because they
386 would not have had the chance of marrying at older ages, nor adequate time to finish greater
387 levels of education before marrying. For example, a 15 year old married pregnant women never
388 had the chance to have married at any age over 15 years. Our analysis therefore includes 2,432
389 women aged 18-39 years measured in their natal households, representing 9.7% of the total
390 25,090 women recruited into the trial.

391

392 **Table S1** examines whether the characteristics of the women measured in their natal homes are
393 different to those measured in their marital homes. This enables us to identify potential bias in
394 our sample which may result in these two groups of women having a different relationship
395 between wealth and marriage age. A direct comparison between these women is not possible
396 because we do not know the socio-economic background of the natal households of the women
397 who were measured in their marital home.

398

399 In comparison to women who were measured in their marital home, those measured in their natal
400 homes were younger, had been married for less time, but at an older age. A greater proportion of
401 women measured in their natal households were from disadvantaged castes, residing further
402 away from big bazaars, and in the trial's cash and food supplementation arms. It is possible that
403 the trial may have incentivised women to return to their natal homes to access these incentives.
404 Women did not differ in their education level, age at first pregnancy, or household asset score.
405 Whilst these results show that women who went to their natal homes during pregnancy were
406 different than those who stayed in their marital homes, they still represent an important sub-
407 group of women with rare data on the socio-economic characteristics of their natal homes.

408

409 **Description of sample**

410 **Table 1** describes our sample of women aged 18-39 years. Women were of median age 21 years
411 (IQR 4) and had been married a median of 5 years (IQR 5). Marriage was typically early among
412 women (median 15 years, IQR 3), and 18% had married ≥ 18 years. Two-thirds of the women
413 were uneducated, 39% were from natal households without agrarian land and disadvantaged
414 castes respectively, and 29% lived far from large bazaars.

415

416

416 **Table 1 here**

417

418 The heat table shows the overall number of women by their education level and natal household
419 wealth quintiles (**Table 2**). Green shaded areas indicate low numbers and red shaded numbers
420 the highest numbers. Within the whole sample, uneducated women are most likely to come from
421 poorer natal households, and the more educated women are more likely to come from richer
422 households. However, since two-thirds of our sample is uneducated, there is nevertheless
423 variability by wealth.

424

425 **Figure 2** uses the raw data to stratify the association of women's marriage age with women's
426 education by natal household asset quintiles. Overall, within each wealth group, women with
427 more education marry later. How much education is associated with delayed marriage differs
428 slightly across wealth groups. Interestingly, even in the poorest and poor wealth groups, the
429 median age at marriage was 2 years later among women with ≥ 6 years of education than among
430 those with no or less education.

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432
433

Figure 2 here

434 **Hypothesis 1**

435 **Table 3** investigates the association of natal household score with the four marriage age groups.
436 Across Models 1-4, there is no evidence of a cohort effect, which may be explained by the
437 relatively narrow age range of our sample. Relative to the richest asset quintile, women from all
438 other asset quintiles have an elevated risk of early marriage, regardless of the age threshold used
439 to define ‘early’. However there is little consistent gradient between the coefficients of the
440 poorest four asset groups, indicating that the main difference in marriage age is between the
441 richest and the rest (this is confirmed by analyses using other asset groups as reference (not
442 shown). The variance in marriage age explained by the four models is very low: 5.0%, 3.2%,
443 2.8% and 2.1%. These results do not support our first hypothesis, that natal household poverty is
444 associated with the likelihood of marrying at different early ages.

445
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Table 3 here

448 **Hypothesis 2**

449 **Table 4** investigates the association of broader socio-economic factors with the likelihood of
450 marrying early as defined by the four different age thresholds. With the exception of Model 4,
451 age is not a significant factor associated with early marriage, indicating the absence of a cohort
452 effect. Model 4 shows that older women were less likely to marry <18 years than ≥ 18 years
453 which is perhaps surprising: we expected that further in the past (older women) prevailing norms
454 might have led to earlier marriage. It is only when education is controlled that this cohort effect
455 shows up, which suggests that this is connected to the difference in the availability of, and
456 attitudes towards, education over time. It is possible that this cohort effect emerges because in
457 the past, high levels of education were rarer, and that they were therefore more tightly associated
458 with delayed marriage than they are in more recent times, whereby education is more widely
459 available to the younger women in our sample.

460
461
462

463 Across Models 1-4, the asset score is no longer associated with early marriage when women’s
464 education is included. The effect of lower wealth appears therefore to be channelled through
465 women’s education, which is a better predictor of early marriage in this context. There is a clear
466 education gradient in the likelihood of marrying early, however ‘early’ is defined. Relative to
467 secondary education, all other education levels have an elevated risk of early marriage, with
468 uneducated women having a substantially greater risk. The magnitude of the effect of education
469 also decreases with each later age at marriage suggesting that education tends to increase with
470 age, but assets don’t. Neither land, caste nor geographic location are associated with any of the
471 marriage age models when women’s education is controlled.

472
473
474

475 Compared to **Table 3**, these Models are almost three times better at explaining the variance
476 across the four marriage age groups: 23.5%, 16.4%, 13.1% and 10.6%. These results support our
477 second hypothesis, that women’s lower educational attainment, independent of natal household
478 poverty and broader markers of socio-economic disadvantage, is associated with early marriage,
479 whatever the age threshold used to define ‘early’.

476
477

Table 4 here

478

479 Hypothesis 3: only the uneducated women

480 Hypothesis 3 investigated whether amongst only the uneducated women ($n=1,610$), poverty,
481 independent of broader markers of socio-economic disadvantage, is associated with early
482 marriage at different ages. Results show no cohort effect, nor any association with wealth (**Table**
483 **5** Models 1-4), suggesting that the uneducated women who marry early are not systematically
484 more or less wealthy compared to those marrying >18 years. There is also no association
485 between broader socio-economic factors and early marriage, whatever age threshold is used to
486 define early marriage (**Table 6** Models 1-4).

487

488

Tables 5 & 6 here

489

490 In **Table 5**, Models explain 6.2%, 5.4%, 5.0% and 5.0% of the variance in women marrying <15 ,
491 <16 , <17 years and <18 years respectively. In **Table 6**, Models explain slightly more of the
492 variance in early marriage across the age groups 7.1%, 6.6%, 5.8% and 6.0%. In comparison to
493 Models in **Table 4** with all educational levels, these models of only the uneducated women
494 explain less variance, and the absence of women's education (as we focus on only the
495 uneducated women) in these models is likely to explain this difference. These results do not
496 support our third hypothesis, that for only the uneducated women, poverty, independent of
497 broader markers of socio-economic disadvantage, is associated with early marriage at different
498 ages.

499

500

501 Hypothesis 4

502 Hypothesis 4 investigated whether poverty, independent of broader socio-economic factors, is
503 associated with women being uneducated. Across the two Models in **Table 7**, older women are
504 more likely to be uneducated, reflecting the increase in the availability and acceptability of
505 education for girls over the twenty year period during which our sample was maturing.
506 Model 1 shows a clear wealth gradient in the likelihood of being uneducated. Relative to the
507 richest quintile, all other asset quintiles have elevated risk of being uneducated, with the poorest
508 quintile having a substantially greater risk. Model 2 finds a similar pattern after inclusion of
509 broader socio-economic factors. In comparison to Model 1, the magnitude of the effect of the
510 first wealth quintile is weaker, that of the mid quintile only slightly weaker, and unchanged in the
511 two richest quintiles. Relative to higher agrarian land-holding, both none and some land-holding
512 are associated with being uneducated. Relative to advantaged caste, the two disadvantaged castes
513 are associated with being uneducated, with the risk substantially greater for the Muslim caste.
514 Relative to living near a big bazaar, living 30-59 minutes away, but not further distances, was
515 marginally associated with being uneducated.

516

517 Model 1 explains 21.0% of the variance in women's education, which is lower than Model 2,
518 which explains 36.3% of the variance. These results support our fourth hypothesis, that poverty,
519 independent of broader socio-economic factors, is associated with women being uneducated.

520

521

Table 7 here

522

523 Supplementary analysis

524 A potential reason why poverty may not be associated with women's early marriage irrespective
525 of the age group, could be that the individual assets owned by households do not actually differ
526 between the wealth quintiles. **Table S2** shows, however, there is substantial variability across the
527 eight individual assets used to produce our composite asset score using PCA. We also include
528 land-holding in this analysis because it is another marker of wealth in our primarily agrarian
529 population. These individual assets and land ownership matters for daily life and indicates the
530 household's purchasing power. Our results show that asset ownership does indeed differ by
531 wealth levels, nevertheless our analyses described above show that wealth in itself is not
532 associated with women's early marriage in this population.

533

534 Given the selection bias in our study of recruiting young, already married and pregnant women,
535 we restricted the analyses described above to women aged ≥ 18 years only. With the exception of
536 the association of age, our results are nonetheless similar if we include the full sample of women
537 aged 12-39 years (**Tables S3-S7**). The significance of the age variable in these models is a
538 product of the selection effects (as discussed above), and not a cohort effect.

539

540 Discussion

541 Our results show that if we measure assets in the natal household, then we do not support the
542 conventional hypothesis that household poverty directly drives families to marry off their
543 daughters early. In our population, relative to the richest households, all other asset levels have
544 an elevated risk of marrying early, and the poorest group does not stand out. Moreover, when
545 women's education is also included, it displaces wealth as a predictor of early marriage,
546 whatever age is used in the definition of early marriage. The association of high wealth with
547 reduced risk of early marriage therefore works through education, and more generally it is
548 education level that is directly related to women's marriage age in this population. Additional
549 analysis showed substantial variability in individual assets and land-holding by asset quintiles,
550 but that wealth in itself is not directly associated with women's early marriage in this population.

551

552 Relative to secondary education, all other education categories are at risk of marrying early,
553 however there is also a clear gradient, with uneducated women showing the greatest likelihood
554 of early marriage. Even in combination, however, household wealth and women's educational
555 attainment still explain a low proportion of the variance in the likelihood of early marriage
556 models, suggesting that other factors largely drive marriage decisions in this population. Among
557 uneducated women, neither poverty, nor broader markers of household disadvantage are
558 associated with early marriage, however 'early' is defined. Our analyses of uneducated women
559 offer even stronger support for the hypothesis that socio-cultural norms may be the primary
560 driver of early marriage. For example, as they are not in school, their primary role in society may
561 be to be a wife and mother. However, the differences in the age of marriage within uneducated
562 women may also relate to other factors unmeasured by our study.

563

564 Where poverty appears to really matter is for the level of education achieved by women,
565 potentially because of the costs associated with schooling. Independently of poverty, both
566 landless and lower agrarian land-holding families are also less likely to send their daughters to
567 school: the lack of land may reflect chronic food insecurity, whereas households with some land
568 may prefer daughters to contribute to family income through working on the farm, rather than
569 attending school.

570

571 Like other studies, we also find that disadvantaged castes, especially of the Muslim faith, tend to
572 have lower education (Stash & Hannum, 2001; Sah, 2018; Devkota, Eklund & Wagle, 2020), but
573 this factor was not associated with early marriage. Caste affiliation may be a maker of overall
574 status in society, and therefore act as another marker of access to resources and life
575 opportunities. We find no evidence of geographic location mattering for early marriage, and
576 there was no clear relationship between distance from bazaar and lack of education.

577

578 **Conclusion**

579 Our study is unique in having objective data on assets and broader markers of disadvantage
580 measured in the natal household. These data enable us to conduct robust and appropriate
581 investigations of the association of natal household wealth with early marriage, using different
582 age thresholds to define 'early'. We also investigate the association of education with the
583 likelihood of early marriage, and whether poverty is the key driver of early marriage in
584 uneducated women who comprise two-thirds of our sample. Finally, we investigate whether
585 poverty is associated with the likelihood of women having no formal education. Whilst we do
586 not find that natal household poverty predicted early marriage in rural lowland Nepal, further
587 research is required in other populations to establish whether this association is apparent more
588 generally.

589

590 Our results have implications for research, policy and practice. First, there is an urgent need for
591 better and more appropriate objective data measuring wealth in women's natal households,
592 ideally before they marry, and also in women's marital households, at marriage. This will
593 provide much needed evidence on whether women marry into households of similar wealth
594 levels, and whether natal household poverty is indeed associated with the likelihood of early
595 marriage.

596 These data-related issues, and in particular the inadequate understanding of the association of
597 wealth and marriage age, may partly explain the inconsistent results of interventions targeting
598 poverty as the main driver of early marriage. A recent systematic review found conditional cash
599 transfers (CCTs) to keep girls in school were more effective in delaying marriage than those
600 directly targeting delayed marriage or poverty (Malhotra & Elnakib, 2021). In Bangladesh, CCTs
601 keeping girls in school for longer delayed marriage, but only for younger girls (aged 12-14 years)
602 living in the poorest district (Amin, 2007). In India, CCTs kept girls in school up to grade 8, but
603 did not delay their marriage (compared to a control group); girls were in fact more likely to
604 marry just after the 18 year cut-off stipulated by the intervention, when parents received cash
605 transfers (Nanda et al., 2015). In both interventions, cash was primarily used to pay the higher
606 cost of dowries demanded by marital households for older, more educated girls (Amin, 2007;
607 Nanda et al., 2015).

608

609 Second, we need to better understand the different factors increasing the risk of marrying at
610 different ages, for women of different education levels. Reducing the costs of schooling (e.g.
611 fees, learning materials, offering scholarships) and improving the quality of education may help
612 girls to stay in school for longer and also delay marriage, thereby achieving several of the
613 Sustainable Development Goals (Muchomba, 2021). The question however is whether cash
614 transfers conditional on girls staying in school for longer or the expansion of free state provision
615 of education would have a sustained impact on delaying marriage. However, any school-based

616 efforts will miss the girls who never went to school in the first place or have already dropped out
617 and married.

618
619 Third, there needs to be a collective shift in societal gendered norms and the value attributed to
620 girls and women in society (Maertens, 2013; Bicchieri, Jiang & Lindemans, 2014; Marphatia,
621 Amable & Reid, 2017). Changing norms is difficult and slow, as shown by social interventions
622 that did not succeed in delaying marriage age in India (Prakash et al., 2019; Ramanaik et al.,
623 2020). Moreover, in a population like our study where women marry very early, at the modal age
624 of 15 years, it may initially be more realistic to delay marriage to 16 years. ‘Nudging’
625 populations towards a slightly later marriage age for women may therefore lead to more
626 substantial secular changes over time. Whilst this may sit uncomfortably with the human rights
627 constituencies advocating for the 18-year minimum marriage age, ignoring these practiced norms
628 may render us even further from the common goal of delaying marriage overall (Schaffnit,
629 Urassa & Lawson, 2019). Delaying marriage, even by one year, will inevitably delay the age at
630 first child bearing. Early marriage must therefore be seen as a critical concern for public health
631 (Marphatia, Amable & Reid, 2017).

632 633 **Limitations**

634 Our study has some limitations. With cross-sectional data, we can only investigate associations
635 and not causality. Although we include education in early marriage models, like other studies,
636 we do not know the direction of this association. Our study involved only married pregnant
637 women and we found that women measured in their natal homes during pregnancy differed from
638 those who remain in their marital homes. Our asset score was measured in the natal household
639 after, and not at, marriage. To address this, our asset score excluded items which could have been
640 purchased after marriage. Despite these limitations, the associations between poverty, education
641 and marriage age, and poverty and lack of education identified in our study are likely to be
642 widely applicable, especially to similar Madhesi populations living around the bordering regions
643 of India and Nepal. Our study also benefited from a large sample size and the unique data on
644 several different socio-economic variables as well as women's education.

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649 (MIRA, Nepal) staff for data collection, and the UCL Institute for Global Health
650 team for their support (see Saville et al., 2018 for details).

651 **Data availability statement**

652 Raw data are available for the purposes of replicating the results in this paper (**Data S1**). Contact
653 Dr Naomi Saville at n.saville@ucl.ac.uk for further information.

654

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- 912

Figure 1

Early marriage groups used in analysis

Our first outcome variable, women's 'early marriage,' uses four different age groupings, described as Scenarios A, B, C and D in the Figure. To ensure comparability across these results, the same reference group, marrying at the minimum age cut-off of ≥ 18 years, is used irrespective of the age used to define early marriage. Each of the scenarios above the <15 years has the lower group nested within it, but excludes the higher group up to 18 years.

Scenario A: we predict being married $<15y$, compared to those $\geq 18y$

Scenario B: we predict being married $<16y$, compared to those $\geq 18y$

Scenario C: we predict being married $<17y$, compared to those $\geq 18y$

Scenario D: we predict being married $<18y$, compared to those $\geq 18y$




Figure 2

Association of women's marriage age and their education level stratified by natal household asset score

This figure uses the raw data to stratify the association of women's marriage age with women's education by natal household asset quintiles.




Table 1 (on next page)

Description of sample

	Traits measured in women's natal household (n=2,432)	
	Median	IQR
Women's age (y)	21	4
Women's age at marriage (y)	15	3
Time since marriage (y)	5	5
	Frequency	%
Trial intervention arm		
Control	429	17.6
Women's Group	446	18.3
Women's Group with cash transfer	793	32.6
Women's Group with food supplement	764	31.4
Women's age at marriage (y)		
<15 years	666	27.4
15 years	574	23.6
16 years	356	14.6
17 years	408	16.8
≥18 years	428	17.6
Women's education level (y)		
None	1610	66.2
Primary (1-5 years)	244	10.0
Lower-secondary (6-8 years)	196	8.1
Secondary or higher (≥9 years)	382	15.7
Natal household asset score (quintiles)		
1: poorest	525	21.6
2: poor	484	19.9
3: middle	528	21.7
4: rich	465	19.1
5: richest	430	17.7
Natal household agrarian land-holding		
None	951	39.1
0.01 to 0.5 hectares	750	30.8
0.51 to 0.99 hectares	344	14.1
≥1 hectare	387	15.9
Natal household access to big bazaar		
<30 minutes	798	32.8
30-59 minutes	934	38.4
60-89 minutes	472	19.4
≥90 minutes	228	9.4
Natal household caste affiliation		
Disadvantaged: Dalit	494	20.3
Disadvantaged: Muslim	468	19.2
Middle: Janjati, Terai castes	927	38.1
Advantaged: Yadav, Brahmin	543	22.3

1 **Table 1.** Description of sample

2 IQR, Interquartile Range.

3

Table 2 (on next page)

Heat map of women's educational attainment by natal household wealth

The heat table shows the overall number of women by their education level and natal household wealth quintiles. Green shaded areas indicate low numbers and red shaded numbers the highest numbers.

1 **Table 2.** Heat map of women's educational attainment by natal household wealth

2

Women's education (y)	Natal household asset quintiles					Total row
	Poorest	2nd Poorest	Mid-level	2nd Richest	Richest	
None	464	351	356	255	184	1,610
Primary (1-5 years)	27	50	61	56	50	244
Lower-secondary (6-8 years)	20	38	41	59	38	196
Secondary/higher (≥ 9 years)	14	45	70	95	158	382
Total column	525	484	528	465	430	2,432

3

4

Table 3 (on next page)

Hypothesis 1: Associations of natal household asset score with marrying early

1 **Table 3.** Hypothesis 1: Associations of natal household asset score with marrying early

	Model 1: Marrying <15 years <i>n</i> =1,094 ¹ <i>R</i> ² =0.050		Model 2: Marrying <16 years <i>n</i> =1,668 ² <i>R</i> ² =0.032		Model 3: Marrying <17 years <i>n</i> =2,024 ³ <i>R</i> ² =0.028		Model 4: Marrying <18 years <i>n</i> =2,432 ⁴ <i>R</i> ² =0.021	
	aOR (95% CI)	<i>p</i>-value						
Women's age (y)	1.02 (0.97, 1.06)	0.485	1.01 (0.97, 1.05)	0.556	0.99 (0.96, 1.03)	0.646	0.98 (0.95, 1.01)	0.178
Asset score								
Poorest	2.98 (1.90, 4.67)	0.001	2.44 (1.67, 3.58)	0.001	2.26 (1.58, 3.24)	0.011	1.93 (1.37, 2.72)	0.001
2 nd poorest	2.39 (1.53, 3.71)	0.001	1.68 (1.16, 2.44)	0.007	1.57 (1.11, 2.23)	0.002	1.41 (1.01, 1.97)	0.043
Mid	2.12 (1.35, 3.31)	0.001	1.83 (1.26, 2.66)	0.001	1.74 (1.23, 2.47)	0.001	1.52 (1.09, 2.12)	0.013
2 nd richest	2.34 (1.49, 3.69)	0.001	1.93 (1.31, 2.83)	0.001	1.90 (1.32, 2.73)	0.001	1.72 (1.22, 2.43)	0.002
Richest (ref)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Intercept	0.52	0.286	1.46	0.462	3.11	0.017	6.00	0.001

2 Models include fixed and random effects estimates for geographic clusters and control for trial arm. As associations of trial arm with early marriage across the
3 age groupings were not statistically significant, they are not reported in Tables. aOR, Adjusted Odds Ratio. CI, 95% Confidence Interval. ¹*n*=428 married ≥18y
4 vs *n*=666 married <15y. ²*n*=428 married ≥18y vs *n*=1,240 married <16y. ³*n*=428 married ≥18y vs *n*=1,596 married <17y. ⁴*n*=428 married ≥18y vs *n*=2,004
5 married <18y.

Table 4(on next page)

Hypothesis 2: Broader socio-economic factors associated with women marrying early

1 **Table 4.** Hypothesis 2: Broader socio-economic factors associated with women marrying early

	Model 1: Marrying <15 years <i>n</i> =1,094 ¹ <i>R</i> ² =0.235		Model 2: Marrying <16 years <i>n</i> =1,668 ² <i>R</i> ² =0.164		Model 3: Marrying <17 years <i>n</i> =2,024 ³ <i>R</i> ² =0.131		Model 4: Marrying <18 years <i>n</i> =2,432 ⁴ <i>R</i> ² =0.106	
	aOR (95% CI)	<i>p</i> -value						
Women's age (y)	0.99 (0.94, 1.04)	0.670	0.98 (0.94, 1.02)	0.401	0.96 (0.93, 1.00)	0.047	0.95 (0.91, 0.98)	0.003
Asset score								
Poorest	1.04 (0.58, 1.85)	0.902	0.90 (0.55, 1.44)	0.651	0.98 (0.63, 1.53)	0.936	0.92 (0.60, 1.39)	0.675
2 nd poorest	1.02 (0.59, 1.74)	0.949	0.74 (0.47, 1.15)	0.183	0.82 (0.55, 1.23)	0.340	0.79 (0.54, 1.16)	0.233
Mid	0.95 (0.56, 1.63)	0.863	0.91 (0.59, 1.40)	0.659	1.01 (0.68, 1.50)	0.949	0.94 (0.65, 1.37)	0.763
2 nd richest	1.61 (0.94, 2.75)	0.083	1.31 (0.84, 2.02)	0.232	1.47 (1.00, 2.21)	0.050	1.31 (0.90, 1.89)	0.675
Richest (ref)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Women's education								
None	18.42 (10.60, 32.03)	0.001	11.51 (7.66, 17.28)	0.001	7.55 (5.58, 11.47)	0.001	5.65 (4.07, 7.55)	0.001
Primary (1-5y)	11.72 (6.06, 22.68)	0.001	7.21 (4.30, 12.09)	0.001	4.83 (3.17, 8.08)	0.001	3.81 (2.46, 5.71)	0.001
Lower-secondary (6-8y)	5.23 (2.56, 10.66)	0.001	4.56 (2.64, 7.88)	0.001	3.80 (2.43, 6.44)	0.001	3.43 (2.18, 5.26)	0.001
Secondary/higher (≥9) (ref)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Agrarian land								
None	1.05 (0.61, 1.79)	0.866	1.06 (0.68, 1.65)	0.793	0.96 (0.64, 1.43)	0.823	0.98 (0.67, 1.44)	0.927
0.01 to 0.5 hectares	1.36 (0.81, 2.26)	0.242	1.42 (0.93, 2.15)	0.104	1.25 (0.86, 1.85)	0.244	1.32 (0.92, 1.89)	0.136
0.51 to 0.99 hectares	0.96 (0.55, 1.69)	0.895	1.08 (0.68, 1.70)	0.746	1.09 (0.74, 1.65)	0.683	1.09 (0.74, 1.60)	0.671
≥1 hectare (ref)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Access to big bazaar								
<30 min (ref)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
30-59 minutes	1.09 (0.71, 1.68)	0.682	1.15 (0.81, 2.01)	0.442	0.89 (0.74, 1.44)	0.839	1.09 (0.80, 1.48)	0.605
60-89 minutes	1.11 (0.66, 1.87)	0.702	1.17 (0.76, 1.64)	0.471	1.01 (0.68, 1.51)	0.953	1.01 (0.70, 1.46)	0.967
≥90 minutes	1.32 (0.69, 2.53)	0.409	1.14 (0.65, 1.80)	0.649	1.03 (0.53, 1.52)	0.691	1.03 (0.63, 1.68)	0.913
Caste								
Disadvantaged: Dalit	0.98 (0.56, 1.71)	0.931	1.12 (0.71, 1.78)	0.621	1.18 (0.78, 1.83)	0.425	1.20 (0.80, 1.79)	0.376
Disadvantaged: Muslim	1.01 (0.59, 1.71)	0.984	0.99 (0.63, 1.55)	0.952	1.01 (0.67, 1.55)	0.945	1.03 (0.69, 1.53)	0.883
Middle: Janjati, Terai castes	0.99 (0.63, 1.54)	0.953	1.13 (0.78, 1.62)	0.521	1.12 (0.81, 1.58)	0.466	1.09 (0.80, 1.49)	0.577
Advantaged: Yadav, Brahmin (ref)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Intercept	0.14	0.007	0.55	0.316	1.63	0.363	4.01	0.005

- 2 Models include fixed and random effects estimates for geographic clusters and control for trial arm. aOR, Adjusted Odds Ratio. CI, 95% Confidence Interval.
- 3 ¹ $n=428$ married $\geq 18y$ vs $n=666$ married $<15y$. ² $n=428$ married $\geq 18y$ vs $n=1,240$ married $<16y$. ³ $n=428$ married $\geq 18y$ vs $n=1,596$ married $<17y$. ⁴ $n=428$ married
- 4 $\geq 18y$ vs $n=2,004$ married $<18y$.

Table 5 (on next page)

Hypothesis 3: Associations of natal household asset score and marrying early in uneducated women

1 **Table 5.** Hypothesis 3: Associations of natal household asset score and marrying early in uneducated women

	Model 1: Marrying <15 years <i>n</i> =736 ¹ <i>R</i> ² =0.062		Model 2: Marrying <16 years <i>n</i> =1,156 ² <i>R</i> ² =0.054		Model 3: Marrying <17 years <i>n</i> =1,376 ³ <i>R</i> ² =0.050		Model 4: Marrying <18 years <i>n</i> =1,610 ⁴ <i>R</i> ² =0.050	
	aOR (95% CI)	<i>p</i>-value	aOR (95% CI)	<i>p</i>-value	aOR (95% CI)	<i>p</i>-value	aOR (95% CI)	<i>p</i>-value
Women's age (y)	0.99 (0.94, 1.06)	0.951	1.00 (0.95, 1.05)	0.923	0.98 (0.94, 1.03)	0.473	0.98 (0.93, 1.02)	0.316
Asset score								
Poorest	0.89 (0.46, 1.72)	0.733	0.87 (0.48, 1.57)	0.634	0.91 (0.52, 1.61)	0.757	0.82 (0.48, 1.41)	0.470
2 nd poorest	0.83 (0.43, 1.62)	0.590	0.69 (0.37, 1.27)	0.231	0.70 (0.39, 1.25)	0.228	0.67 (0.38, 1.16)	0.155
Mid	0.87 (0.44, 1.71)	0.679	0.83 (0.45, 1.54)	0.560	0.83 (0.46, 1.50)	0.544	0.75 (0.43, 1.32)	0.319
2 nd richest	1.71 (0.80, 3.65)	0.168	1.53 (0.76, 3.11)	0.235	1.48 (0.75, 2.93)	0.258	1.48 (0.77, 2.84)	0.241
Richest (ref)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Intercept	3.28	0.133	7.14	0.006	12.28	0.001	17.30	0.001

2 Models include fixed and random effects estimates for geographic clusters and control for trial arm. aOR, Adjusted Odds Ratio. CI, 95% Confidence Interval.

3 ¹*n*=206 married ≥18y vs *n*=530 married <15y. ²*n*=206 married ≥18y vs *n*=950 married <16y. ³*n*=206 married ≥18y vs *n*=1,170 married <17y. ⁴*n*=206 married4 ≥18y vs *n*=1,404 married <18y.

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Table 6 (on next page)

Hypothesis 3: Broader socio-economic factors associated with women marrying early in uneducated women

1 **Table 6.** Hypothesis 3: Broader socio-economic factors associated with women marrying early in uneducated women

	Model 1: Marrying <15 years <i>n</i> =736 ¹ <i>R</i> ² =0.071		Model 2: Marrying <16 years <i>n</i> =1,156 ² <i>R</i> ² =0.066		Model 3: Marrying <17 years <i>n</i> =1,376 ³ <i>R</i> ² =0.058		Model 4: Marrying <18 years <i>n</i> =1,610 ⁴ <i>R</i> ² =0.060	
	aOR (95% CI)	<i>p</i> -value	aOR (95% CI)	<i>p</i> -value	aOR (95% CI)	<i>p</i> -value	aOR (95% CI)	<i>p</i> -value
Women's age (y)	1.00 (0.95, 1.06)	0.959	1.00 (0.95, 1.05)	0.995	0.98 (0.94, 1.03)	0.481	0.98 (0.93, 1.02)	0.338
Asset score								
Poorest	0.75 (0.36, 1.57)	0.449	0.78 (0.40, 1.49)	0.446	0.86 (0.46, 1.61)	0.639	0.78 (0.43, 1.40)	0.400
2 nd poorest	0.74 (0.37, 1.50)	0.402	0.63 (0.33, 1.20)	0.163	0.65 (0.35, 1.20)	0.172	0.62 (0.35, 1.12)	0.115
Mid	0.79 (0.39, 1.59)	0.503	0.77 (0.41, 1.46)	0.432	0.79 (0.43, 1.45)	0.440	0.72 (0.40, 1.28)	0.260
2 nd richest	1.56 (0.72, 3.38)	0.262	1.45 (0.71, 2.96)	0.311	1.41 (0.71, 2.82)	0.325	1.43 (0.74, 2.77)	0.287
Richest (ref)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Agrarian land								
None	1.41 (0.72, 2.78)	0.315	1.24 (0.69, 2.25)	0.476	1.16 (0.66, 2.06)	0.610	1.26 (0.73, 2.18)	0.402
0.01 to 0.5 hectares	1.59 (0.81, 3.11)	0.179	1.48 (0.82, 2.68)	0.196	1.46 (0.82, 2.59)	0.201	1.67 (0.97, 2.89)	0.066
0.51 to 0.99 hectares	1.21 (0.55, 2.67)	0.634	1.18 (0.58, 2.39)	0.646	1.18 (0.60, 2.31)	0.639	1.32 (0.69, 2.53)	0.395
≥1 hectare (ref)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Access to big bazaar								
<30 min (ref)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
30-59 minutes	0.94 (0.56, 1.57)	0.810	0.91 (0.57, 1.44)	0.687	0.89 (0.57, 1.38)	0.597	0.92 (0.61, 1.41)	0.715
60-89 minutes	1.10 (0.58, 2.09)	0.777	1.35 (0.76, 2.43)	0.308	1.19 (0.68, 2.07)	0.536	1.18 (0.70, 2.00)	0.536
≥90 minutes	1.47 (0.67, 3.22)	0.331	1.29 (0.61, 2.70)	0.506	1.09 (0.54, 2.21)	0.803	1.10 (0.56, 2.14)	0.790
Caste								
Disadvantaged: Dalit	1.09 (0.54, 2.20)	0.800	1.03 (0.56, 1.89)	0.933	1.01 (0.56, 1.82)	0.972	1.07 (0.61, 1.88)	0.813
Disadvantaged: Muslim	0.96 (0.50, 1.82)	0.890	0.85 (0.48, 1.51)	0.576	0.87 (0.50, 1.50)	0.610	0.88 (0.52, 1.49)	0.642
Middle: Janjati, Terai castes	0.96 (0.53, 1.74)	0.904	1.00 (0.59, 1.69)	0.996	1.00 (0.60, 1.66)	0.996	0.96 (0.59, 1.56)	0.865
Advantaged: Yadav, Brahmin (ref)	1.00		1.00		1.00		1.00	
Intercept	2.27	0.354	5.62	0.032	10.95	0.002	13.49	0.001

2 Models include fixed and random effects estimates for geographic clusters and control for trial arm. aOR, Adjusted Odds Ratio. CI, 95% Confidence Interval.

3 ¹*n*=206 married ≥18y vs *n*=530 married <15y. ²*n*=206 married ≥18y vs *n*=950 married <16y. ³*n*=206 married ≥18y vs *n*=1,170 married <17y. ⁴*n*=206 married4 ≥18y vs *n*=1,404 married <18y.

Table 7 (on next page)

Hypothesis 4: Broader socio-economic factors associated with women being uneducated

1 **Table 7.** Hypothesis 4: Broader socio-economic factors associated with women being
 2 uneducated

	Model 1: Natal household asset score <i>n</i> =2,432 ¹ <i>R</i> ² =0.210		Model 2: Broader socio-economic factors <i>n</i> =2,432 ¹ <i>R</i> ² =0.363	
	OR (95% CI)	<i>p</i>-value	aOR (95% CI)	<i>p</i>-value
Women's age (y)	1.16 (1.12, 1.20)	0.001	1.18 (1.14, 1.22)	0.001
Asset score	1.00		1.00	
Poorest	11.84 (8.36, 16.76)	0.001	8.77 (5.96, 12.91)	0.001
2 nd poorest	4.01 (2.97, 5.40)	0.001	3.59 (2.58, 4.99)	0.001
Mid	3.18 (2.39, 4.23)	0.001	3.16 (2.30, 4.33)	0.001
2 nd richest	1.68 (1.27, 2.22)	0.001	1.67 (1.23, 2.28)	0.001
Richest (ref)			1.00	
Agrarian land				
None			2.99 (2.15, 4.18)	0.001
0.01 to 0.5 hectares			1.79 (1.33, 2.42)	0.001
0.51 to 0.99 hectares			1.17 (0.84, 1.63)	0.350
≥1 hectare (ref)			1.00	
Access to big bazaar				
<30 min (ref)			1.00	
30-59 minutes			1.18 (0.90, 1.55)	0.220
60-89 minutes			1.16 (0.83, 1.61)	0.383
≥90 minutes			1.62 (1.05, 2.52)	0.030
Caste				
Disadvantaged: Dalit			1.67 (1.18, 2.35)	0.004
Disadvantaged: Muslim			7.12 (4.83, 10.49)	0.001
Middle: Janjati, Terai castes			0.99 (0.76, 1.29)	0.923
Advantaged: Yadav, Brahmin (ref)			1.00	
Intercept	0.04	0.001	0.01	0.001

3 Models include fixed and random effects estimates for geographic clusters and control for trial arm. aOR, Adjusted
 4 Odds Ratio. CI, 95% Confidence Interval. ¹*n*=1822 educated (≥1y schooling) vs *n*=1,610 uneducated.
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